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Post by bc on Feb 24, 2009 18:38:18 GMT -5
Ignored Scouts: Ok Fred, I understand you would have had Custer lay low and have a small party shadow the NAs sending riders back to relay messages. However you were also concerned with what would Custer do if the NAs moved south.
First I believe it was Gerard and/or Varnum in their RCOI testimony that they suspected 1500 warriors which was talked about around the night halt. (Gordie's exact quote is a new one to me too and sounds like a Robert Shaw movie quote) Which Custer probably already knew about the NAs since they were following these massive trails since turning west from the Rosebud. They already knew where the NAs were going. The view from the Crow's nest probably told Custer most of the NAs were north of Reno Creek but because of the bluffs to the south, they couldn't see for sure necessitation Benteen's movement.
The problems with your "Custer ignoring the scouts and then shadow the NAs while sending riders back theory" are many. 1. like you said if they went south he couldn't stop them as the next crossing of the Wolf mountains was too far south and too hard to get to in order to head them off and also didn't stop the NAs if they decided to go southwest to the Bighorn mtns as they eventually did after the battle. 2. they had been discovered by the NAs both with the lost pack and the other group out hunting. 3. The NA camp was not moving to allow it to be shadowed. It was stationary at the time (I'd agree if they came upon a moving camp then shadow it for a while). It could have remained there for days. Had the village started moving when they did discover Custer, Custer could not cut them off or prevent them from scattering to the south and southwest. 4. Custer would have to expose his command and move them southwest over virtually impassable terrain to prevent a south or southwest movement. 5. At the time, they didn't know if the village already extended south of Reno creek. 6. That would require coordination with Terry and since the start on the 22nd, Custer was "not" communicating with Terry and even ignored a chance to have Herendeen return. Working with Terry was not a part of the mindset of Custer.
Your shadow theory only works if Custer would have headed southwest from the Crow's nest over virtually impassable terrain in what would have been full view of the NAs with his command in an effort to drive the NAs to the north. Your shadow theory could have also worked if Custer had reason to believe Crook had crossed over from the Rosebud to the LBH/BH valleys but he had no such information and Crook was out of the Terry/Gibbon/Custer AO. But then I believe his orders were to seek out and engage the NAs anyway and I don't see anybody including Reno, Benteen, Godfrey, and others disputing that. For all we know, Custer may have thought about or talked about your shadow plan but decided to take a different course of action since they had been discovered. They had been shadowing the trails since the Rosebud. I believe he would have laid low for a dawn attack if at all possible.
Plan: You agreed with Benteen that there was no plan. I stated what I thought and Gordie did also. You didn't really address what I said about the plan(1. recon in force while at the battalion halt 2. then attack the village while at the lone tepee/Gerards 2nd knoll). I would add that I suspect they talked generally at officer's call and/or at the battalion halt, that if they came up on the south end of the village they would attack it there and then flank it. This was what was done and Reno saw Custer proceed on north and "not" follow Reno's trail.
Routes of travel: I agree with you that there are numeorus disputes over the particular routes of travel and I'm not sure this thread was meant to argue them as you stated. Gordie provided some specific information but probably beyond the scope of this thread.
Reno creek movement: I'd consider Custer's movement down Reno creek using utmost haste combined with just enough tactical caution to avoid running into a NA trap on Reno creek proper. He had scouts on both sides and in the front with flankers and he was riding in battle formation. This was based on their observations from the Crow's nest that there were no big concentrations of NAs, tepees, etc. in Reno creek.
bc
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 18:49:41 GMT -5
Before I make any responses I just signed in and noticed my old SF buddy, George Mabry, has checked in. Now we'll have some good fun!
Let me read....
