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Post by keogh on May 15, 2017 23:51:08 GMT -5
Chapter XI With my own annotations in brackets. -- Part II
Lines of Communication, their liability to attack, the drain they are upon the Army, and the circumstances under which they can be dispensed with.
This involves the Army being accompanied by large convoys.
When the army itself abandons it communications and becomes thus a flying column, the fact of its being a self-contained force, advantageous as this is in certain respects, has also very serious drawbacks. For it follows ... that the army is burdened with wounded and with great supply trains and columns carrying military stores -- sufficient to make good whatever is expended during the whole time that the army is cut off from its base; and all this transport has to be protected. The size of the train, relative to the strength of the force depends ... upon the the length of time which it is to be adrift, but in all cases it is bound to form a troublesome charge, and it may become a veritable mill-stone round the neck of the commanders. [Analysis: This was certainly the case with Custer's regiment at the Little Big Horn in 1876. The 7th Cavalry formed a flying column as it left its communications behind when they left the steamboat at the Yellowstone River and began their pursuit of the hostile tribes along the Rosebud River and thence on to the Little Big Horn valley. During this march, the regiment's supplies were transported by way of a mule train. The protection of the mule train during this advance was assigned to 3 cavalry companies under the command of a battalion commander. This guard force comprised roughly 1/4 of the total combat strength of the 7th Cavalry.]
Question greatly affected by the length of time which the operation involves.
There is ... a great difference between an army merely casting itself loose from its communications for an operation which can be concluded in a few days, and the same army becoming a flying column for a considerable time and with a view of making some lengthy march; for the supplies and stores required for some very short period do not become a really serious burden to the force. ... [In this case, the 7th Cavalry became a flying column when it left its communications base along the Yellowstone River to begin its pursuit for the hostile village along the Rosebud River. This column brought along 15 days rations and a supply of salt in the event they were forced to eat horse or mule meat along the way. As it was, the hostile village was found after only a 4 day pursuit, but no one could have foreseen that eventuality.]
Partial abandonment of communications.
It is often the case that the abandonment of communications is not complete. ... In warfare of this nature there is always risk of the communications being cut, and so the situation in the theatre of war is sometimes ... a matter of opinion whether a line of communications can be properly said to exist or not.
Examples of Armies casting loose from their communications for a considerable time.
... Such incidents are of very rare occurrence in regular warfare -- the solitary instance of such an operation upon a great scale of late years has been General Sherman's famous march through Georgia to the sea. But as long as an army is fully equipped and prepared for the enterprise, and is capable of dealing effectively with any opposition it may meet with, the undertaking is not necessarily dangerous or even difficult. And when ... the force is proceeding to some secure point, where it can depend upon establishing its communications afresh, the operation may be quite a simple one. ...
Sir Roberts daring advance on Kabul.
The last Afghan war furnishes another ... striking instance of abandonment of communications. This was when Sir F. Roberts first advanced from the Kurum valley to Kabul. Unable to spare the troops necessary to guard his communications, he organized his army as a flying column. ... In this case a telling blow, speedily delivered, was demanded, and it was essential to strike at once. The force was compelled by the circumstances to cast itself loose from its communications, and its capture of Kabul was a signal exploit -- a memorable feat of arms. But the operation was somewhat hazardous, and it serves ... as an illustration of the startling results which in warfare of this nature can be obtained by boldness and resolution, than as an example ... to be followed in the future except when there is no help for it. [Analysis: Note that the example of a flying column marching into enemy territory -- as the 7th Cavalry did at the Little Big Horn -- can be "somewhat hazardous," yet can produce "startling results" when led by a bold and resolute commander. When led by a commander that is timid or indecisive, such an operation can lead to disastrous results.]
Risks attend to this.
