I'm not sure you took those 6 points as I meant.... My analysis was talking about Custer being at the divide already when I thought you said he ignored the scouts and you are referring to back on the Rosebud. As part of your plan you also were stating that Custer was making a mistake by ignoring the scouts. I was trying to show it wasn't a mistake but a matter of choice with few alternatives.
In this regard, I agree with you. Once at the divide, Custer was committed because now he realized he had been spotted. The fact that no one alerted the village was unfortunately fortuitous for the Seventh.
But we agree that he was pretty much committed at the divide.
Yes, we agree here; absolutely.
As an aside, it gets me also when people say Custer was surprised by the number of NAs and failed to realize how many were there but I say wrong, the scouts, the signs, and everyone else told him or he recogizned that there were a large number of NAs.
But you see, this is part of what I mean when I say he ignored what his scouts were telling him. He chose a poor alternative to following the letter of Terry's orders. This is all I am saying when I say he ignored his scouts.
At the risk of boring everyone to tears, I have snipped some excerpts from my notes and pasted them here. If you read these things closely, you will see the pattern developing and-- probably because of hindsight-- you should walk away feeling amazed at how much these guys either
failed to comprehend or
chose not to comprehend.
June 22, 1876--
12:40pm—Reach mouth of Rosebud. Wallace described it as a narrow creek, about three or four feet wide and three inches deep! The mouth, however, was broad. High bluffs to the west, sage-covered hills to the east. The narrow creek snaked through the eastern flats.
√ Column stops to re-tie packs, sloppily done in the early morning, probably because most of the packers were hung-over.
√ Rainy day.
√ Cross to west side of the Rosebud (left bank).
√ Custer sent the Rees out in advance—though their fear of the Sioux kept them remarkably close to the column—with Soldier leading one group and Bob-tail Bull leading another.
√ LT Wallace wrote: “‘… the trail followed the high ground, or second bottom, where the soil was poor, the grass thin, and crowded out by sagebrush and cactus. In the lower part of the valley the soil appeared to be good, the grazing fair, the bottom timbered with large cottonwood. Small willows grew thickly along the banks in many places…’” [Dustin, in Willert,
LBH Diary, pp. 216-217]
√ Because the valley narrowed sharply, Custer was forced to cross and re-cross the creek, causing problems with the pack mules as they struggled through the foliage-hidden creek bed.
√ As the column moved farther up the valley, the terrain got more difficult.
4pm—Custer ordered camp near the base of a steep bluff, about 12 miles from where they
started, 10 miles up the Rosebud. Wood, grass, and water were in adequate supply. (Verified by Godfrey. [Smalley,
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 2-2])
√ Rain stopped.
Evening (about sunset)—Officers conference called by Custer.
√ Custer tells his officers of his estimates of the size of the Indian force:
• Indian Office in Washington estimated 3,000 persons, translating to 850 warriors. That tied in with Boyer’s estimate of 400 lodges = 800 warriors.
• Custer figured another 500 might come out of the agencies for the summer, making a maximum of 1,500. No more!
• “This figure was an underestimate, for General Sheridan’s attempts to control the agency Indians with heavy garrisons would drive out exceptionally large numbers of summer roamers. That was what Custer did not know.” [Gray,
Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 208]
◊ This ties in perfectly with what Connell said about the agencies.
√ Custer announces no more trumpet calls; officers’ watches synchronized.