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 19:09:13 GMT -5
Apparently the most important factor that people seem to forget is the fear that the Indians would not make a stand, would run, scatter in all directions and the campaign would fizzle out with no decisive battle to force the hostiles .... Reno's orders were to BRING the Indians to battle . . . Custer was afraid the Indians wouldn't fight and would split. Custer meanwhile would head downriver and try to bring any Indians there to battle at best, or worst capture non-coms and/or the village proper. Size did not seem to be a factor to anyone, yet it WAS the size of the village and NUMBERS of warriors that was the factor . . . and it's more than likely the command knew the village was large but still would not make a stand . . . . When the Indians took their stand all the plans for Indians running went out the window and the separated commands were now vulnerable to hordes of Indians taking out each unit. I agree almost entirely here; it is this scattering, plus the "knowledge" that he had been spotted and that the spotting would most likely be reported back to the village, that prompted Custer to move down Reno Creek in some haste. Gordie's rationale at some earlier time made me back off my original thoughts that he moved the 12 miles from the divide at a breakneck speed-- Gordie's rationale and Steve Andrews' incredible knowledge about horses and their speeds, characteristics, and stamina!!!-- but I still maintain that solid galloping, interspersed with a slower trot or canter, brought the three battalions into the "flats" very quickly. You don't take the risk Custer took to throw away its possible gains by sashaying down Reno Creek like he was on a Sunday outing. My contention regarding Custer's plans as he neared the LBH is that he intended a three-pronged attack (sound familiar?), with Benteen automatically following suit as prong # 3. The Martini message was the afterthought once Custer got the lay of the battle from atop the bluffs. He saw Reno on the skirmish line and believed from the way things were unfolding that Reno could hold long enough (remember, the Indians never did really close on him) until he could raise havoc farther downstream. Rather than risk Benteen following Reno's tracks, Martini was sent back in ensure that my intrepid captain follow along to the "real" battleground. Custer expected the Indians to be either already running or in the process of doing so and I think he envisioned a fluid, moving battle, his troops routing Indians all over the place as they struggled to head downstream to safety. That would allow Custer to use his strengths and advantages: organization; discipline; mobility; and firepower. By the Indians standing and fighting Reno, i. e., a covering force, that would slow things down too much and allow too many people to escape north. Ergo, the end-run to the bluffs. Best wishes, Fred.
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lew
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Post by lew on Feb 24, 2009 20:19:28 GMT -5
Fred, If I understand you correctly,then I would agree that when Custer sent Reno to open the attack-Custer fully intended to follow directly behind as a "second wave". However, after sending Reno,Custer changes his mind. Why? Perhaps the old instinct gained by actions during the Civil War took over his thoughts. He would try a flanking movement,while using Reno to amuse or attract the bulk of the Indian force. Had Reno known of this change of plan, he would never have advanced upon the massive Indian camp with such a small force. Who in their right mind, would blindly charge with only 3 Companies into to that firestorm,without direct support? I wouldn't, and I'm sure you wouldn't either.At this point Custer could have cared less as to what happened to Reno,and most likely it would have served Custer's interest best-if Reno had conducted a fighting withdraw in order to lure as many warriors away from the village. In my view the worst option would be for Reno to make a stand in the timber,as this would keep the bulk of the warriors too close to the village,for Custer's new plan to work. Trouble was, Custer developed tunnel vision,the farther away from Reno that he traveled. Custer just didn't realize how long it was going to take him to reach the unprotected end of the Indian village. His sole thought was striking a undefended portion of the village and the plight of Major Reno receded from his mind. As for Benteen,I have always felt that Custer intentionally sent him on the "scouting mission" to keep him out of the initial action. All officers are taught to keep a reserve in actions, and Benteen was in effect the reserve.
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Post by conz on Feb 24, 2009 20:22:14 GMT -5
Gordie,
My model agrees very closely with yours up to MTC.
In your model, do you believe heavy firing occurred within a few minutes of Reno reaching the top of the bluffs during his retreat, and if so, whom do you believe was doing most of that firing?
Clair
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Post by conz on Feb 24, 2009 20:26:58 GMT -5
Y'all may note in many Indian campaigns, by many different commanders, that a large force, when attempting to overrun a village without surprise, will detach an "advance guard" to gallop out and attempt to "bring them to battle," while the rest of the force follows at a measured pace, recons, and "develops the situation."
