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Post by Deleted on Feb 25, 2009 21:29:27 GMT -5
... he misread their probable courses of action. That they would not just attempt to cover the villages retreat (which all expected...nobody thought they would "just run"...they knew the Warriors would attempt a rear guard action if given time to create one), but more than that, they aggressively attacked his columns in force. Clair-- I think on the one hand you are not giving GAC enough credit, yet on the other, you are ascribing faults or shortcomings where he doesn't deserve the criticism. While you and I seem to be in general agreement, I think I may need to fine-tune my case a little here. When Gerard's report to Cooke reached Custer, I do not believe Custer was as surprised as he was disappointed. What they were seeing in the valley was not something unusual. In fact, Custer pulled back from the more advanced stages of just such an Indian demonstration at the Washita, so for the Indians to stand by their numbers was not entirely unusual. What was unusual, was that they would come after the troops, not just stand there threatening until the outnumbered cavalry would move away. The steadfastness didn't surprise Custer; the aggressiveness did. Now he was not even so concerned with this "most dangerous action," because they'd tried it on him before, and failed. He would assume that any of his battalions could hold out in a lager if required, and that the Warriors would not be able to stop more than one column. I cannot argue this point. Reno never gave him the chance to find out. Pulling his battalion out of the fight allowed the Warriors to fight only one column at a time. This is where I begin to disagree with most battle students and historians. I am no Reno-lover, nor am I a big Reno defender. I do, however, give the man credit where credit is due. Reno spent as much as 45 minutes in that valley, including his time in the timber (short, compared with the time spent on the valley floor). Up until "a-point-in-time" in the timber, he commanded his battalion in a credible and competent manner. His decision-making had been sharp, concise, and tactically sound. And his troops performed as admirably, despite what many wags would have us all believe, i.e., no fire discipline, running, no order, panic, etc. That's all a crock of bull and not even something I waste my time discussing any more. To me, commentary like that deserves no more than a wave of the hand and my back. You had a contingent of M Company men who operated under the aegis of a sergeant and who made their way quickly through the timber, probably along the river line and got into the village, firing several tepees. You had troops chasing Indians out of the dry ravine bed and advancing toward the foothills, right at the mounted warriors, and you had others advancing, laying down, firing, getting up, advancing again.... If some shots ran high, it was mostly because of the terrain and probably less to do with poor fire discipline. You can have all the Indians you want calling Reno's men "old women," but the fact is they performed very well, especially in light of those odds. I would have liked to have seen the odds reversed. Those redskins would have set new land speed records in getting out of there. As far as what happened after Reno pulled back into the timber, the story and the picture changes somewhat. His performance deteriorates dramatically, but again, that only pertains to his method of "retrograde." When you weigh all the factors involved in "a decision to leave"-- not necessarily the processes that may have gone through Reno's mind, the decision to leave was sound indeed and it was supported by-- I believe-- every military man involved. Again, you and others probably say, Well they were just covering Reno's ass, and you may be correct, but that doesn't change the soundness of the decision. You also tend to accuse Reno of releasing the Indians that killed Custer, and my theory says those Indians made no difference in the Custer battle. There are plenty of Indian testimonies that support my viewpoint. There are some testimonies that say there were so many Indians sitting on the ridges because they didn't have enough room to get into the Custer fight! The fact that most of the Indians left the Reno field is irrelevant. Actually, that poor decision-making probably was a factor in Reno's and Benteen's survival, because Reno's command certainly wasn't prepared to stave off another deluge, even though Benteen's may have been. Now Custer's battalions should have been able to hold out, but something happened on his battlefield that destroyed his defense (if he ever set one). Here is where you may be giving Custer too much credit. I don't think he ever set up a defense. I don't believe the word ever crossed his mind and I think Custer was on the offensive until Indian numbers forced him up the ridge to Custer or Last Stand Hill and by that time "defense" was too late. So I'd have to judge that the numbers of Warriors didn't cause the catastrophe, nor their aggressiveness. Both those things had to happen, but if Custer's