For an army without communications in a hostile country which meets with a reverse is in a very serious plight. And especially is this so if the population is ... merely waiting for an opportunity to rise en masse and tread the invader down. ... Not the least important function of a line of communications is that of serving as a line of retreat in case of need; the posts along it, fortified as they usually are, afford a refuge to the army in its rearward march. A force which has no such line to follow may have to fight its way through against ever increasing odds right back to where it started from. It has no temporary asylum near at hand where it can gain a brief respite from hostile attacks and recover from defeat, and it runs grave risk of being utterly destroyed. The disastrous retreat from Kabul in 1844 is a case in point. [Analysis: The disastrous reverse suffered by the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn is also a case in point, wherein the surviving elements of the regiment under Major Reno and Capt. Benteen had no real line of retreat to follow and were forced to hold an exposed position on the bluffs suffering heavy casualties until eventually relieved by the Terry/Gibbon column. Had they not been fortuitously relieved two days later, their defensive corral on the bluffs ran a "grave risk of being utterly destroyed" were it to be cut off from its water supply or had it attempted to withdraw.]
Inconvenience which may arise from the force being unable to communicate with bodies with which it may be cooperating.
And there is another matter in regard to an army which has abandoned its communications which should be mentioned here. Cooperation between it and other forces in the theatre of war is rendered very difficult because its movements are unknown. Information as to the course of events and of changes in the military situation cannot be imparted to it. It is in the dark as to the progress of the operations. The whole strategic conditions of the campaign may change without its commander being aware of it. He cannot communicate with other forces with which it is desirable that he should act in combination, in case he is obliged to vary his plan.... [Analysis: In this case we see the difficulty for Custer's 7th Cavalry to act in concert with the Terry/Gibbon column in any proposed attack on the hostile village once it had been found in the lower Little Big Horn valley. It is believed by some students of the battle that Custer may have attempted to notify the Terry/Gibbon column to his general whereabouts on the morning of his attack on the hostile village when he set fire to both lone tepees. The heavy black smoke which rose over the horizon could be spotted for miles on the open prairie and there are accounts within the Terry/Gibbon column that indicate just such sign of black smoke was seen shortly after noon on June 25. General Terry had requested that Custer send scout Herendeen down Tullock's Creek to inform him of developments from Custer's column, but this was postponed once the decision was made to attack the hostile village by the 7th Cavalry on June 25th, as Herendeen would not be able to reach the Gibbon column before that attack was consummated. It was for these difficulties that no provision was made to cooperate in a joint attack between the 7th Cavalry and the Terry/Gibbon column.]
Conclusions as to the abandonment of communications.
It is clear, then, that objections exist to an army abandoning its communications and advancing as a flying column. Under certain circumstances the course is perfectly justifiable [ed. as was the case of the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn.]; conditions will arise in small wars [ed. and especially so with the Plains Indian Wars] which compel this procedure to be adopted, [as] it saves the drain upon the resources and men which a line of communications ... of necessity involves. But it is not a strategic maneuver to be taken lightly, except as a temporary expedient or as a minor operation of war. And it is absolutely essential that a force which casts itself loose in this manner ... should have an organization calculated to meet the special requirements of the case, and based on a full acquaintance with the conditions of the campaign. [Analysis: In the case of the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn, this organization would center on a mobile pack train supplied with 12 to 15 days rations, forage and spare ammunition to sustain operations in the field independent of communications with their base.]
Chapter XI -- FINI
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Post by keogh on May 17, 2017 23:36:44 GMT -5
Chapter XII -- Part I (with my annotations in brackets)
Guerilla Warfare in General.
Guerilla Warfare in General.
...guerilla warfare has been pointed to as a form of operations above all things to be avoided, because the ... art of conducting small wars is to strive for ... decisive methods. ... It is only proposed in this chapter to treat of the strategic aspect of carrying on guerilla warfare, or ... the means by which adversaries depending on this system of conducting hostilities can best be dealt with. ... The aptitude of such opponents of which such regular armies have ... to cope with display in harassing the troops who have penetrated into their fastnesses is known to all. They revel in strategems and artifice. They prowl about waiting for their opportunity to pounce down upon small parties moving without due precaution. The straggler and camp follower are their natural prey. They hover on the flanks, fearing to strike but ready to cut off detachments which may go astray. [Note: This describes Plains Indian combat behavior very well.] And it is not only ... the rank and file who are masters of this branch of the military art, leaders are produced who excel in controlling the scattered bodies engaged in it, and who give to it direction and vitality. A glance back over the small wars in this century reveals ... few chiefs of imperishable renown, few personalities figuring large in history. But the few great names handed down to us are not the names of men who led great hosts to battle, they are the names of commanders of guerillas and banditti. [Note: The Apache war chief Geronimo is one of those personalities who has achieved some renown due to the success of his guerilla activities. Others would include the Modoc 'Captain Jack' and the Kiowa Satanta.] ....