• Benteen designated Officer-of-the-Day for the following day. [Mills,
Harvest of Barren Regrets, p. 240]
√ LT Godfrey wrote that watches were compared to ensure they were set on “official time.” [Godfrey,
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 17] This was the only instance of comparing watches mentioned in any of the journals. [Smalley,
LBH Mysteries, p. 2-9]
√ Custer gave great discretion to the troop commanders, saying the only thing to come out of his HQ would be, “when to move out of and when to go into camp. All other details, such as reveille, stables, watering, halting, grazing, etc., on the march would be left to the judgment and discretion of the troop commanders; they were to keep within supporting distance of each other, not to get ahead of the scouts, or very far to the rear of the column.” [Godfrey,
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 16]
√ Godfrey made the necessary preparations and gave the necessary orders to his company. During this routine, he came to the bivouac area of the scouts and met up with Mitch Boyer, Bloody Knife, and Half Yellow Face. Boyer saw him and—apparently at the suggestion of the Crow—asked Godfrey, “‘Have you ever fought against these Sioux?’” The following conversation ensued:
• Godfrey: “ ‘Yes,’ I replied. Then he [Boyer] asked, ‘Well, how many do you expect to find?’ I answered, ‘It is said we may find between one thousand and fifteen hundred.’ ‘Well, do you think we can whip that many?’ ‘Oh, yes, I guess so.’ After he had interpreted our conversation, he said to me with a good deal of emphasis, ‘Well, I can tell you we are going to have a ----- big fight.’” [Godfrey,
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 17]
June 23, 1876—Friday—
3am—Stable guards moved throughout the camp waking the troopers. Their breakfast consisted of black coffee and fried bacon cooked over small fires dug into the earth.
5am—Depart camp. Custer led out, followed by two sergeants, one carrying the regimental
standard, the other carrying Custer’s personal flag. Godfrey mentioned it was the same flag Custer carried in the “Rebellion.” The column continues up the Rosebud, crossing and re-crossing, for about 30 miles. Benteen’s H and two other companies brought up the rear, behind the recalcitrant mules [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 226], now re-organized into one command following the main column. (Time verified by Wallace, Godfrey, and Herendeen. [Smalley,
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 2-3])
√ The lead party probably consisted of Custer, Bloody Knife, Boyer, Herendeen, and Half Yellow Face. [Smalley,
More LBH Mysteries, p. 1-4]
√ Another very hot day.
7:40am—Cross river to right bank, pass 1st Sioux camp (8 miles). “‘Here’s where Reno
made the mistake of his life. He had six troops of cavalry and rations enough for a number of days. He’d have made a name for himself if he’d pushed on after them.’” Remark made to Varnum. [Varnum in Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 227] Benteen said the village was “immense.”
• It should be noted here that according to Wooden Leg, there were 6 Indian camps along the Rosebud. The “sundance” camp was number 5 and the Busby/Mouth-of-Davis Creek camp was the 6th and last. The 7th was in Davis Creek valley; the 8th, along Reno Creek; the 9th and 10th in the LBH valley.
√ This was the Indian camp Bradley had seen.
√ 350-400 lodges
• LT Godfrey was perplexed by the “numerous stands of brush, whose crowns had been joined to form a kind of overhead framework.” At first, the troops thought it was to protect the Indians’ dogs, but it was later learned and Wooden Leg also told Marquis, these were wickiups housing young, single warriors who had joined the main camp. [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 228; Godfrey,
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 17]
• Keep this size in mind when wondering about Custer’s thinking and planning.
• Gray—The Indian Office in Washington, D.C., had told Custer they estimated the winter roamers at 3,000 persons, i.e., 850 warriors. That further tallied with Boyer’s estimates of villagers on the Tongue and Rosebud Rivers, i.e., 400 lodges, 800 warriors.
• Custer figured 1,000 + another 500 coming out of the agencies, the so-called “summer roamers.”
• What Custer did not know was that Sheridan’s attempts to control the agencies with larger garrisons (the 5th Cavalry) drove exceptionally large numbers of Indians out of the agencies. These summer roamers joined the winter roamers.
• How did Custer ever reconcile the vast discrepancies in these numbers? What about the telegrams Terry sent to Sheridan, first 2,000 lodges, then 1,500, vs. what he was seeing now?
