Guard Forces in Doctrine Jul 14, 2011 23:47:49 GMT -5
Post by keogh on Jul 14, 2011 23:47:49 GMT -5
Jul 14, 2011 23:22:03 GMT -5 @brittles said:Keogh: You are confusing the operational arts with tactics. Lee was an Army commander. At the Army and Corps level where Lee and Jackson were it is these operational arts that come into play. Tactics start at the division and move downward. So your example of Lee and Jackson at Chancellorsville is not akin to the Custer/ Reno battlefield relationship where small unit tactics prevailed.
Yes, I understand the difference. But on a larger scale we are still dealing with the fact that Lee's small force had to hold out all day against superior odds until his force could be supported by Jackson's flanking attack. My point being that both Lee and Reno had to hold on until that support arrived. Lee had the capacity, as well as the will, to hold on for over 10 hours until his support arrived. Reno had only to hold on for 15 more minutes. Same situation, only on a smaller scale.
Now, if you would prefer me to use a smaller unit tactical example to make my point, I would refer to Crook sending out a battalion of Cavalry under Capt. Anson Mills to search for and attack the Indian village which he thought was further up Rosebud Creek during the height of the Rosebud Battle. Mills was sent several miles away and far beyond any tactical support. His sudden arrival behind the Indian force caused their immediate withdrawal from the battle. Col. Royall's battalion was also deployed several miles away and well beyond the tactical support suggested by Montrose. Cavalry commanders would consistently maneuver and deploy their forces far beyond immediate tactical support, at least in the way Infantry officers might view it.