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Post by strange on Feb 21, 2009 18:15:13 GMT -5
Do we know if in fact Benteen was to support anyone? How would he know the command had been divided? How would he know who was attacking who? How would he know where Reno and Custer were? The only knowledge he had of a battle was when he returned and first heard gunfiring and then saw the end of Reno's "fight". Still he didn't know who exactly was engaged. And it wasn't until Reno and Benteen actually met that he found out what was going on. Still gotta think Custer made a mistake by at least not notifying Benteen of the division of the command and an attack order issued. I can grab this... #1. Yes we do. Rationally speaking, I think it was Custer's idea to split into the three factions and for each faction to arrive for the other as soon as any one had touched fire with the Indians. On a specific note, Custer had himself taken the role of a supporting wing and sent Reno before him with the promise that he will arrive after. Meanwhile, Benteen has apparently not been located yet, so he is temporarily not an immediate factor of the equation. But by all reason he is now hanging in the balance as a wild card for whoever needs him. Did Benteen know that he was a wild card? Maybe he did, maybe not, but Custer would've made him to understand if the areas of communication had rolled more smoothly. Be that as it may, I'll use my first point above to reinforce my reasoning that Benteen was to reinforce some one and that he was well informed of this measure, even if he may not have always been update on all of the current happenings. Of coarse that last point brings me to another conclusion, and that is that Benteen should've been ready to improvise (just like Custer would promote during warfare against the Indians.). Custer's orders work to a flow of this idea.... 1.)what to do while we're chasing the Indians... 2.) what to do after we've hit the Indians...3.) what to do when someone needs assistance... 4.)what to do after the Indians are routed or retreated..... etc. etc. Benteen is no stranger to sarcasm, half truths, and occasional outright lies. In this respect, he clings to his "orders", very tightly, as a means to wipe his hands of the situation. I will call this a half truth. Benteen was using his orders alright, he was practicing in a Step 1 capacity as the entire battle was advanced to the higher levels of concern. #2. I assume that Messengers would've informed Benteen of how every one was being divided. Again, Benteen could not be located at the moment. #3. Messengers #4. Messengers I'm not being sarcastic with those last couple answers. I simply mean to say that Benteen would've been briefed with a steady stream of orders as the battle came underway IF HE HAD BEEN EASIER TO LOCATE. And its not necessarily Benteen's fault that he was no where to be found, because Custer sent everyone into various positions in order to obtain a reasonable far reach of the Indians. Indians are not easy to find, so you spread your arm around and wait to strike, reaching onward for whoever you can grab and calling the other factions to your aid as soon as you have hooked the big trout and you need help to reel it in. Benteen was operating on the First Stage, even as the battle had entered into the 5th or 6th out of 100 possible stages that you will face during any conflict with the Indians. When the Indians are found, you stop looking for them. When the Indians move this way, you'll move that way...etc, etc. Those are my thoughts, and I think they are damn good! Strange
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Post by keogh on Feb 22, 2009 2:14:13 GMT -5
Do we know if in fact Benteen was to support anyone? The hostile village was known to be up ahead in the valley of the Little Big Horn. Benteen's battalion was sent to this valley to either attack the hostiles directly or support an attack made by the other battalions. He didn't need to know that. But if he bothered to ask either of the two messengers sent back to him, he would have been informed of this....assuming they did not already inform him of this. It was expected that all the battalions (including his own) would strike the village as soon as they discovered its whereabouts in the valley. They were all heading for the same valley that he was. It was a safe bet that he'd find them where the village was. He didn't need to know who was engaged.....just that there was an engagement and he was expected "to pitch into anything he might find." Reno was told by Custer that he "would be supported by the whole command". That statement included Benteen, so we can safely assume that Benteen knew what his responsibility was that day, contrary to his later assertions of bewilderment. He knew very well that their mission that day was to find and attack the hostiles. And (surprise, surprise) that was exactly what he found out was going on. I don't really think it was necessary for Custer to let him know of the division of his command, although it is a safe bet that he could have easily found that out from either Kanipe or Martini. I believe that Custer intended Benteen to support Reno's attack in the valley, rather than follow up Custer's trail in support of himself. If this is true, then it is really irrelevant to Benteen's orders that Custer's battalion separated for a flank attack.
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Post by benteeneast on Feb 22, 2009 8:42:54 GMT -5
Do we know if in fact Benteen was to support anyone?
Benteen's original orders supported the mission but not necessarily anyone else.
How would he know the command had been divided?
Kanipe states he was heading to the packtrain Benteen was in his way. He was to bring the packtrain cross country whatever that means. If Custer survived he was after the two that returned to the packtrain. Its an NCOs duty not to let them drop out.
How would he know who was attacking who?