• As a review,
◊ Spotted Tail: instead of 9,610, there were 2,315
◊ Red Cloud: instead of 12,873, there were 4,760
◊ Cheyenne River: instead of 7,586, there were 2,280
◊ Standing Rock: instead of 7,322, there were 2,305
♠ Totals: instead of 37,391, there were 11,660
√ At one of these first Sioux encampments, the Ree scouts discovered ancient pictographs (they mistook for new), that Bloody Knife interpreted to mean: Do not follow the Dakotas into the Bighorn country... for they will turn and destroy you. [Connell]
10:20am—Pass 2nd Sioux camp (Teat Butte, 26 miles up the Rosebud), right bank; another
8 miles.
11am—Go another 2 miles; halt for pack train.
11:30am—Leave halt up right bank.
1:30pm—Cross Greenleaf Creek and reach 3rd Sioux camp—the Greenleaf site (34 miles
up the Rosebud), 6 miles farther up. Wooden Leg claimed this was the 4th Indian camp on the Rosebud. See May 28th.
√ These last 2 camps were no more than 14 miles from the first and the trail kept widening. Everyone assumed these camps were simply consecutive locations of one village and not possibly separate villages, all ultimately moving in the same southerly direction. Reno worried about this, but apparently was the only one who did.
(Thread: “June 20: Ass-Chewing Tuesday”)
Post by “conz” on Oct 25, 2007, 12:07pm
Reno says in his autobiography:
"I was chastised by General Terry for going to the Rosebud. I do not think his discomfort was so much with me as with the fact that the information I brought forced him to change his plans. Custer also condemned my actions, saying that I ran too much risk of being discovered. Both seemed to hint that I was 'glory hunting,' when in fact I had neither the ammunition nor the supplies to have taken on the hostiles. What I really did was to prove that Terry's plan was futile and by forcing him to revise the plan saved him a great deal of embarrassment.
"One of the most important bits of intelligence was never known to us. The signs we found were all signs of the winter roamers only; the summer roamers had not yet joined them. This fact caused everyone to grossly underestimate the ultimate size of the village we would encounter on June twenty-fifth at Little Big Horn."
√ Varnum writes: “We struck not only the trail of the Indians but the entire valley of the Rosebud appeared to have been a camp, where they had moved along as the grass was grazed off.” [Varnum,
I, Varnum, p. 85]
√ “The trail in some places was at least 300 yards in width and deeply worn. The scouts said that it had been made by about 1,500 lodges, and since there were doubtless other trails, they agreed that it proved that enormous numbers of Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes had left the agencies to join Sitting Bull. But the officers, misled by the report that there were only five to 800 warriors in the hostile bands, missed the significance of the trail entirely and persisted in believing that these large camps—they were from 1/3 to 1/2 a mile in diameter—were a succession of camps of a single band, rather than what they were, the single camp of several large bands together.” [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 259]
• “Our trail… was from a quarter to half a mile wide at all places where the form of the land allowed that width. Indians regularly made a broad trail when traveling in bands using travois. People behind often kept in the tracks of people in front, but when the party of travelers was a large one there were many of such tracks side by side.” [Marquis,
Wooden Leg, p. 207]
2:30pm-3pm—The valley narrowed to about 1/4 mile in width, bordered by steep, rocky
hills covered in pine. It was along this stretch that Reno turned back. LT Wallace wrote, the “‘country back from the hills looked to be very much broken.” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 229] It was ideal country for an ambush.
4:30pm—The column moved up the right bank, another 9 miles. Custer orders the
regiment to pitch camp on a broad, sage plain. The camp was located near the present-day junction with the Colstrip Road [Gray]. Willert says where Lee Coulee enters the Rosebud Valley. They had traveled 33 miles for the day [Godfrey,
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 18], 43 miles from the mouth of the river. (Halt time verified by Wallace [Smalley,
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 2-3]; Godfrey claimed it was “about 5 p. m.”[
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, pp. 17-18])
√ Pleasant summer aromas of plum, crabapple, and wild roses. Ash and elder covered the creek banks rather than the more common willow and cottonwood. To the west, rugged pine-covered bluffs; to the east, less rugged cliffs of sandstone, topped with pine.