battalion had not made a mistake, there still should have been no massacre...just a tactical draw while the village escaped, and a following pursuit. So Custer's biggest mistake, I think, was on his little action site, and none of us knows what that was. I cannot argue that point because, like you, I don't know. I will say this: the whole deal was a simple operation. Reno attacks and ties up the warriors; Custer makes an end-run and gathers in the fugitives, one way or another, choice depending on the situation. Nothing more than that. Reno couldn't hold because he was overwhelmed; Custer died because he was overwhelmed. Nothing more complicated than that. Custer's tactical moves were sound, but they proved inadequate precisely because he met a force that was just too big. He misjudged their actions and their aggressiveness surprised him. Their actions should not have surprised him-- and so that was an error-- but their numbers, their situation, their mind-sets were all of a timbre no one had ever encountered before. Can we excuse him for that mistake? No. At least in my opinion. But to blame Custer's defeat on anyone but Custer is to me, a mistake. Tactics that are sound, but inadequate, are due to fail. Custer failed to adapt and he failed to properly employ his own tactics (that's the support issue). Some people call that arrogance; to me, he simply overstepped. A Bridge Too Far. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Feb 25, 2009 22:36:58 GMT -5
It's too bad Custer didn't attack at Ford B. That way when he would have been driven back by the NAs, he could have retreated back up MTC and linked up with Reno in the Reno hill/Weir point area. Which, by the way, is also evidence that he didn't attack at Ford B and get repulsed. If the NAs were strong enough to repulse him at Ford B, then the only logical point of retreat would be back towards your support and not away from it. The village extended to far north to try to retreat in that direction.
Custer went into MTC with 5 intact companies approaching Ford B and left with 5 intact companies. A few NAs that worked themselves between MTC and Reno hill could not have stopped 5 retreating intact companies who had just been repulsed by overwhelming odds and were running for their lives ala Reno.
bc with some reverse logic
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Post by Deleted on Feb 26, 2009 8:12:31 GMT -5
BC--
Your logic and your military sense in that last post are impeccable. No more need be said.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteeneast on Feb 26, 2009 9:24:20 GMT -5
Fred That response to Clair pretty well sums up what I think. You got it down in words and I saved it.
Thanks Steve
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Post by conz on Feb 26, 2009 15:19:36 GMT -5
"...Spoken like an infantryman...."Thank you Clair. High praise. Obviously the role of cavalry is different and therefore requires a different modus operandi from infantry's maneuvering, but the workings of a commander's mind are much the same. When discussing Custer's mistake/s, the key (to my way of thinking) is in how he came to the decisions he did, rather than pointing at any one thing in particular. Annihilation wasn't fore ordained until late in the battle. Fred you and Clair deserve a more fleshed out version of what I posted earlier, and an extension of what I just said. I will try to make time to get it together later tonight and post it in the AM. Maybe a different thread - exploring what was really going on in his head, and why it was so. Forget that Presidential nomination non-sense. highway Look forward to it! And yes, it IS a compliment...we are all riflemen at heart... Clair
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Post by conz on Feb 26, 2009 15:58:47 GMT -5
When Gerard's report to Cooke reached Custer, I do not believe Custer was as surprised as he was disappointed. What they were seeing in the valley was not something unusual. In fact, Custer pulled back from the more advanced stages of just such an Indian demonstration at the Washita, so for the Indians to stand by their numbers was not entirely unusual. What was unusual, was that they would come after the troops, not just stand there threatening until the outnumbered cavalry would move away. The steadfastness didn't surprise Custer; the aggressiveness did. Yes, that is what I think...if fully surprised, there may be mass panic in the village and very little opposition, but I don't think Custer believed he had achieved that much surprise...in fact, he was down there on the end of Ash Creek that afternoon BECAUSE he believed he had lost surprise. So I think his mental picture going down the creek was that he would find a Warrior rear guard attempting to slow down his regiment long enough for the village to scatter to the hills to the west. THAT was his greatest fear. So to overcome this, he would have to make a decision as to how to deal with this rear guard, once he got enough information to make one. That was his "plan." I agree, and have no complaint against Reno up to this point. Up to the timber, Reno was doing just what an advance