He would not until after contact with Reno. Martin would have in the village and Kanipe was after the packtrain. Neither could say where Custer went correctly.
How would he know where Reno and Custer were?
He would not until he turned back and he was not compelled to do that so no one could expect support until ordering him to do so. It was when he decided mission complete that he turned back and Reno had the rank and chain of command to take over.
The only knowledge he had of a battle was when he returned and first heard gun firing and then saw the end of Reno's "fight". Still he didn't know who exactly was engaged.
Neither Martin or Kanipe were there when Custer engaged so at best they could have a direction which would be obvious since he didn't follow Reno.
And it wasn't until Reno and Benteen actually met that he found out what was going on.
True
Still gotta think Custer made a mistake by at least not notifying Benteen of the division of the command and an attack order issued.
Command of the regiment should have been maintained rather recon in force with one battalion. He had to much to think about once he placed himself in the battalion to worry about what the others were doing.
Benteeneast
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Post by cisdyd on Feb 23, 2009 10:30:49 GMT -5
Sorry to bust up a good old conspiracy theory get-together but didn't Godfrey state that they were following Reno's trail when the scouts motioned them to the right towards what turned out to be Custer's trail? Also, despite not being much of a scout, I would think that it was obvious that two separate commands had gone their different way simply from the horse tracks and droppings.
Billy
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 12:17:14 GMT -5
Ladies and Gentlemen—
This has all the earmarks of being the beginning of a wonderful conversation, albeit one we have visited before, but with the number of contributors I see here, one that we can have again and one that can seemingly re-stimulate some solid interest. (I can thank Mr. Harper and Mr. Horse for this, though the particular site may be misplaced.)
I love theories, no matter how outré they may be, and I certainly hope Gordie will add something as well, even though he does not like to debate these things.
My own personal feelings about Custer’s thoughts and plans are set fairly well, though I will continue to hold that a convincing anti-argument can sway my opinions to the contrary. So here are my 2¢, as of February 24, 2009.
Probably to the chagrin of my friend, George Mabry, I still hold to my conviction that Custer ignored the advice of his scouts. To ease George’s pain, however, I will concede the point that Custer was not the only one at fault; witness the following exchange:
At the evening officers call of June 22, Godfrey claimed Custer showed a lack of self-confidence. As LTs Wallace, Godfrey, and McIntosh were walking away, Wallace made the comment, “Godfrey, I believe General Custer is going to be killed… I have never heard Custer talk in that way before.” Godfrey made the necessary preparations for the next day’s move and gave the necessary orders to his company. During this routine, he came to the bivouac area of the scouts and met up with Mitch Boyer, Bloody Knife, and Half Yellow Face. Boyer saw him and—apparently at the suggestion of the Crow—asked Godfrey, “‘Have you ever fought against these Sioux?’” Godfrey: “‘Yes,’ I replied. Then he [Boyer] asked, ‘Well, how many do you expect to find?’ I answered, ‘It is said we may find between one thousand and fifteen hundred.’ ‘Well, do you think we can whip that many?’ ‘Oh, yes, I guess so.’ After he had interpreted our conversation, he said to me with a good deal of emphasis, ‘Well, I can tell you we are going to have a ----- big fight.’”
Godfrey was perplexed by the “numerous stands of brush, whose crowns had been joined to form a kind of overhead framework.” At first, the troops thought it was to protect the Indians’ dogs, but it was later learned these were wickiups housing young, single warriors who had joined the main camp.
If all this wasn’t ignoring the facts as the scouts perceived them—however tacit the “advice” may have been—then I don’t know what is. Indeed, Custer held several more “pow-wows” with his scouts and it is inconceivable to me that they did not express their concerns, even as we know in the historical bromides, i. e., “… a road we do not know,” etc., and the “you can hang me” business atop the Crow’s Nest.
Be all that as it may, I believe Benteen to have been correct when he said Custer had no plan, no plan whatsoever, and did not even believe the village was where his scouts said it to be. At this point, forget about the size; even the village’s location was doubted by Custer. I do, however, believe Custer made cautious and careful plans as he went along, always keeping that “wild card” that the scouts may have been on to something well within sight. Contrary to Benteen, I believe the “scout to the left” was a prudent and intelligent tactical maneuver; shrewd, may even be a better word, because it was Custer’s ace: a tactical reserve led by a brilliant commander who would know what to do and when to do it. And Custer was correct; unfortunately, it was left to a series of impossible-to-predict circumstances to tip over the card-house.