When the advance guard finds, and hopefully pins the enemy, or at least hits his rear guard (or "covering force") then you maneuver to bypass that guard and get around it, either to hit the main enemy body that is running, or come up behind that enemy guard and disperse it.
Custer isn't the only one who used such tactics, eh? It is very text book, and these Civil War vets new them well...
What IS surprising is that Reno and Benteen purport to understand so little about it...although Reno did say he knew he was performing an advance guard mission that day, at the RCOI.
Clair
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Post by biggordie on Feb 24, 2009 20:36:48 GMT -5
Billy:
I don't have the source handy for that "quote" about the largest village ever seen on the continent, and I have no intention of wading through my notes and bookshelves to try to find it. Would that I had the type of software that Fred has, that can pull up info in a trice; but alas........ I seem to recall seeing that quote on one of the Custer-related sites, but cannot recall which one.
I think that it was from the mouth of an enlisted man, but am not sure. I just filed it away in the memory banks. When I come to write that section of the book, I'll look for it. Until then, you guys can do my work for me. I don't consider it important, particularly, and mentioned it only because it popped into my head.
I did, however, find the names of two more horses, which I will post over on the other boards, so my time was not entirely wasted.
Fred - if the Spring runoff was so substantial, why was it that Ash Creek was mostly dry in its upper reaches? Remember my question from some time ago: "Where did Benteen cross Ash Creek?" Nobody seemed to consider the question pertinent to anything, or dismissed it out of hand; but it needs to be answered.
Regards,
Gordie
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 20:37:21 GMT -5
I understand you would have had Custer lay low and have a small party shadow the NAs sending riders back to relay messages. However you were also concerned with what would Custer do if the NAs moved south. BC-- I think you may have misunderstood me here. The thinking amongst the major commanders before Custer took off up the Rosebud, was that the Sioux were camped on the upper LBH and would soon be moving south, not north. Terry's plan and orders anticipated such a move. They did not anticipate a move to the south. Even John Gray admitted that much. So this was the original plan. At some point-- in order to get to the LBH-- the Indians would have to turn west. That was anticipated and was included in Terry's orders; yet he still wanted Custer to continue moving south. To me, the discretion in those orders dealt with "confrontation," not "route," because Terry had already precluded such a movement. I believe it was Gerard and/or Varnum in their RCOI testimony that they suspected 1500 warriors which was talked about around the night halt. I don't believe Varnum made any guesstimates of Indian size at the RCOI or at any other time, until he reached the end of his tale, and then he gave a number of more than 4,000. This is from my "notes" and includes just about everything Varnum said regarding numbers: LT Charles Varnum—the wickiups were very thick along the edge of the timber, along the stream, and at the south end of the village [RCOI]. LT Charles Varnum—Four thousand [Graham, The Custer Myth, p. 343]. Varnum felt there were as many as 4,000 Indians, many of whom were never engaged. The men on the hill could see large masses of them a good ways off.As for Gerard, after having returned to FAL some time in the fall of 1876, Gerard went aboard the “Far West” to pay his respects to General Terry. In the presence of several officers, Terry remarked: “Mr. Gerard, I recall very well certain remarks of yours at the outset of the campaign, and particularly your estimate of the fighting strength of the Indians. Had I known you as well then as I do now, the operations of the campaign would have been conducted on a different plan.” Varnum told Camp he had seen this same basic statement in writing, in a letter from Terry to Gerard. At the RCOI, he originally claimed to have told Custer at least 2,500, then a day later recanted and said he told GAC 1,500 to 2,000. The problems with your "Custer ignoring the scouts and then shadow the NAs while sending riders back theory" are many. 1. like you said if they went south he couldn't stop them as the next crossing of the Wolf mountains was too far south and too hard to get to in order to head them off and also didn't stop the NAs if they decided to go southwest to the Bighorn mtns as they eventually did after the battle. Alright, one at a time. This works both ways: if Custer couldn't cut west, the Indians certainly couldn't