guard is supposed to do...fix the enemy and allow the main force to maneuver. The enemy also did just what it is supposed to do in military tactics, by instinct...they attacked that fixing force with overwhelming power. They didn't know it yet, but the objective is to destroy the fixing force in time to then turn on the maneuvering force in full strength. Happened by accident for them, but they pulled off what Frederick the Great did many times...Maybe Crazy Horse WAS educated at the German War College. <g> I could even live with Reno's withdrawing from the timber if he felt he had to, as long as he retained his combat capability to maintain pressure ("contact") on/with the enemy. THAT is his mistake...it is not one of position, but rather one of mission. He failed to maintain contact with the enemy, one of the three or four primary responsibilities of any advance guard in any army, any era. Now if the enemy destroys you and it is not your fault, you won't get blamed. But Reno brings condemnation upon himself by his inadequate withdrawal, causing his loss of ability to perform his mission henceforth (until Benteen comes up, at least). So a second condemnation comes up when Benteen arrives, and he clearly has offensive capability again, and no enemy to his front. His tactical responsibility is to regain contact with the enemy...that is all. And this he is too slow to do to have any positive effect. Whether or not he COULD have had any good effect is irrelevant to this judgment...the fact that he didn't try to perform that duty immediately is what condemns him. It may be irrelevant to the outcome, but it is not irrelevant as to Reno's proper tactical decision-making, I think. He still had the responsibility to regain contact with an enemy that had abandoned him. And yes, I can't believe that without "Reno's Indians" Custer would have been hurt much. I think that transfer of Warriors was THE critical issue to the Warriors confronting Custer's battalions to have enough combat power and aggressiveness to jump on his tactical mistake on his field. And it is not just an issue of numbers against Custer...it is just as much, or more, the moral issue of the Warriors having to fight on two fronts at the same time. There is plenty of evidence to support that they simply cannot do this...they don't have the C2 for it. They break and run in every such case I can remember this happening...see the Rosebud Battle for an example concerning this very same bunch of Warriors only a few days before. I agree with you...I was postulating "IF" he set a defense. I don't think he did, either...it would not have been so spread out if he had time to do a proper one. Even Keogh's battalion would have been better positioned than indicated by the bodies and Native testimony. It was like Napoleonic infantry formations attempting to form a square, and getting ridden over before they had time to finish it, as so often happened back then. Bad things happen to units caught in the middle of changing formations or tactical stances. Yep...but as I think Clausewitz said, "everything in war is simple, but even the simplest things are complicated." <g> Yeah, as I mentioned earlier, I think that these two things had to happen, but Custer would not have proved "inadequate," still, if the 7th hadn't made mistakes...on the part of Reno, Benteen, Keogh, and Custer. I think the 7th Cav could have at least "handled," if not outright won, their situation if none of those mistakes were made, in spite of Warrior numbers and aggressiveness. I'm an optimist, as you must be if you want to be a Hussar. "Do you want to live forever?!" <g> I'm not sure he was as surprised by the Warriors actions as he was by MAJ Reno's and CPT Benteen's actions, to tell you the truth. Their's made a bigger difference, in my model, to the outcome than the Warriors numbers and actions. To be sure, but I also think there is plenty of blame to go around. <g> Thanks! Clair
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Post by conz on Feb 26, 2009 16:00:21 GMT -5
It's too bad Custer didn't attack at Ford B. That way when he would have been driven back by the NAs, he could have retreated back up MTC and linked up with Reno in the Reno hill/Weir point area. Which, by the way, is also evidence that he didn't attack at Ford B and get repulsed. If the NAs were strong enough to repulse him at Ford B, then the only logical point of retreat would be back towards your support and not away from it. The village extended to far north to try to retreat in that direction. Yeah...but what if the Warriors attacked you at Ford B from along your route of march! I.e, from Weir point? How do you retreat, then? Clair
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Post by Deleted on Feb 26, 2009 16:21:15 GMT -5