The dichotomy now is interesting. The main thing that precipitated Custer’s move down Reno Creek—his fear of the loss of surprise—seems to have dissipated as he neared the LBH. I believe Custer fully intended to send Reno down the LBH valley to attack the village and that Custer’s five-company command would form a second—and possibly even a third wave (remember, he had sub-divided into Keogh/Yates)—and that Benteen, once mission was completed, would automatically form a third or fourth wave, ultimately clinching the deal. And I believe Custer formulated this plan as he “roared” down Reno Creek valley. When Fred Gerard’s message that the Sioux weren’t biting the poisoned apple reached Custer’s ears, Custer’s “loss-of-surprise”-turned-“surprise,” turned back to “loss-of-surprise.” The subsequent “move-to-the-right” in all likelihood precipitated the debacle, for it deprived Reno of the absolutely necessary support to fulfill what was rapidly becoming an impossible mission. (And as an aside, I have done enough work on this thing—right?, Bill, Ray, and Clair?—to believe Reno did a highly credible job until “snap-time” in the timber.) In addition, it changed—unknown to Benteen—Benteen’s mission. A hint of that came at the RCOI when PVT Davern claimed to have heard LT Cooke order Reno to charge: “‘Gerard comes back and reports the Indian village three miles ahead and moving. The General directs you to take your three companies and drive everything before you.’ Those I believe were the exact words.” He added, “Colonel Benteen will be on your left and will have the same instructions.” The order was given about 200 yards before the tepee. Now, rather than call Davern a liar or a poseur—or say others conspired to drop that particular observation for Benteen’s sake—it makes sense. Custer, at that time, fully intended to do exactly that and had communicated as much to Cooke along the way, only a few minutes later everything changed because of Gerard’s semi-panicked observation.
We also have the genesis here for the Martini note, because now, in Custer’s mind, the Benteen Mission had changed and he was no longer to go into the valley to support Reno. Benteen would have to be informed, ergo, the note, whereas before, no other notification would have been required. We already know the good captain was on the horns of a dilemma when he reached the LBH and had to be directed up the slopes as opposed to entering the valley; but if Plan A had been in effect, it would have been a lay-up: Benteen into the valley and away we go!
To make matters worse for GAC, Benteen moved cautiously because of uncertainty, yet buoyed by the silly commentary of both Kanipe and Martini about an easy victory, and then exacerbated by comments like Godfrey’s regarding straggling gunfire being the sounds of the end of battle.
What is really interesting to me is speculation about what would have happened had Benteen chosen to mount the bluffs, following Custer’s trail, and Reno had remained in the timber. In my opinion, the Seventh Cavalry would have ceased to exist that day; but that brings the size of the village into question and that we can reserve for another post.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by biggordie on Feb 24, 2009 15:17:02 GMT -5
Well, Fred, I will throw out a few random and not-so-random thoughts and observations, starting with the Officers' Call just before crossing the divide, when Custer returned from the Crow's Nest. Despite somebody's assertion that Custer did not believe that there were large camps ahead, he is alleged to have said to the assemblage that "The greatest aggregation of Indians ever seen on this continent lies ahead, and I am going to attack it." Or words to that effect.
This he proceeded to do, although he did not make a headlong rush, as some might have us believe. He moved with caution, with scouts out in front and to the left and right, and sent Benteen of to the left to see what might be seen [probably having been alerted by the Crows that the Lakotas often used the side valleys for camping or movement - as they had done only a weel before].
When Gerard observed NDNs across the Little Horn, ostensibly hurrying away to the north, driving horses and etc etc etc, Custer responded by sending Reno ahead, and shortly after that gave him the pursue and attack order, which might have been intended to fix the NDN warriors in place, or whatever one wants to believe it to have intended.
As Reno started ahead at a lope, Varnum had just returned from his scouting trip to the left, where he saw , as he said, NDNs mounted, in the valley, from every rise. This he reported to Custer, adding that "you can see for yourself from those bluffs up ahead on the right." Or words to that effect [those interested can look up the true quotes]. At roughly the same time, or a tad earlier, Mitch Bouyer and the Crows, along with Hare, came down from their position of top of the Chalk Bluffs/Buttes/whatever, and reported to Custer that the camps stretched away to the north [the northern portions can be seen with glasses from that point- and the statement that they had been watching the camp through glasses all morning, mostly likely pertains to this sighting, not to any camp at the Lone Tipi site]. This is of course, mere conjecture on my part, but.....
After watering his horses in the North arm of Ash Creek [there are only a couple of places where there is sufficient water for five companies in late June], Custer immediately headed "north" onto the high ground [he went a couple of hundred yards west in order to use a good route].
After going some distance, he left the command and rode to a high point of ground north of where Reno later entrenched. For those who might be interested in such things, this spot is located at 45 31 25 83 and 107 22 42 56 [approxinmately - I know the spot but not the exact coordinates]. It is from near here that Knipe was sent back.