Guerilla warfare is what regular armies always have to dread, and when this is directed by a leader with a genius for war, and effective campaign becomes well-nigh impossible. The guerilla has ever been a thorn in the side of an organized force.... The Cossacks, masters of this method of conducting these operations, contributed almost more towards bringing about the terrible disasters which befell the Grand Army [of Napoleon] on its retreat from Moscow than the rigors of a Russian winter, or ... the able commanders of the pursuing armies.... Therefore ... the art of combating this method of conducting operations deserves especial attention when small wars are in question; and experience ... proves that even when there have been ... armies in the field to beat, the campaign often drifts on in desultory fashion long after these have been overthrown.
Influence of terrain.
The terrain has much to say about the conduct of partisan warfare.... Hilly and broken ground, or districts ... in jungle growth and thickets are requisite. On the prairie and the steppes, on the other hand, guerilla warfare can only be attempted by mounted men whose mobility at least partially compensates for the lack of cover as they approach. [Note: This latter best describes the nature of Plains Indian guerilla warfare.]
Promptitude and Resolution essential to deal with guerillas.
Surprise is the essence of such operations -- surprise with retreat ere the opponent can recover ...; and in consequence the combinations are ... framed on a small scale. Surprises with large forces are difficult to carry out; the withdrawal of these when once committed to action is most risky. Guerilla warfare, therefore, almost of necessity, means petty annoyance and not operations of a dramatic kind. Such capricious methods of conducting operations are best met by a resolute plan of campaign and by an organization favouring rapid and energetic counter-strokes. Surprise can, to a certain extent, be guarded against by measures taken for security; but the escape of the enemy can only be frustrated by having troops ready to follow up at once and to follow up effectively. ...
Campaigns where want of mobility and decision on the part of the regular troops against guerillas has a bad effect.
In those campaigns where the hostile tactics have been limited to surprises on a small scale and to ambuscades, and which have drifted on in desultory fashion for long periods, the want of prompt energetic action on the part of the regular troops has ... been mainly responsible for their failure to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. ... The hill campaigns of India excellently illustrate guerilla warfare, for here the climate does not favour rapid, energetic movements and the troops are always hampered by much baggage; but the fact that the marauding hill tribes dwell in villages of which the locality is often well known compensates to a certain extent for this, as their homes can be destroyed and their fields laid waste.
(to be continued)
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Post by keogh on May 20, 2017 14:02:43 GMT -5
Chapter XII -- Part II (with my annotations in brackets)
Guerilla Warfare in General.
Exceptional strategy and tactics necessary.
The guerilla mode of war must ... be met by an abnormal system of strategy and tactics. The great principle which forms the basis of the art of war remains – the combination of initiative with energy; but this is applied in a special form. The utmost vigour and decision must be displayed in harassing the enemy and in giving him no rest; the hostile bands may elude the regular detachments, but their villages and flocks remain. [Note: Here Callwell makes an important point that the objective in guerilla warfare must often be the hostile village and its herds of livestock, as opposed to fighting and defeating the enemy force per se. In much the same way, the punitive objectives of most Plains Indian war campaigns -- and not just the Little Big Horn campaign -- was the capture and destruction of the hostile villages and horse-herds.] The theatre of war must be sub-divided into sections, each to be dealt with by a given force or by a given aggregate of separate detachments. Defensive posts must be established where supplies can be collected, whither raided cattle can be brought, and which form independent bases. To each such base must be attached one or more mobile, self-contained columns, organized to ... move out at a moment's notice, and equipped so as to penetrate to any part of the district ... and to return, certain of supplies for the task....