1. I could even live with Reno's withdrawing from the timber if he felt he had to, as long as he retained his combat capability to maintain pressure ("contact") on/with the enemy. THAT is his mistake...it is not one of position, but rather one of mission. He failed to maintain contact with the enemy, one of the three or four primary responsibilities of any advance guard in any army, any era. 2. Now if the enemy destroys you and it is not your fault, you won't get blamed. But Reno brings condemnation upon himself by his inadequate withdrawal, causing his loss of ability to perform his mission henceforth (until Benteen comes up, at least). 3. So a second condemnation comes up when Benteen arrives, and he clearly has offensive capability again, and no enemy to his front. His tactical responsibility is to regain contact with the enemy...that is all. And this he is too slow to do to have any positive effect. Whether or not he COULD have had any good effect is irrelevant to this judgment...the fact that he didn't try to perform that duty immediately is what condemns him. 4. It may be irrelevant to the outcome, but it is not irrelevant as to Reno's proper tactical decision-making, I think. He still had the responsibility to regain contact with an enemy that had abandoned him. Clair-- This is probably our most major area of disagreement in this particular discussion. Otherwise, we are pretty much on the same wave-length. You have 4 paragraphs above; I have numbered them for easy reference. Number (1). We agree here; no dispute. 2. Again, complete agreement. 3. Unless you are specifically referring to Reno rather than Benteen, I think you are completely off base. At the risk of going into a long, drawn-out diatribe, I will assume you are referring to Reno. If so, I guess there's little or no disagreement here, either. 4. Looking at it, I guess I agree with you here, too. So maybe we don't disagree! Providing, of course, you are referring to Reno only. If you drag Fred. Benteen into it, you run the risk of nuclear retaliation (I guess that should elicit grins!!!). So, as long as all your comments pertain to Reno and not Benteen, we don't disagree at all. Sorry to raise up false hopes! Thanks, Clair! Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 26, 2009 16:22:55 GMT -5
Benteeneast--
Thanks! That's a hell of a nice compliment, and I appreciate it, especially coming from a real pro.
Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 26, 2009 16:35:40 GMT -5
Yeah... but what if the Warriors attacked you at Ford B from along your route of march! I.e, from Weir point? How do you retreat, then? Clair-- I don't think that would have happened. In my opinion, there were not enough Indians on the east side of the river at that time to do much, if any, damage. I am guessing there were well under 50 east of the river, not counting, of course, Wolf Tooth's band which was too far east of the river. The archaeological fan on Luce Ridge shows heavy firing concentrated on targets on the east side of the river, but the distances involved are too far for an 1873 Springfield, other than for one particular area, and that area is a clear egress into MTC, leading behind any column that would be heading to or already at Ford B. Despite a couple "here," a half-dozen "over there," and maybe 3 or 4 "someplace else," there was little or no threat on the east side. The biggest threat those guys represented was the "information highway" leading right back across the LBH to inform their buddies of the impending danger. This is another reason I feel strongly that Custer was not repulsed from Ford B. Just not enough time to develop any threat. It is also one of the key reasons why I believe Custer never intended to cross there. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by strange on Feb 26, 2009 16:47:34 GMT -5
Custer could've retreated from anywhere. He was not intending to kill himself, but he seems to have believed that he was winning or that he needed to hold up a position for the safety reasons of making sure that Reno and Benteen were not overrun. Or he was making sure that he could make an organized retreat without foolishly squandering 30+ men (Reno).
Custer had options for retreat in at least the first hour and a half of the conflict (if you believe the 3-4 hour time frame of the heavy fighting, as I believe). Aside from a couple nutcases who threw down their arms too early and tried to surrender (4-5 soldiers accounted by White Bull and another native), there were no attempts to give up until the very end when it was all too late and most of the officers were killed (thats when a few survivors made a last attempt to salvage their lives.).
If Reno could organize a retreat while openly slipping "out of his head" in front of everyone else, then more competent officers could've also organized a way out if that had been their intention. If Red Horse was correct, the Indians were repulsed at least 5 times (to a major degree), so not everything was looking dire from the white man's perspective. Again now, I'm also going to iterate the unusual fight patterns of the Indians. Speaking roughly, the natives are organized into "bands" and these factions have varying degrees of motivation and success. Speaking bluntly, you can off as many bands as you want but if you allow some one like Crazy Horse to stomp through.... (Keogh's area?).... then that crumb will give a great message to other natives and you'll have an achy breaky hell of unpredictable warfare on your hands.