Custer saw Reno advancing down the valley; saw the large dust cloud; saw ponies being driven in toward the camps, and could see some of the latter, but not all, and not much. He continued on north, since it was difficult, if not impossible to get down the bluffs, and it would have served little or no purpose if he had done so - that leading to only another "stern chase," he likely figured.
So the command continued on. Custer went to the top of SSR, from where he could still not see the full extent of the camps. But he could see a mass exodus toward the north - what he took to be fleeing women, children, old persons and some warriors, mounted and not, taking belongings and not, and etc etc etc.
He determined to head off this exodus, if he could, and "trap" the hostiles between Reno and himself. He needed to close up the regiment as quickly as possible, while not wasting time to wait for anyone's arrival, and so dispatched Martin. He then descended the east slope of SSR to the flat at the bottom, altered his formations, gathered in his flankers, and headed north.
He made a quick turn into MTC and then struck for the high ground north of same, from where he could for the first time see the full extent of the camps, and of the "flight" of the people. He then made an arcing approach toward the northern fords, which Mitch Bouyer had told him about, so as to conceal himself as best he could [and to use the easiest ground].
That is what he did. What motivated him to do what he did is my opinion, based upon what he could see and what he was told. That part of it is conjecture, the physical events and locations are not.
Regards,
Gordie
"Still, a man hears what he wants to hear, and disregards the rest......"
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Post by strange on Feb 24, 2009 15:23:48 GMT -5
Ladies and Gentlemen— This has all the earmarks of being the beginning of a wonderful conversation, albeit one we have visited before, but with the number of contributors I see here, one that we can have again and one that can seemingly re-stimulate some solid interest. (I can thank Mr. Harper and Mr. Horse for this, though the particular site may be misplaced.) I love theories, no matter how outré they may be, and I certainly hope Gordie will add something as well, even though he does not like to debate these things. My own personal feelings about Custer’s thoughts and plans are set fairly well, though I will continue to hold that a convincing anti-argument can sway my opinions to the contrary. So here are my 2¢, as of February 24, 2009. Probably to the chagrin of my friend, George Mabry, I still hold to my conviction that Custer ignored the advice of his scouts. To ease George’s pain, however, I will concede the point that Custer was not the only one at fault; witness the following exchange: At the evening officers call of June 22, Godfrey claimed Custer showed a lack of self-confidence. As LTs Wallace, Godfrey, and McIntosh were walking away, Wallace made the comment, “Godfrey, I believe General Custer is going to be killed… I have never heard Custer talk in that way before.” Godfrey made the necessary preparations for the next day’s move and gave the necessary orders to his company. During this routine, he came to the bivouac area of the scouts and met up with Mitch Boyer, Bloody Knife, and Half Yellow Face. Boyer saw him and—apparently at the suggestion of the Crow—asked Godfrey, “‘Have you ever fought against these Sioux?’” Godfrey: “‘Yes,’ I replied. Then he [Boyer] asked, ‘Well, how many do you expect to find?’ I answered, ‘It is said we may find between one thousand and fifteen hundred.’ ‘Well, do you think we can whip that many?’ ‘Oh, yes, I guess so.’ After he had interpreted our conversation, he said to me with a good deal of emphasis, ‘Well, I can tell you we are going to have a ----- big fight.’” Godfrey was perplexed by the “numerous stands of brush, whose crowns had been joined to form a kind of overhead framework.” At first, the troops thought it was to protect the Indians’ dogs, but it was later learned these were wickiups housing young, single warriors who had joined the main camp. If all this wasn’t ignoring the facts as the scouts perceived them—however tacit the “advice” may have been—then I don’t know what is. Indeed, Custer held several more “pow-wows” with his scouts and it is inconceivable to me that they did not express their concerns, even as we know in the historical bromides, i. e., “… a road we do not know,” etc., and the “you can hang me” business atop the Crow’s Nest. Be all that as it may, I believe Benteen to have been correct when he said Custer had no plan, no plan whatsoever, and did not even believe the village was where his scouts said it to be. At this point, forget about the size; even the village’s location was doubted by Custer. I do, however, believe Custer made cautious and careful plans as he went along, always keeping that “wild card” that the scouts may have been on to something well within sight. Contrary to Benteen, I believe the “scout to the left” was a prudent and intelligent tactical maneuver; shrewd, may even be a better word, because it was Custer’s ace: a tactical reserve led by a brilliant commander who would know what to do and when to do it. And Custer was correct; unfortunately, it was left to a series of impossible-to-predict circumstances to tip over the card-house. The