Sunset—The last of the pack train arrived in camp.
Evening— This seems to be the evening Custer’s personal guidon blew down repeatedly, interpreted by some officers as a bad omen.
√ The Indians prepared to move downriver as even more Indians joined them. They would move the next morning.
N. B. — On 28Jun76—three days after the battle—CPT Edward Ball (H/2C) tracked the Sioux up the LBH valley and discovered another, very large Indian trail leading downriver.
June 24, 1876—Saturday—
4:30am (just before daybreak)—5 Crows eat their breakfast and leave early to scout the route of advance.
5am—Regiment leaves camp, moving up the right bank, riding hard. Half Yellow Face and
Boyer rode with Custer. (Time verified by Wallace and Herendeen. [Smalley,
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 2-3])
√ The air was cool, crisp, and invigorating.
√ CPT Yates designated OD. [Mills,
Harvest of Barren Regrets, p. 243]
√ Curley soon returns to the main column.
√ “Evidences of deserted camps continued to be found along the valley; but, interestingly, none appeared to be significantly larger than those already examined.” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 236]
6:10am—4 Crows reach Lame Deer Creek where they find fresh trails of summer roamers
joining the main trail.
√ Godfrey wrote that they “passed a great many camping places, all appearing to be of the same strength.” Then, in one of the more telling admissions of error, he remarked, “One would naturally suppose these were the successive camping-places of the same village, when in fact they were the continuous camps of several bands. The fact that they appeared to be of nearly the same age, that is, having been made at the same time, did not impress us then.” [
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 18]
7am ± — Custer tells Herendeen to get ready to take Charlie Reynolds and scout Tullock’s
Creek, but Herendeen tells him it’s too early yet, that the gap leading to the creek’s headwaters is still farther ahead. Boyer concurs.
7:10am—The Crows report in. They reported fresh tracks, “‘but in no great numbers.”
[Herendeen/Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 237] The Crows also told Custer the trail was fresher 10 miles ahead.
√ “… three or four ponies and of one Indian on foot.” [Godfrey,
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 18]
√ Custer now calls his officers together for a quick briefing.
7:30am—Resume march at a fast walk, up right bank.
√ Custer moved out in front with the scouts and 2 companies, the remainder of the regiment following about a half-mile behind. They moved at a fast walk.
√ Regiment was required to march on separate trails to keep the dust clouds down.
√ They moved slowly, up the right bank (the east bank).
√ Custer sends the 4 Crows ahead again.
√ Godfrey: “The march during the day was tedious. We made many long halts so as not to get ahead of the scouts, who seemed to be doing their work thoroughly, giving special attention to the right, toward Tulloch’s Creek, the valley of which was in general view from the divide. Once or twice smoke signals were reported in that direction. The weather was dry and had been for some time, consequently the trail was very dusty. The troops were required to march on separate trails so that the dust clouds would not rise so high. The valley was heavily marked with lodge-pole trails and pony tracks, showing that immense herds of ponies had been driven over it.” [Godfrey,
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 18]
√ They moved slowly, up the right bank (the east bank).
√ More and more pictographs were discovered on the sandstone out-cropping.
9:20am—The Crows, trotting at 6mph, reach the abandoned Sioux camp at East Muddy
Creek.
9:40am—The Crows head back to the column after studying the campsite.
10:30am—Pass Lame Deer Creek (6 miles), basically where Boyer had turned back to the
column when he was on Reno’s scout; Crows report again.
√ The 4 Crows report the abandoned campsite at East Muddy Creek.
√ Herendeen spots an Indian trail that diverged up Lame Deer Creek and he follows it. It continued to diverge and he turned back to report to Custer.
Some time in mid-morning—The Indians dismantle their village, preparing to cross to the west side of the LBH, and begin moving downstream, the Cheyenne leading, the Hunkpapa bringing up the rear.