cut east. Again, anticipated and planned for in Terry's comments about always "feeling to your left." The worry was that the Indians would beat Custer south, turn east and slip past him back into the Powder River Country, while others returned to their agencies to collect their "pelf." This was a punitive expedition and someone needed to be punished, not chased around again in 1877. No one really worried about them heading into the Big Horns (west) and the Wolf's couldn't sustain them. 2. they had been discovered by the NAs both with the lost pack and the other group out hunting. Both the loss pack and the hunters were after Custer made his turn up Davis Creek. They have nothing to do with Custer originally making the move. Little Wolf's small band apparently watched the column as it moved up the Rosebud, but the troops never knew it and the Indians never reported it to the larger encampment (until the 26th). 3. The NA camp was not moving to allow it to be shadowed. It was stationary at the time (I'd agree if they came upon a moving camp then shadow it for a while). It could have remained there for days. Had the village started moving when they did discover Custer, Custer could not cut them off or prevent them from scattering to the south and southwest. I don't get your point here, or is it just semantics? Shadowed, watched...? No one knew what the village was doing until Reno's men saw it. One rider sent galloping... or so... to report on what had been seen/found was all that was needed. Terry was to have started up the LBH on the 26th. This fiction that says Custer would have been spotted if he continued up the Rosebud boggles my mind. Do I stand a better chance of being spotted by moving with a mountain range between me and the enemy or if I follow along the enemy's trail, where he is liable to be sending back scouts, runners, hunters, or just people leaving for the agencies? The Indians didn't join together via the southern part of the Rosebud. They came up the Rosebud or across the Powder, Pumpkin, and Tongue rivers. 4. Custer would have to expose his command and move them southwest over virtually impassable terrain to prevent a south or southwest movement. That's wrong. There were gaps that led from one valley to another. And remember, Custer was a damned-sight more mobile than that village. 5. At the time, they didn't know if the village already extended south of Reno creek. No, but they thought it did! That's what made Custer move up Davis Creek so risky. If that had been the case, Custer would have inserted himself between Terry and the enemy. How could that have been part of the plan? Remember, the Indians were scared stiff of infantry and these guys knew it; Terry, novice though he may have been, was certain to have been aware of it and that's why he was so insistent about getting his foot soldiers involved in the festivities. 6. That would require coordination with Terry and since the start on the 22nd, Custer was "not" communicating with Terry and even ignored a chance to have Herendeen return. Working with Terry was not a part of the mindset of Custer. No argument here! That's my whole point. But Terry didn't expect coordination, per se. What he hoped for was for Custer to be driving the Indians down the valley-- ergo, a full regiment of cavalry-- and force them smack-dab into infantry and Gatling guns. Your shadow theory only works if Custer would have headed southwest from the Crow's nest over virtually impassable terrain in what would have been full view of the NAs with his command in an effort to drive the NAs to the north. Your shadow theory could have also worked if Custer had reason to believe Crook had crossed over from the Rosebud to the LBH/BH valleys but he had no such information and Crook was out of the Terry/Gibbon/Custer AO. But then I believe his orders were to seek out and engage the NAs anyway and I don't see anybody including Reno, Benteen, Godfrey, and others disputing that. For all we know, Custer may have thought about or talked about your shadow plan but decided to take a different course of action since they had been discovered. They had been shadowing the trails since the Rosebud. I believe he would have laid low for a dawn attack if at all possible. Again, BC, I think you missed the point here. Once Custer made the Crow's Nest, he had already committed to the middle/lower LBH valley. Yes, he could have chased them up the valley, but then he would have really been in trouble because that's how they would have escaped: there was no force up that way, blocking them. Custer threw the dice and won (if you could consider the afternoon of June 25 winning!!); if those Indians had headed south, he would have had an open-ended chase, precisely what Terry didn't want. That's why Terry ordered him to the headwaters