dichotomy now is interesting. The main thing that precipitated Custer’s move down Reno Creek—his fear of the loss of surprise—seems to have dissipated as he neared the LBH. I believe Custer fully intended to send Reno down the LBH valley to attack the village and that Custer’s five-company command would form a second—and possibly even a third wave (remember, he had sub-divided into Keogh/Yates)—and that Benteen, once mission was completed, would automatically form a third or fourth wave, ultimately clinching the deal. And I believe Custer formulated this plan as he “roared” down Reno Creek valley. When Fred Gerard’s message that the Sioux weren’t biting the poisoned apple reached Custer’s ears, Custer’s “loss-of-surprise”-turned-“surprise,” turned back to “loss-of-surprise.” The subsequent “move-to-the-right” in all likelihood precipitated the debacle, for it deprived Reno of the absolutely necessary support to fulfill what was rapidly becoming an impossible mission. (And as an aside, I have done enough work on this thing—right?, Bill, Ray, and Clair?—to believe Reno did a highly credible job until “snap-time” in the timber.) In addition, it changed—unknown to Benteen—Benteen’s mission. A hint of that came at the RCOI when PVT Davern heard LT Cooke order Reno to charge: “‘Gerard comes back and reports the Indian village three miles ahead and moving. The General directs you to take your three companies and drive everything before you.’ Those I believe were the exact words.” He added, “Colonel Benteen will be on your left and will have the same instructions.” The order was given about 200 yards before the tepee. Now, rather than call Davern a liar or a poseur—or say others conspired to drop that particular observation for Benteen’s sake—it makes sense. Custer, at that time, fully intended to do exactly that and had communicated as much to Cooke along the way, only a few minutes later everything changed because of Gerard’s semi-panicked observation. We also have the genesis here for the Martini note, because now, in Custer’s mind, the Benteen Mission had changed and he was no longer to go into the valley to support Reno. Benteen would have to be informed, ergo, the note, whereas before, no other notification would have been required. We already know the good captain was on the horns of a dilemma when he reached the LBH and had to be directed up the slopes as opposed to entering the valley; but if Plan A had been in effect, it would have been a lay-up: Benteen into the valley and away we go! To make matters worse for GAC, Benteen moved cautiously because of uncertainty, yet buoyed by the silly commentary of both Kanipe and Martini about an easy victory, and then exacerbated by comments like Godfrey’s regarding straggling gunfire being the sounds of the end of battle. What is really interesting to me is speculation about what would have happened had Benteen chosen to mount the bluffs, following Custer’s trail, and Reno had remained in the timber. In my opinion, the Seventh Cavalry would have ceased to exist that day; but that brings the size of the village into question and that we can reserve for another post. Best wishes, Fred. I'll quote a sentiment from crzhrs to the effect that Indians are not easy to find, let alone making concrete battle plans to formulate against them. Indians are very tricky in this way, which is why so many of the well seasoned, West-Point educated, Civil War veterans of the U.S. army had to practically go back to school all over again when their careers finally clashed sabers (metaphorically speaking) with the Red Man. Sharp minds like Fetterman became massacred, and people like Crook just decided to organize a whole army of other tribes altogether and just have the Indians, in some theory, to fight amongst themselves with military assistance. Nevertheless, so many of the rules had changed. Which is why its hard to nail down everybody's this thats without slamming into a brickwall of great mystery/confusion toward trying to guess whats on the minds of the fallen. God knows, if Custer had lived, he'd probably be writing more about the subject than any researcher in the last many years since his death (a little quip to say that Custer jotted down everything, eventually. Whether or not he'd thought of everything from the beginning or made his mind as he went and reflected later...... Custer would've talked, and talked, and talked.... and written and written, and right now, wherever he is, he's probably gnawing down a pencil in his clenched teeth as he'd probably be dying to tell every one what happened.) Did Custer have a plan? Did he know he'd have some action that day? Did he have the size, shape or atmosphere of the village? Did Benteen know completely everything about what was going on? Yes and no, yes and no, yes and no,yes and no. As I presented in my theory, you have a concept to zero in on the natives by casting out the fish hooks. As the evidence of his adversary became more persistent, so there the concrete soon hardened and the Stages of action became more advanced. Instead of casting out the hook, you now have to reel it in, and its a big fish, so you call on buddies to help yank it and you send a team of harpooners to dive in behind its fins and spear it....... observing new stages as the levels progress. Thats what I presented above. Benteen did not need to be informed of every minute detail. He actually