Late morning—Suddenly, to everyone’s surprise, “the first of the campsites to be of
considerable size and dimension was encountered. This had been the place of the Sun Dance celebration of the Indians.” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 237]
• According to Wooden Leg, the sundance camp would have been the 5th Indian camp along the Rosebud.
√ Gray claimed this was the first camp encountered this day and this was the first halt, around 6:30am. Others disagree.
• Gray places the distance at 1 mile above (4 miles for the day, so far).
√ It was “a short distance below the valley which today guides to the small settlement of Lame Deer…” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 237]
√ A scalp was found on a willow twig and someone brought it to Custer. It was identified as belonging to PVT Stocker (H/2C), one of the 3 men killed from Gibbon’s command (23May76). Godfrey claimed this was found in the sun dance camp. [
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 18]
√ The “sundance” camp was much larger than the others and LT Godfrey remarked, “It was whilst here that the Indians from the agencies had joined the hostiles’ camp.” [
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 18]
√ Sun dance pole was probably in excess of 35 feet high.
√ Troops discovered a sand pictograph (in a sweat lodge), the Ree and Crow scouts interpreted to mean “many soldiers plummeting towards an Indian village.”
√ Also found an iconograph—3 red stones in a row—meaning a Sioux victory.
√ Also: a cairn of rocks with the skull of a buffalo on one side and the skull of a cow on the other, with a stick aimed at the cow. “This meant the Sioux would fight like bulls and the whites would run like women.” [Connell,
Sun of the Morning Star, p. 267]
• All these things indicated just how confident the Indians were.
√ Located several hundred yards west of the state highway that now parallels Rosebud Creek. (Willert claimed it was “a short distance below the valley which today guides to the small settlement of Lame Deer.” {
LBH Diary, p. 237})
Before noon—The advance is continued.
√ Herendeen—Godfrey, as well—spots an Indian trail of lodge poles that diverged up a tributary valley leading to Lame Deer Creek. He reports this to Custer.
√ Scouts sent out, some to summon Varnum and when he reported in, Custer instructed him to check out Herendeen’s diverging trail. Varnum protested that his scouts could not have missed any such trail, but he went out to check anyway.
• Varnum claimed that Custer told him it was LT Godfrey who reported the diverging trail. {
I, Varnum, pp. 60 and 85; also, Hammer,
Custer in 76, p. 59, Camp’s notes}
√ LT Hare was now assigned to assist Varnum.
1pm—Custer orders a halt, waiting for Varnum’s return. This was the 2nd halt of the day,
at East Muddy Creek, 5th Sioux camp (5 miles). Halt time verified by Wallace. (Smalley,
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 2-3)
√ Varnum and his scouts follow the diverging trail and discover that it was merely a branch-off from the main trail and it swings west, re-joining the main trail.
√ There was some speculation as to why the trail had diverged.
√ Custer sends out Crows to scout the advance.
√ It was probably here that the Indian trail became “more than a mile wide, the earth so furrowed by thousands of travois poles that it resembled a plowed field.” (Connell,
Son of the Morning Star, p. 267; see 17Jun76)
√ “The assemblage was a straggling one, since the hostiles did not move in ‘Indian file’ but in a wide, irregular column, each family traveling by itself, and the group was spread out probably one mile wide and over three miles in length.” [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 192]
• Despite the cumbersome formation, they could move with remarkable speed, covering as much as 50 miles a day.
√ Gray never specifically mentions Connell’s huge trail, but he does say, “everyone noted puzzling changes in the Indian trail.... Instead of a single heavy trail with old campsites a day’s journey apart, there were now multiple trails in various directions and small scattered campsites, some growing fresher and fresher. These were, in fact, converging trails left by summer roamers coming out to join the winter roamers.” [Gray,
Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 215]
√ Gray goes on to explain why this was of such concern to Custer and why he spent the next 4 hours bivouacked, while he sent scouts scurrying hither and yon. This is also an extremely important point when considering Custer’s actions and strategy during the battle: “Every officer on the frontier knew only too well that Indians shunned pitched battles and were so mobile and elusive as to be frustratingly difficult to corral. Thus the overriding fear was that the village would break up and scatter.” (
Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 215)
√ Troops made coffee and prepared a meal.