Flying Columns.
The question of flying columns deserves special attention.... The principle of flying columns has since been used with great success in the Western [United] States against the Red Indians, in Afghanistan, in Burma, and recently in Rhodesia. [Note: As pointed out previously, the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn was operating as a 'Flying Column.']
Their strength and composition.
The troops forming such columns must be thoroughly equipped and must be able to travel light. Mobility is the first essential, for the guerilla trusts to sudden strokes, and it is of the utmost importance that the marauding party should not have time to disperse and that it should be attacked before it can withdraw and dissolve. [Note: The above requirements explain to a large degree why Gen. Custer elected to reject the offer of the gatling guns along with the decision to leave the heavy sabers behind. In both cases it enabled the 7th Cavalry to travel lighter and faster in its pursuit of the hostile village.] Hoche urged the leaders of mobile columns to accustom their men to fatigue and hardships and to keep them in condition. The strength of the columns depends upon the circumstances of the case. In Burma they seldom numbered more than 300 men, with one or two guns. In Algeria where the enemy was brave, resolute, and capable of suddenly gathering in formidable strength, small bodies would have been unsuitable, and General Bugeaud recommended three or four battalions with cavalry and two guns as a proper strength. [Note: At the Little Big Horn, the 7th Cavalry was composed of 4 attack battalions although not supplemented with any artillery or guns.]
Practically however the columns should be as small as possible consistent with safety. Their composition, of course, depends upon the conditions of the campaign and upon the terrain – on open ground a large part of the force would often consist of mounted men, in thick bush infantry alone can be used. In Abd el Kader’s days portable artillery scarcely existed, and it was wheeled guns to which General Bugeaud so much objected. [Note: The gatling guns offered to the 7th Cavalry were also wheeled guns and were likely rejected by Custer for much the same reasons as Gen. Bugeaud.] Guns on mules are by no means out of place in a flying column of dismounted troops, and they may be very useful [note: The wheeled gatling guns did accompany the dismounted troops under Gen. Gibbon at the Little Big Horn]; machine guns [ie. gatling guns in 1876] are generally very well adapted for this sort of work. Where it is proposed to raid livestock some mounted troops are indespensable to bring the booty in.
Columns of Mounted Troops in certain Theatres of War.
On the prairies in the campaigns against the roving Indians the United States leaders always depended largely upon mounted troops, [as] great distances had to be covered and the cavalry became highly efficient at this sort of work. Some of the marches were astonishing, and they often finished up with a skillfully executed surprise of the hostile mauraders. Sometimes infantry were carried in wagons [or on mules], but the most brilliant exploits in these campaigns were carried out by mounted troops [ie. cavalry] alone. In Kaffirland, and in South Africa generally, only mounted troops can hope to get on terms with with the enemy if he does not mean fighting. On the steppes also, the mobile columns are formed of mounted Cossacks and irregulars;....
Suppression of the rebellion in southern Rhodesia.
Suppression of the rebellion in southern Rhodesia in 1896 affords an ... illustration of the right method of dealing with guerilla warriors of a certain type. The Matabili ... were not ... a formidable fighting race, and they eschewed fighting in the open except on one or two occasions during the prolonged operations; the Mashonas were still less warlike. But the territory affected was of vast extent, the available British forces were small, and ... large tracts of country were ... well adapted for the display of guerilla tactics by nimble savages such as were the insurgents. The troops employed to stamp out the revolt were, for the most part, mounted, but they were assisted by dismounted friendlies. They were broken up by General Carrington into mobile columns, varying in strength according to the task set before them, but often consisting of only a mere handful of men. Although the food supply ... in their rapid movements over great distances sometimes proved a difficulty, the fine climate and open air life rendered all ranks capable of enduring great fatigues and of covering an immense amount of ground within the 24 hours. Some portable guns and maxims were available and accompanied the more important columns, rendering useful service.