probably was brought up to date on most of what Custer had wanted, but we might never know everything about what Benteen was expected to do because he has underplayed himself to a point where he is virtually nonexistent. Its always possible that Benteen was the one who never expected to run into any Indians, or atleast not ore than a handful. He'd have a right to that opinion because he served with Custer before on the previous Indian campaigns and he observed how few and far apart the major battles were. Little Bighorn was at the very beginning of the major new Indian conflicts. It was, as if, like the first day of work and everybody was settling into the various reaches of their preparation. No one was quite ready to engage, with the Indians (of all people), into a Gettysburg type of battle on what would be the very onset of this particular campaign. No typical soldier, high or low, would've even wanted to make that type of sacrifice against the "red skins". Above everything else, Benteen is entering this situation on strange terms. He is given the orders that we do know about, the order to split from Custer with a large detachment and do whatever he was supposed to do. Benteen is confirmed that he did not quite know how to feel about this. He was maybe feeling like the two of each other were on bad terms and that Custer wanted to maybe work this campaign from a distance, possibly Benteen was thinking that maybe he was to maintain a "professional distance" so that they could work smoothly with one another without actually having to be by one another. Whatever the case, Benteen was not entering the battle with a full deck of cards as far as some people are thinking. And his temperance is advanced further by Reno's admitted state of disarray whereby Benteen had to intercede on his behalf due to the precarious mental state that Marcus Reno had manifested somewhere during the battle. Now we have Custer, expecting two "competent" officers to due their job as expected. What was expected, is what we are debating. I suppose the official "concrete" planning would've been passed along to people who were present with Custer for a longer duration, thus making Reno's neck of the woods to be the primary source of official survivors who would've known everything about anything of how they were mobilized to strike. Benteen, as I've said, hangs in the balance as a wild card. He is not immediately brought up to speed, but he's expected to act when the situation progresses and he would've been briefed (is that terminology correct?) in further detail as soon as any messenger could get a hold of him. But none of it weird or mysterious. Its simply Indian warfare and Benteen has got to hold up his side of the tent when the situation presents itself. Benteen is clinging to a variety of orders to remove himself from responsibility, but I'm not quite gonna believe (especially since I use that same trick on my parents, "I was asked to sweep the driveway, so it was not my responsibility to grab a fire extinguisher when the garage suddenly caught aflame." or something in that range of excuses. Not that I've ever done chores, or swept a drive way. Usually I just carry heavy things in and out of the house and no one asks me to do more than that.) Strange
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Post by bc on Feb 24, 2009 16:46:10 GMT -5
Fred:
Scouts' information:
I think we agree that Custer and others and advance scouting knowledge of at least 1500 warriors and a great camp.
I disagree with your use of the term "ignored", that Custer ignored the information provided by the scouts. "Ignored" implies that there was an alternate course of action had he "not ignored" the scouts' information. What would be your alternate course of action had he not ignored them?
I suppose some could say: 1. retreat to Terry telling him the 7th couldn't handle 1500 warriors; 2. hold in place, hope he isn't discovered and attacked, while sending a message to Terry saying Come on, Big village, Be quick, too big for 7th to handle alone; 3. learn that he has been discovered, hold in place while the village scatters to the four winds and be deemed a failure for not following his orders since no one will believe the 7th couldn't handle 1500 warriors; or 4. learn that he has been discovered and attack as best he can before they scatter.
Plan:
At the battalion halt, I would agree he had no plan to "attack". However he had a plan for a "reconnaisance in force" at that time until he gathered . First he had to determine if anyone was to the south who could attack his rear. The attack plan came in the area of the lone tepee which was after Gerard sighted the village to the north/downriver (nothing to the south) and Varnum also let him know there was nothing to the south/upriver and then the plan was later revised at MTC for his battalion. Reno and others also knew they were facing 1500 warriors and it didn't faze him with his head long attack into this massive village. I don't think anyone was concerned about the number of warriors until they stopped and fought.
I generally concur with Gordie up to MTC except I don't know exact locations of Kanipe, etc. The only part of the post MTC movement I can then agree on was an excursion to the northern fords with an attack there. When and how the companies died in the postions where there bodies were found is still up in the air for me.