of the Rosebud. Plus, if Terry had known Tullock's Creek was clear, he had the option of moving up that creek, then cutting west to the LBH, retracing Ball and Roe's footsteps of two months earlier. If he had been correct and the Indians were headed south, he would have cut his "anvil" distance substantially. He may not have done it, but he could have. As it was, his move to the Big Horn damned neared killed his command because of its difficulty. Plan: You agreed with Benteen that there was no plan. I stated what I thought and Gordie did also. You didn't really address what I said about the plan(1. recon in force while at the battalion halt 2. then attack the village while at the lone tepee/Gerards 2nd knoll). I would add that I suspect they talked generally at officer's call and/or at the battalion halt, that if they came up on the south end of the village they would attack it there and then flank it. This was what was done and Reno saw Custer proceed on north and "not" follow Reno's trail. I agreed with Benteen about there being no plan until Custer reached the "flats." By then, I believe he had formulated his plan to attack the south end of the village in waves. Gerard's news that the Indians were coming back out at Reno caused Custer to believe his semi-surprise had failed and the Indians were coming at Reno as a screen to shield the retreating village; to give it time to escape. That precipitated Custer's sudden divergence right. Heaven only knew how many Indians were being thrown at Reno and I doubt seriously if Custer wanted a head-on clash between 500 Indians and 150 soldiers; it was one thing to chase 500 scattering Indians, quite another to confront 500 charging Indians. He would have really been non-plussed had he know there would be 1,000. I also believe Custer was rather pleased at Reno's dismounted skirmish line, especially since he watched long enough to notice the lay of the land and the timber Reno could use. I am not saying Custer saw Reno move into the timber; what I am saying is Custer was a savvy commander and saw the defensive possibilities of Reno's ultimate position(s). I am sure Custer looked at that fight and figured he was going to have a cake-walk, that Reno was drawing everyone to him, and Custer could raise hell at the northern end of the village, thereby pulling those Indians from Reno, who would then re-group and hound the Indians from behind. Routes of travel: I agree with you that there are numeorus disputes over the particular routes of travel and I'm not sure this thread was meant to argue them as you stated. Gordie provided some specific information but probably beyond the scope of this thread. I agree. And I'm tired of that discussion, anyway. I have reached the brick wall. Those who believe me, believe me; those who don't, will never, so the argument becomes frivolous. Reno creek movement: I'd consider Custer's movement down Reno creek using utmost haste combined with just enough tactical caution to avoid running into a NA trap on Reno creek proper. He had scouts on both sides and in the front with flankers and he was riding in battle formation. This was based on their observations from the Crow's nest that there were no big concentrations of NAs, tepees, etc. in Reno creek. I totally agree with you here. We are one, BC!!!! Now... you better watch out for my ass on that re-ride!! Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteeneast on Feb 24, 2009 20:39:10 GMT -5
Since the Indians did not run did Custer not understand what he was observing in the village?
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Post by biggordie on Feb 24, 2009 20:50:38 GMT -5
Clair:
I was off hunting up that quote, and didn't see your question as to the heavy firing. In short, yes as to the firing occurring shortly after Reno reached the top, and as to who was doing it, I will refer you to one of the several posts in which I explained that point. I hate to sound dismissive, and I have no real intention of being so, but I get tired of repeating myself, particularly for the benefit of those who do not pay any heed, or who do not believe what I post about certain subjects [which is most everyone].
If you would like to "share" in my time-line, with some of the details thrown in, so that you can see how it fits in, I will be happy to send you a copy. I will also be happy to give you the map co-ordinates of various important locations, so that you can make some maps for your personal use [not to be posted on any web-sites], This is all proprietary information, subject to copyright laws and to the ONEROUS RESTRICTIONS I placed on the other stuff I sent you. Penalties are strictly enforced and are extremely prejudicial to one's health.
I will not include sources for any of this, so you know that it will be as good as gold.