The principle enforced, and rigidly carried out, was that each column had some definite task to perform, and must push through with it in spite of distance and of natural obstacles. The scattered impis [ie. warbands] of the Matabili were hunted down relentlessly and compelled to fight or to submit. On one or two occasions – as in the Matoppo hills – the enemy gathered in considerable numbers, and, profiting by the nature of the terrain, accepted battle after a fashion. But such favourable opportunities for giving the rebels a lesson did not generally present themselves, and the campaign was essentially one of surprises and ambuscades on one side, and of vigour and determination on the other. In 1897, during the final operations against the Mashonas, it was found that the only way of compelling their submission was to hunt them into their cave strongholds, destroy their kraals [ie. villages or livestock enclosures], and finally capture them in their caves, a by no means easy task.... The operations were not of a dramatic kind, but they were singularly effective. It was the system of [Generals] Bugeaud and Hoche ... and the campaign serves as a model of what such campaigns [against guerilla forces] should be.
(to be continued)
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Post by keogh on May 21, 2017 17:00:34 GMT -5
I think Major Callwell is correct on a pre-planned junction of forces with timing subject to the situation. " Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible." That is much different then suggesting Crook and Terry were on the same plan of a junction at some general area. The intent is clearly that "the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible". So if the Indians are not on the "Little Horn" then there is no plan. It would be nice to be able to pick an absolute date and time but in my experience that is not usually possible. That does not mean there is no plan, It's more real life situations if it states you start at one location on the river and I will start at another and it is anticipated the target will be in the area between us where we can prevent them from escaping. Regards Benteeneast Unfortunately, the Little Big Horn river is 138 miles long and the hostile village could have been located anywhere along that span, making its presumed enclosure by the two columns more wishful thinking than real. In reality there were simply too many avenues of escape along that river for there to have been any kind of practical enclosure resulting from the approach of the two columns -- with one of those columns being primarily infantry. But I will agree with you that after the fact, such a plan might sound more feasible on paper for those who don't know how long the Little Big Horn river valley actually is. garryowen, keogh |
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Post by keogh on May 25, 2017 13:50:22 GMT -5
Callwell's book is written in 1906 and the version I have is a copy of a 1914 reprint. The book is written 30 years after the LBH and in the 20th Century. Callwell's book Small Wars was first published in 1896. The 2nd edition came out in 1899. The 3rd edition you reference above was published in 1906. More to the point, Callwell's research for the book was based on his earlier work titled "Notes on the Tactics of our Small Wars" which was written in 1884, as well as his "Notes on the Strategy of our Small Wars" which was written in 1885. Callwell's 1st edition of Small Wars was published only 20 years after the LBH Battle. His earlier notes on the tactics and strategy of Small Wars was written only 8 and 9 years after the LBH. Yes, but Col. Callwell made it clear that enemy irregular forces in Small Wars do not all fight in the same manner. One must learn the particular combat behavior of each force confronted in Small Wars. For ex., Zulus do not fight like Plains Indians. Callwell made the mistake of assuming that Terry had a plan of direct cooperation with Custer's column when it attacked the hostile village. In reality there was no such plan. Callwell was not so naive as to believe that the 138 miles LBH valley could contain any force of Indians if they wished to leave and move away from it. Its a valley, not a canyon. garryowen, keogh |
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Post by keogh on May 26, 2017 13:46:22 GMT -5
One second past the LBH battle is of no use to Custer. I think we realize that Custer never read Small Wars. Then again, he didn't need to, as most of Custer's methods of fighting Plains Indians are endorsed by General Callwell in the book he published 20 years after Custer fought his last battle. I would say about 90% of material from Callwell's later editions are indeed reprints of the first edition. His later editions simply incorporated examples of small wars that occurred after the printing of the 1st edition: for example, the Philippine War 1899-1902. These additions bear no relation to his material or maxims on mounted Plains Indian warfare. Additional chapters covered jungle and bush warfare. All of Callwell's pertinent information bearing on Plains Indian irregular warfare come from his 1896 first edition, which are based on his earlier work titled "Notes on the Tactics of our Small Wars" which was written in 1884, as well as his "Notes on the Strategy of our Small Wars" which was written in 1885. And unlike Plains Indians, Zulus would accept massive casualties and were willing to make frontal attacks on established skirmish lines. Terry gave Custer the option of riding all the way to the headwaters of the Tongue before crossing over to the LBH valley. How long a distance do you think Terry thought that was? Can you produce anything before June 22, 1876 that shows that Terry thought the LBH river valley was a significantly shorter distance than it actually was? And is there any information you can find that Terry thought the LBH valley was actually a canyon that would keep the Indians from escaping from it once they slipped into it? garryowen, keogh |
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Post by keogh on May 28, 2017 17:32:19 GMT -5
Chapter XII -- Part III (with my annotations in brackets)
Guerilla Warfare in General.