bc
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 16:53:02 GMT -5
I am delighted you chimed in here, Gordie. Even though we may not agree of all the "theory" or all the "facts," your opinion is always helpful to me and I value it. Let me make a few comments. Despite somebody's assertion that Custer did not believe that there were large camps ahead, he is alleged to have said to the assemblage that "The greatest aggregation of Indians ever seen on this continent lies ahead, and I am going to attack it." Though I have never heard that quote from Custer and at that location, I do not dispute it. Whether he said anything like that simply adds to the fact he knew something was there whether or not he believed the claims of size and location. You seem to believe he thought it was huge; maybe 1,500 was the largest he thought it could have possibly been. This he proceeded to do, although he did not make a headlong rush, as some might have us believe. He moved with caution, with scouts out in front and to the left and right, and sent Benteen of to the left to see what might be seen (probably having been alerted by the Crows that the Lakotas often used the side valleys for camping or movement - as they had done only a weel before). You dissuaded me previously of "headlong" rushes, but I believe his movement down Ash Creek was in considerably more haste than allowed in the use of the word "caution." I completely agree with your Benteen mission and scouts as flankers during this move. When Gerard observed NDNs across the Little Horn, ostensibly hurrying away to the north, driving horses... Custer responded by sending Reno ahead, and shortly after that gave him the pursue and attack order, which might have been intended to fix the NDN warriors in place, or whatever.... No disagreement whatsoever. As Reno started ahead at a lope, Varnum had just returned from his scouting trip to the left, where he saw , as he said, NDNs mounted, in the valley, from every rise. This he reported to Custer, adding that "you can see for yourself from those bluffs up ahead on the right." Or words to that effect (those interested can look up the true quotes). At roughly the same time, or a tad earlier, Mitch Bouyer and the Crows, along with Hare, came down from their position of top of the Chalk Bluffs/Buttes/whatever, and reported to Custer that the camps stretched away to the north (the northern portions can be seen with glasses from that point- and the statement that they had been watching the camp through glasses all morning, mostly likely pertains to this sighting, not to any camp at the Lone Tipi site). This is of course, mere conjecture on my part, but.... It may be conjecture on your part, but it is good conjecture and I will join the party. If there were anything wrong with it, it would be too trivial to even worry about. After watering his horses in the North arm of Ash Creek (there are only a couple of places where there is sufficient water for five companies in late June), Custer immediately headed "north" onto the high ground (he went a couple of hundred yards west in order to use a good route). We begin to diverge a bit here, for I feel Custer went much closer to the LBH than this statement implies. There had been a very heavy winter run-off that spring and the small creeks feeding into each of the larger creeks were fairly flush. After going some distance, he left the command and rode to a high point of ground north of where Reno later entrenched. For those who might be interested in such things, this spot is located at 45 31 25 83 and 107 22 42 56 (approximately - I know the spot but not the exact coordinates). It is from near here that Knipe was sent back. Our divergence becomes a bit wider here. I will leave it at that. Custer saw Reno advancing down the valley; saw the large dust cloud; saw ponies being driven in toward the camps, and could see some of the latter, but not all, and not much. He continued on north, since it was difficult, if not impossible to get down the bluffs, and it would have served little or no purpose if he had done so - that leading to only another "stern chase," he likely figured. No disagreement either in theory or fact. So the command continued on. Custer went to the top of SSR, from where he could still not see the full extent of the camps. But he could see a mass exodus toward the north - what he took to be fleeing women, children, old persons and some warriors, mounted and not, taking belongings and not.... We disagree about Sharpshooters' Ridge-- but you know that. We do not disagree about what was happening in the valley and, probably, what was going through Custer's mind at this sight. He determined to head off this exodus, if he could, and "trap" the hostiles between Reno and himself. He needed to close up the regiment as quickly as possible, while not wasting time to wait for anyone's arrival, and so dispatched Martin. I wouldn't have phrased this the way you did, but I certainly wouldn't argue against your thesis here... so, I will agree. He then descended the east slope of SSR to the flat at the bottom, altered his formations, gathered in his flankers, and headed north. You already know my feelings here. I respect yours. He made a quick turn into MTC and then struck for the high ground north of same, from where he could for the first time see the full extent of the camps, and of the "flight" of the people. Same page here, Gordie. He then made an arcing approach toward the northern fords, which Mitch Bouyer had told him about, so as to conceal himself as best he could (and to use the easiest ground). I do not disagree with this statement at all. Where we disagree here is Custer's trip/no-trip to Ford B. That is what he did. What motivated him to do what he did is my opinion, based upon what he could see and what he was told. That part of it is conjecture, the physical events and locations are not. I feel the same way about my "physical events and locations." One of these days, Gordie, you and I are going to have to get drunk over this. Then when we rise together into Libbie's mist, old GAC will greet us and say, "Here's where you're wrong, boys...." Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 17:32:50 GMT -5
BC--
I have no disagreement that Custer expected as many as 1,500 warriors, though I believe he felt the number closer to 800. I also believe he had good reason to think he could whip 1,500 whether or not they stood and fought. Quite frankly, I think he could have... had he kept his command together or divided it with proper support between the divisions. If there had been only 1,500 Indians, then 60% of that force attacked Reno, who represented only 24% of the regiment. Even had Reno and Custer remained together and attacked in the valley, their combined force represented the same proportion of the total available that the 900 warriors represented of the supposed 1,500. Using a similar proportion for the Indians would have projected a force of more than 3,600 warriors, something I do not believe Custer could have handled had he stood on his head.