Give me a PM, and I'll mail the junk out to you when the weather improves [probably August].
Gordie
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 21:24:06 GMT -5
I've seen that damned quote before, as well, but I'll be dipped if I can find it right now.
Benteeneast-- Custer knew precisely what he was looking at. He was looking at precisely what Gerard told him. The Indians came out to face off Reno. That formed a screen to allow the families to gather and run. And that's exactly what was happening.
Gordie-- I don't use any special software. All this "quick grab" stuff is in my notes. Their organization makes it easy for me to access it. I simply use a Mac PowerBook G4 (Aluminum), 867 MHz with memory of 256 MB DDR SDRAM (sounds like an East German nuclear missile!). I have MS Word X for Mac Service Release 1 and MS Excel X for Mac, both 2001 versions. I have said before, I am a prolific note-taker and I document everything. That's why it always takes me so long to finish a book. And it's an offer I extend to everyone: if there is a specific area of this thing you want info on just let me know.
While I couldn't find that quote just yet, here are a couple of interesting clips I have taken:
George Herendeen—this was the largest camp he had ever seen, but he felt the Indians had moved the camp the morning the troops arrived (wrong). Just after the battle, he estimated the village contained about 6,000 people, half of who were warriors (3,000) [Graham, The Custer Myth, p. 260]. Later, at the RCOI, he told the court there were about 1,800 lodges and 3,500 fighting men. [Official Transcript, p. 334; Army & Navy Journal, July 15, 1876; RCOI] In his 1911 interview with Walter Camp, Herendeen claimed there were 1,800 lodges and 3,500 warriors. Herendeen felt there were between 400-500 in the surrounding hills.
1LT John F. McBlain (Ninth Cavalry)—“With Gibbon’s command was an odometer cart, and the instrument registered the camp as four and three-quarters miles long; now let anyone familiar with Indian ways of camping picture to himself the fighting strength of that camp. I never did and do not now believe that there was a soul less than 6,000 fighting men.” [McBlain, “With Gibbon on the Sioux Campaign of 1876”]
1SG John Ryan (Company M, Seventh Cavalry)—In his book, Ryan claims there were usually 5 or 6 warriors to a lodge: “… the ordinary rate….” [Barnard, Ten Years With Custer, p. 252] Ryan estimated the Indian strength at the Pompey’s Pillar fight during the Stanley Expedition of 1873 at 1,500 warriors [p. 270]. Ryan also makes the point that in 1873, “… Sitting Bull was not at that time joined by any very formidable force of agency Indians.” [p. 271] “… I have seen the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Apaches and Comanches move together in the Indian Territory and in Kansas years before, while campaigning there under General Custer, and I should say there was double the amount move out from this camp.” [p. 301]
The Chicago Times—in a 24May76 article—reported, “In all there are Cheyennes, Sioux, and others, some 3,000 ready to fight out this campaign against Gen. Crook. They have numerous allies and people well-informed place the actual hostile Indian camp at from 7,000 to 8,000 first class fighting men…” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 44]
June 24, 9:25pm—Custer called officers together informing them of the Indians’ probable location and that there would be a night march to cross the Divide so as to not be seen. Custer “… told the officers they would have the fight of their lives.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 23] Apparently, Fred Gerard had told Custer he could expect to find 2,500 to 3,000 warriors. Gerard claimed to have told Terry there would be as many as 4,000 warriors if all those who had left the reservations united. [Hammer/Camp, Custer in 76, p. 229]
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 21:36:03 GMT -5
Fred - if the Spring runoff was so substantial, why was it that Ash Creek was mostly dry in its upper reaches? Remember my question from some time ago: "Where did Benteen cross Ash Creek?" Nobody seemed to consider the question pertinent to anything, or dismissed it out of hand; but it needs to be answered. Gordie-- I don't know that the upper reaches of Ash were so dry...! I was there in June 2007 and the landscape was as lush as can be... green, flowers in full bloom. There is a small, swampy area below the divide, on the Davis Creek side, an area Vern Smalley has mistaken for the area Varnum slept in before mounting the Crow's Nest/"Varnum's Lookout." It was soaking wet and Davis Creek's headwaters were flowing. So was Reno Creek. I don't know that the winter of 2006-2007 was that bad, but from what I have read, the 1875-1876 winter was pretty tough. I think the fact that the campaign was delayed as it was and that the first couple of weeks were packed with rain storms, plus you had that June snowstorm for two days, probably means those streams were pretty strong. There are also several indications that Reno had trouble crossing Reno Creek and that the LBH was flowing very strongly, so I tend to doubt that there were many dry headwaters in those areas at that time. And no, I do not remember reading about your question of where Benteen crossed Ash/Reno. I absolutely agree with you, however. It clearly needs to be answered. Obviously, the standard answer is at the creek's confluence with No-Name Creek. Is that wrong? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 24, 2009 21:58:17 GMT -5
Larry--
Great to see you here! You always add good stuff!