Indians are notso conscious of how many overall casualties they are sustaining because their groups are very compact (albeit MULTIPLE in this case, as in we're dealing with many compact groups) and they're not paying as much attention to what is happening on the other man's neck of the woods. When Custer was defeated, he was surely being reminded whenever ammo was running low, or whenever the slightest casualty was reported, and on top of everything altogether he was also trying thinking about the current state of affairs concerning Benteen and Reno. The Indians, on the otherhand, are not worried about ammo because a) they were at home and they were probably well stocked, and b) they had alternate weapons such as arrows, clubs, and knives. And they don't immediately take casualties to heart as long as they have someone inspiring to cling to. In which case, Mr. Crazy Horse enjoys taking a ride through a midst of soldiers and wandering out unharmed. Indians take a spiritual significance from a stunt like this, and afterward they are terribly difficult to force down.
And again, Indians are not accustomed to fighting with the type of numbers they used against Custer. The bands (roughly 20 or 30?) are not usually pulled together for major battles unless someone is springing a Fetterman style of trap. Each band keeps track of its own progress and so many bands were functioning from different areas and probably not reporting to each other. To simply stretch their head around to observe what is going on past the sea of soldiers,warriors, and land...... not all of them could keep track of the overall conflict. Therefore you will get conflicting accounts, and some accounts will simply conflict when the Indians are not telling the truth while other accounts will conflict when you juggle the perspectives of the many Indian commanders. Case in point, Red Horse saw alot more blood than Gall..... therefore Gall is either lying or he simply happened to be more successful than the other Indians who slammed themselves into a brickwall of "area fire" and were immediately wounded from multiple areas of their body (as Red Horse details in his drawings, toward what his own people suffered).
Strange
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Post by strange on Feb 26, 2009 17:05:28 GMT -5
If Benteen steps in to relieve Reno of his command, due to his delicate mental state, would that make it Benteen's responsibility to follow through with Reno's mission?
Benteen took the reigns over Reno's detachment, and instead of following through with the original directives to hit the Indians and await for support (as Reno was instructed), Benteen seemingly cooperated with the wishes of the wily subordinate who wished to get the hell out of there pronto. Thus, is Benteen refusing orders on behalf of Reno? Or am I making wild military speculations?
Strange
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 26, 2009 17:47:36 GMT -5
I believe an Indian woman (THE CUSTER MYTH?) stated Custer must have mistaken warriors running down river to meet him as non-coms escaping.
As for the Reno/Benteen survivors saving themselves . . . the Indians could have continued their sniping and eventually the command made have fallen to lack of water, food, elements or got so weakened that it would have been easier for the Indians to over-run them with less risk of casualties.
Two things: Indians didn't like long sieges and Terry was coming.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 26, 2009 20:10:01 GMT -5
Custer could've retreated from anywhere. He... seems to have believed that he was winning or that he needed to hold up a position for the safety reasons of making sure that Reno and Benteen were not overrun. Or he was making sure that he could make an organized retreat without foolishly squandering 30+ men (Reno). Strange-- I think you are making assumptions that you cannot support here. I believe you are correct about him retreating from almost anywhere and I also believe you are correct when you say he thought he was winning... up to a point. Beyond that, however, I do not believe Custer took one single action or had one single thought regarding Reno, Benteen, or the packs, other than how those "instruments" could help him achieve his goal. If you think Custer took one single, solitary action that day with the intent to relieve pressure on or aid Reno, I believe you're barking up the wrong tree. This was not a man laced with altruism, especially in military operations. Custer had options for retreat in at least the first hour and a half of the conflict (if you believe the 3-4 hour time frame of the heavy fighting, as I believe). Your time frame here is way too long. Others do not believe Custer went to Ford B-- though I certainly do-- but the "Custer fight," if you consider the volley firing its beginning, lasted barely two hours from that point. I do not have my specifics down pat yet, but the general outline is there, and there is no way that fight took as many as 3, much less 4, hours. Not a chance. If Reno could organize a retreat while