It appears my continued comments about Custer not following the advice of, or ignoring the warnings of, the scouts, seems to drive everyone nuts, but I will continue to hold my position based on a fairly good grasp of military tactics and what appears to me to be the mind-set of George Custer. As for his "ignoring" the scouts' warnings, his simple course of action would have been to obey his orders, regardless of the clear signs the Sioux had made the turn west. Custer could have sent a small party to shadow the Indians, sending riders back if information needed to be relayed. After all, no one has ever been able to answer the question of what the hell would Custer have done had the Indians turned south rather than north. Since he only made the decision to attack in the late-morning of the 25th, he had already planned on laying low when he moved west off the Rosebud and no one had a clue that the Sioux had moved in the direction they were supposedly least likely to take. In addition, by not scouting Tullock's when he should have, he eliminated a choice for Terry. I am not saying Terry would have moved up Tullock's had he known it to be clear, but the area was a known Indian campground and its passes served as a perfect egress to the east. Wouldn't that have been nice?
As for Custer's routes toward and into MTC, I have said all I am going to say about that issue. I am blue in the face about it and if anyone wants more, I will simply refer them to the summer 2008 edition of the LBHA's Research Review. The person I respect the most in all of this business is a fellow named Don Horn and he disagrees with me, so if he can't persuade me, no one can, not without a video-cam. From a military point of view-- and remember, I am enthralled by military tactics and map collecting and always have been, so I have some knowledge in that regard-- nothing else makes sense. That's especially so when one considers, (a) "the man"; and (b) the unfolding situation. We again tend to make this whole thing way too complicated: KISS prevails; speed and simplicity are the keys here. Not formations and plans and changes and circuitous routes and digressions. It was a fast, sharp, mobile operation that required thinking on the fly and a quick wit, not a lot of looking and watching... and on and on.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by cisdyd on Feb 24, 2009 17:46:39 GMT -5
Damned good conversation folks-I was getting pretty shell-shocked because of the Peter Thompson thread (sorry Steve & Gerry.)
Fred & Gordie, if I read both of your posts correctly, you two are pretty much in agreement that GAC was acting in a rational, perhaps improvisational, but still rational manner as a commander. If so, I agree although that and $1.75 can get you a cup of coffee somewhere.
Gordie, can you share the source of that Custer quote about the "greatest aggregation"? I am not disputing your word, only like Fred, it is the first I have heard of that and while not up to Fred's and others' caliber on LBH, something like that would have stuck in my mind like a catchy but terrible song.
Billy
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 17:53:21 GMT -5
Billy--
I for one, thank you. I agree, this is a great "conversation," and I am delighted Britt has chimed in as well, because I like what he brings to things. We don't always agree-- so what else is new?!-- but he's a thinker and that always adds tremendously.
Now we need something from you....
Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by cisdyd on Feb 24, 2009 17:56:54 GMT -5
Billy-- <snip> Now we need something from you.... Very best wishes, Fred. Uh...99 bottles of beer on the wall, 98 bottles of beer on the wall, glug, glug, 97 bottles of beer on the wall, glug, glug, glug... Burp, Billy
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 24, 2009 17:59:13 GMT -5
Apparently the most important factor that people seem to forget is the fear that the Indians would not make a stand, would run, scatter in all directions and the campaign would fizzle out with no decisive battle to force the hostiles (after all, it was the HOSTILES that were the target) not all the Indians reservations that unbeknowst to everyone had joined them.
Reno's orders were to BRING the Indians to battle . . . Custer was afraid the Indians wouldn't fight and would split. Custer meanwhile would head downriver and try to bring any Indians there to battle at best, or worst capture non-coms and/or the village proper.
Size did not seem to be a factor to anyone, yet it WAS the size of the village and NUMBERS of warriors that was the factor . . . and it's more than likely the command knew the village was large but still would not make a stand . . . again the phobia of Indians running forcing the military to make plans on that assumption.
When the Indians took their stand all the plans for Indians running went out the window and the separated commands were now vulnerable to hordes of Indians taking out each unit.
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Post by benteeneast on Feb 24, 2009 18:05:14 GMT -5
Damned good conversation folks-I was getting pretty shell-shocked because of the Peter Thompson thread (sorry Steve & Gerry.) Fred & Gordie, if I read both of your posts correctly, you two are pretty much in agreement that GAC was acting in a rational, perhaps improvisational, but still rational manner as a commander. If so, I agree although that and $1.75 can get you a cup of coffee somewhere. Gordie, can you share the source of that Custer quote about the "greatest aggregation"? I am not disputing your word, only like Fred, it is the first I have heard of that and while not up to Fred's and others' caliber on LBH, something like that would have stuck in my mind like a catchy but terrible song. Billy I agree great conversation. I think either Thompson, Kanipe or Goldin heard Custer say it. Just kidding Steve Gordie, Fred, and Billy I am just mad that I bought some book that doesn't have all the narratve in it yet is titled as if it does. Would not be the first Custer related book that didn't pan out. Semper Fi
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