√ After about a 12-mile trot over 2 hours, out and back, Varnum reported Herendeen’s trail did diverge, but it eventually re-joined the main trail. He also reported the trail became fresher by the mile and the signs indicated an immense force of Indians.
√ “Lame Deer Creek joins Rosebud Creek…. Near the junction of the two streams, the crossing of Lame Deer is mandatory. Rosebud Creek skirts the high banks on the left bank, making travel on the right bank more accessible due to the opening up of the valley on that side.
“The vast Indian trail heading up Rosebud Creek all but obliterated any good crossing of Lame Deer Creek. Therefore, if any of the bands of Lakota traveling near the end of the vast assemblage wanted to cross Lame Deer Creek, they most likely would have turned and headed up Lame Deer Creek a short distance, crossed the creek, and instead of following the creek back down to the Rosebud, would have cut across country picking up the main trail again farther on.
“… [T]he deviant travois trail left Rosebud Creek, traveled southeast up Lame Deer Creek about 0.7 miles from the Rosebud, crossed the creek, thence skirting bluffs to the south eventually wound its way back to the trail again. This deviation most assuredly followed the ‘short cut,’ or tribal road for a short distance before rejoining the main trail.” [Heski, “‘Don’t Let Anything Get Away’,” Summer 2007
Research Review, p.10]
√ Heski feels the reason Custer halted was to wait for Varnum to return.
Afternoon—The Indians’ move downstream begins. Most accounts claim they
were preparing to move again, either the same day or the day after Custer struck, making this only a temporary camp.
4pm—Crow courier (White Swan) returns, reports finding a fresh camp at the forks of the
Rosebud.
• Heski feels this was an indication that the hostiles were no more than 30 miles away. [“‘Don’t Let Anything Get Away’,” p. 11]
√ Varnum returns and reports that the trail links up again with the main trail, up the
Rosebud and farther westward.
• Varnum also told Custer, “that the trail sign indicated a force of immense size ahead, that the trail was fresher by the mile, that a ‘… fresh camp…’ had been found ‘… at the forks of the Rosebud…’ some 10 or a dozen miles west, and that the hostiles, at this time, were probably ‘… not more than 30 miles away…” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 240]
5pm—Custer resumes his march up the Rosebud, now across to the narrow, sage covered
left bank of the valley, passing “‘… through several large camps. The trail was now fresh and the whole valley scratched up by trailing lodgepoles.’” (Wallace/Gray,
Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 217) Departure time verified by Wallace. (Smalley,
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 2-3)
√ Custer sends out flankers—Varnum took the left front, Hare took the right front—to check for diverging trails, again worried about the village breaking up. “‘He said he wanted to get the whole village and nothing must leave the trail without his knowing it.’”[Herendeen/Gray, p. 217]
• Only converging trails found, but Custer and his officers never grasped the meaning, always thinking the trails moved away. “The fresh side trails represented agency Indians finally joining the large camp.” [Donovan,
A Terrible Glory, p. 198]
√ Column moves very slowly.
• Several more campsites found.
√ A number of halts were made; very dusty. Trail heavily marked by lodge poles and pony herds.
√ Herendeen was impressed by the fact that the village sites seemed so close to one another.