openly slipping "out of his head" in front of everyone else, then more competent officers could've also organized a way out if that had been their intention. If Red Horse was correct, the Indians were repulsed at least 5 times (to a major degree), so not everything was looking dire from the white man's perspective. I would be very careful of Indian "counts." These are, after all, the same guys who claim they placed a stick next to the bodies of dead soldiers and the "count" reached 388. That little country schoolhouse on the back of the Iowa coin hadn't reached Margaritaville in 1876!! Also, beware of "more competent officers" ready and willing to assume command. If Fred Benteen wasn't willing to do so, certainly Mylie Moylan and Charlie Varnum were not interested in assuming that mantle. Indians are not so conscious of how many overall casualties they are sustaining because their groups are very compact (albeit MULTIPLE in this case, as in we're dealing with many compact groups) and they're not paying as much attention to what is happening on the other man's neck of the woods. Bingo! Ergo, "counts." When Custer was defeated, he was surely being reminded whenever ammo was running low, or whenever the slightest casualty was reported, and on top of everything altogether he was also trying thinking about the current state of affairs concerning Benteen and Reno. Negative! If Custer was doing any thinking about Benteen, it was in, "Where the hell is he?" As for ammo and casualties, I don't buy it. I don't buy for a second the idea that they were running low on buckshot... too many reports of "found" cartridge belts loaded with bullets and with the Indians closing in ever-increasing numbers, the only way the troopers' carbines were to remain effective was for them to further consolidate, giving up territory for space, ever tightening, thereby bunching. That leads to signs of so-called panic, yet the Springfield did that to you: time to load, time to eject, distances shortened... and so on. And they don't immediately take casualties to heart as long as they have someone inspiring to cling to. In which case, Mr. Crazy Horse enjoys taking a ride through a midst of soldiers and wandering out unharmed. Indians take a spiritual significance from a stunt like this, and afterward they are terribly difficult to force down. Well... quite frankly, I don't see that as any different than a white man. I'm not a big believer in the "death wishes" of one ethnic group over another. There are plenty of examples in Indian lore of guys taking a powder rather than risk confrontation. I know what you're saying here, but leaders are leaders and they do certain things to get themselves in those positions. I am certainly not convinced Indians were any "braver" than those soldiers. I mean... how do you outdo Fred Benteen? How about the water carriers? Look at the war records of men like Cooke and Yates, TWC, or 1SG Hill of B Company. How do you get any braver than that? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 26, 2009 20:28:15 GMT -5
If Benteen steps in to relieve Reno of his command, due to his delicate mental state, would that make it Benteen's responsibility to follow through with Reno's mission? Benteen took the reigns over Reno's detachment, and instead of following through with the original directives to hit the Indians and await for support (as Reno was instructed), Benteen seemingly cooperated with the wishes of the wily subordinate who wished to get the hell out of there pronto. Thus, is Benteen refusing orders on behalf of Reno? Or am I making wild military speculations To my way of thinking... and I would love to know what each successive JAG would have had to say about this... as well as a panel of senior generals!... once Benteen reached Reno, all orders, written or otherwise, were superseded by Reno's authority. That's how I would view it. There were also a whole series of circumstances and assumptions that entered the picture and have to be considered before rendering judgment on either of those officers, but it is a very touchy, very iffy, very nebulous situation for one officer to take command from a superior under the claim that superior was no longer competent to command. Think "The Caine Mutiny" (fiction); think "Mutiny of the 'Bounty'" (true). Captain Bligh was a highly competent, highly proficient, highly thought-of British naval captain and Fletcher Christian was correct in hightailing his ass outta there!, 'cause the Admiralty was gonna get 'im! Reno may have been harried and may have made some bad decisions, but that was not a risk an officer was going to take. I wouldn't have, certainly! Another thing, regardless of what you may think of the aplomb of the command in its move to Weir Point, the fact remains, the command moved to Weir Point. Who among us condemns those men for pulling back from that point? How then can we condemn Benteen for not moving into that brou-ha-ha an hour or so earlier, with a mere 100 men and without the packs? Best wishes, Fred.
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