Danger of very small columns.
Although the columns must be as small as possible, they must not be too small. If there is any fear of the enemy combining his forces to attack columns in detail, or of acting on interior lines ... there must be troops enough to deal with whatever hostile forces can be assembled.... [Note: General Nelson Miles' comments on the Little Big Horn fight reflect on this maxim when he observed: "It is not expected that five troops could have whipped that body of Indians, neither is it believed that that body of Indians could have whipped twelve troops of the Seventh Cavalry under Custer's command, or if his orders had been properly executed."] In Mexico small columns of French and of Imperial troops suffered very severely when the troubles first broke out against Maximillian's rule because the enemy was able to bring considerable forces against them.... During the operations against the ... Zulus in ... 1898, an insignificant force of 400 local troops, with two guns, by dint of rapid marches and resolute initiative completely broke up a numerous and warlike tribe, seizing their cattle when they fled, and attacking them whenever they made any attempt to stand. The smaller the column, the more generally mobile it will be; the more mobile it is, the more suddenly it can deliver its strokes; and the essence of combating guerilla warfare is to hit unexpectedly and hard. The enemy's game is to hit unexpectedly, but generally not very hard. [Note: It is for this reason -- ie. greater mobility -- that cavalry were most often used in this type of campaign.]
Need for independence.
It is very important that flying columns should be made as independent as possible within their own sphere of operations. [Note: This was the case when the 7th Cavalry was sent out as a flying column in pursuit of the hostile Indian village on June 22, 1876.] Sir F. Robert's instructions in the case of Upper Burma were that the "utmost latitude of movement" should be given to their commanders. This principle also appears in General Hoche's system, and to a less extent to that of General Bugeaud. In summing up the lessons of La Vendee General vs. Boguslawski writes: "The leaders of the columns must be officers who in certain cases understand how to depart from the plan of operations on their own responsibility, if the general situation appears to have altered."[Note: General Terry was apparently aware of this maxim when he gave Custer 'carte blanche' to deviate from his written suggestions during his pursuit of the hostile Indian village on June 22, 1876.]
Difficulty of controlling movements of separated columns.
In dealing with guerilla warfare ... one of the greatest difficulties to be contended with is that it is impracticable to issue definite orders to a force operating at a considerable distance from headquarters.... Under such circumstances a great deal of latitude must be left to subordinates, whose judgements must remain, as far as possible, unfettered. [Note: Hence Gen. Terry's decision to give Gen. Custer 'carte blanche' authority to do as he thought best on his 'search and destroy' mission against the hostile Indian village on June 22, 1876. Gen. Custer did likewise on a battalion level when he gave his subordinate commanders -- Major Reno and Capt. Benteen -- a great deal of latitude in the execution of their orders on June 25th, 1876.] It is one of the awkward problems which an officer with the general control of operations over a large territory finds himself confronted with. On more than one occasion in Rhodesia, contemplated junctions of separate columns did not come off, but their leaders knew that what they had to do was to strike at any hostile gatherings with which they obtained touch, and they frequently acted on their own responsibility in consequence. [Note: In much the same way, at the Little Big Horn Capt. Benteen's battalion was expected "to strike at any hostile gathering with which they obtained touch" while acting "on their own responsibility in consequence."] In no class of warfare is the need of self-reliant subordinate officers so urgent as in operations of this nature, and the lack of such may spoil the best matured combinations of the chief. [Note: Many students of the Little Big Horn Battle would point to the failure of this maxim as one of the leading causes for the defeat of the 7th Cavalry on June 25, 1876. Many believe that Gen. Custer did not possess the "self-reliant subordinate officers" which he so urgently needed "in operations of this nature." The resulting "lack of such" may well indeed have spoiled "the best matured combinations of the chief" and led directly to the defeat of the 7th that day.] It will be seen further on that the Spanish failure in dealing with the Cuban insurgents has been attributed partially to the want of an abundant supply of such leaders, a want which will generally make itself felt in any army in which the bulk of [officer] commissions are gained from the ranks.