√ Heski states, “Another reason for the halt… was the remains of another village site a few miles west of Muddy Creek.” Herendeen said the halt was for two hours—between 1 p. m. and 3 p. m.: “… the command started ahead on the large trail again, which became fresher as we advanced. We passed over places where a number of camps had been pitched quite close together from which we wrongly inferred that the Indians had been traveling very slowly and moving only for grass… these camping places represented the village of separate bands or tribes simultaneously encamped and not successive camps by any one band.” (Heski, Summer ’07
RR, p. 11, citing the Camp Field Notes, folders 40-41, BYU Library)
6:30pm—The command reaches the gap in the western hills that led to the headwaters of
Tullock’s Creek. Herendeen told Custer, but the latter only kept moving forward and Herendeen simply remained in the column. No trails went in the direction of Tullock’s Creek.
√ Godfrey wrote that smoke signals were reported—once or twice—from the direction of Tullock’s Creek valley. (
Custer’s Last Battle 1876, p. 18)
√ “But Custer—Herendeen recalled—only looked at him, said not a word, and finally the civilian scout reined back to once again take his place in the moving column. Herendeen was unable to fathom Custer’s curious behavior at this junction, but Custer’s reason should have been obvious—the hostiles trail continued up the Rosebud Valley, but where did it lead?” [Willert,
LBH Diary, p. 241]
7:30-7:45pm [nearly sunset]—Custer orders the command into camp at the Busby Bend
(present-day town of Busby, MT, approximately 70 miles from the Yellowstone), on the right bank (12 miles; 27 miles for the day; Godfrey claimed 28 miles).
√ It was here that Varnum had discovered the fresh camp.
√ PVT Windolph wrote: “… went into camp at sundown. In late June up here in the Northwest country that means around 9 o’clock.” (Heski, “‘Don’t Let Anything Get Away’,” p. 12, citing Frazier and Robert Hunt,
I Fought With Custer: The Story of Sergeant Windolph: Last Survivor of the Battle of the Little Big Horn, p. 73)
√ Camp approximately 2 miles below and opposite the (upper) Rosebud forks, specifically, Davis Creek. On the right was a high bluff and between this bluff and the river was a level, grassy plateau (about 200 yards wide) covered with wild roses.
√ Camp was located in a freshly abandoned summer roamer campsite.
√ George Herendeen stated: “About four o’clock we came to the place where the village had been apparently only a few days before, and went into camp two miles below the forks of the Rosebud [i.e., Davis Creek]. The scouts all again pushed out to look for the village…” [Hutchins,
The Army and Navy Journal on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, p. 40,
Narrative of A Scout, July 7, 1876]
• Heski explains the time difference—Herendeen’s 4 p. m. versus the 7:45 pm—by saying Herendeen probably arrived at the bivouac site earlier with the scouts.
7:45pm [nearly sunset]—Custer sends White Man Runs Him, Goes Ahead, and Hairy
Moccasin to explore farther up the valley to see if they could find which stream the Indians had taken.
√ “The Cheyenne location was about 2 miles north from the present railroad station at Garryowen, Montana. We were near the mouth of a small creek flowing from the southwestward into the river. Across the river east of us and a little upstream from us was a broad coulee, or little valley, having now the name Medicine Tail coulee.” [Marquis,
Wooden Leg, p. 206]
I hope the length of this thing hasn't chased anyone away. To me, as I read it, it means that there was every indication of something monumentally large looming out there, and it was completely mis-read by the commanders. I do not believe that was the case with the scouts, as there are those subtle indications of advice.
Also, to me, the Rosebud excursion is inextricably intertwined with the divide and the decision to deviate from the Rosebud up Davis Creek. Everything has to be looked at as a whole and-- again, to me-- one must judge GAC's tactics in light of a "failure" to adhere to the strict letter of Terry's orders. You cannot separate them.
My breast is bared... I shall attempt to fend off the thrown rocks!!!!
Very best wishes,
Fred.
PS-- By the way, for those of you who are driven crazy by all my "symbols" in this thing, I merely use them as indents. A "check" is the first indent off a "time." A "dot" is an indent off the check; the "diamond" is an indent off the dot; and that lone "spade" is simply an indent off the diamond. Any deviations from this are because I have eliminated things for this post. These boards won't take a "tab" key to show how I have my original notes organized.
FCW