I believe Custer fully intended to support Reno as a "second wave," if you will. He went right instead when he got Fred Gerard's report that the Sioux were coming out to meet Reno rather than running into their village and trying to flee. If Custer could catch the village unawares-- like he did at the Washita-- he felt he could run right through it; but with Indians massing to meet Reno, that would build a large enough barrier to delay the troops and allow the families to flee. That would invariably include plenty of warriors, as well, and that event would wreck the entire campaign. Custer's advantages were in surprise, firepower, organization, discipline, and mobility. The proper use of those factors could overcome seriously larger numbers... maybe as many as two to three times his own. The loss of any one of those factors would dangerously upend the odds. Custer could ensure those advantages by the chase, not be head-to-head confrontation. His men were no match for that. That's why his Springfield carbines were so effective: keep the enemy at range and close only when it's to your advantage.
In order to prevent this "refugee" scatteration, Custer had to make a rapid move north, along the village's flank, and try to head them off from farther below.
Custer got himself in trouble when he couldn't keep the Indians at a distance, thereby negating his firepower, and he lost his mobility because he couldn't keep the Indians from killing or stampeding his horses. Surprise was no longer a factor; mobility was lost; firepower was negated; and it was then only a matter of time before his discipline began to break down, and his organization fail.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Feb 24, 2009 22:11:59 GMT -5
Fred, I'm not sure you took those 6 points as I meant them but I'm not going to argue it anymore anyway. My analysis was talking about Custer being at the divide already when I thought you said he ignored the scouts and you are referring to back on the Rosebud. As part of your plan you also were stating that Custer was making a mistake by ignoring the scouts. I was trying to show it wasn't a mistake but a matter of choice with few alternatives. By asking what I did, I essentially and unintentially ended up with the both of us discussing one of those woulda, coulda, shoulda situations which I normally now try to avoid as they are not very productive and detract from what actually happened. We probably misunderstood each other on this one.
But we agree that he was pretty much committed at the divide.
As an aside, it gets me also when people say Custer was surprised by the number of NAs and failed to realize how many were there but I say wrong, the scouts, the signs, and everyone else told him or he recogizned that there were a large number of NAs.
Their propensity to stand and fight was known to be virtually nonexistant. I would hazard to bet that the NAs were going to run but decided to fight at the last minute when they found themselves cut off at the northern fords. Nothing that could be planned for.
I agree with your response to horse above which is what I was looking for when you started this issue. You got me off on a tangent with the ignored scouts.
bc
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Post by bc on Feb 24, 2009 22:35:38 GMT -5
Benteen's crossing of Ash/Reno creek: I tend to follow Doran on this one. That Benteen followed Custer's trail to the right of Gerard's second knoll and crossed at the oxbow where Martin's marshy place is located. And Weir, the loose cannon, was the first one across it on his return from Ford A after Weir had initially followed the Reno trail to the river. All this while Benteen was on top of the knoll.
bc
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