Fortified posts.
As already stated, these columns must have [supply] bases, secured positions in favored localities from which they issue and from which they return on completion of a task. [Note: At the Little Big Horn, the 7th Cavalry had two such bases to fall back on -- the Powder River depot and the Terry/Gibbon column at the temporary base established at the mouth of the Little Big Horn river.] The nature of these fixed points depends on circumstances.... In operations in Rhodesia in 1896, the "base" of a column often consisted merely of some wagons in laager [ie. corral], with a few men and perhaps a maxim [gun] acting as garrison. Their character depends ... on the nature of the theatre of war, and the strength of hostile resistance.
Need of a good intelligence department in guerilla warfare, and of secrecy.
In no class of warfare is a well organized and well served intelligence department more essential than in that against guerillas. Hoche instituted an elaborate system of espionage in Brittany, paying especial attention to this very important subject; guerillas trust to secret and to sudden strokes, and if the secret is discovered their plan miscarries. On the other hand, all movements intended against them must be concealed. Guerilla warfare means that the regular troops are spread about a hostile country where all their movements can be watched by the enemy and where their camps are full of spies. Partisan leaders seldom can be trusted, and in all dealings with them, great circumspection is essential. Hoche discouraged parleying with the rebels by subordinate officers, distrusting their chiefs. "Parle comme si tu avais confiance en tout le monde" ["Speak as if you trusted everyone"] was the motto of General Bugeaud "et agis comme si tu ne pouvais t'en rapporte a personne" ["And act as if you could not trust anyone."].
A well organized corps of scouts, drawn from the more intelligent members of the community who may side with the regular forces, is an invaluable adjunct to the intelligence department.... Moving about secretly by night scouts of this class can detect and locate the hostile gatherings, can discover where the enemy had concealed his flocks, and can lead the columns to the spot where it is proposed to strike. [Note: The use of Indian scouts were effectively utilized by the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn. As Gen. Callwell mentions above, "moving about secretly by night" these scouts detected and located the main hostile village and horse herds on the morning of June 25, 1876. They subsequently led the column to the spot where it was proposed to strike.] In Bush warfare ... scouts are generally natives who cannot be trusted far out of sight; but Europeans who have long lived an open air life in a theatre of guerilla warfare, who are accustomed to track footprints and know the hunter's craft, will move out miles ahead of the fighting force, and can sometimes fix the quarry at several miles distance.
(to be continued)
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Post by moderator on May 29, 2017 18:32:10 GMT -5
Chapter XII -- Part IV (with my annotations in brackets)
Guerilla Warfare in General.
Raids for carrying off property or to destroy property.
When operations are being carried out against guerillas scattered over great tracts of country, it has sometimes been found very useful to send out raiding parties, consisting generally of mounted men, to carry off the enemy’s flocks and herds or to destroy encampments and villages. [Note: Callwell points out here the military objectives of fighting guerilla wars -- the capture and destruction of enemy villages and herds. These were the same objectives for the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn in 1876.] As already mentioned, the Russians have put this method of warfare in force in Central Asia, and the French made large use of it in some of their Algerian campaigns. In Chapter XVIII raids will be considered from the tactical point of view, here it is only necessary to draw attention to them as one means of bringing guerillas to book.
Objection to the principle of raids.
The objection to raids is really one of principle. To filch the property of irregulars when they are absent is not the true spirit of waging war against such opponents; the proper way to deal with them is to kill them or to wound them, or at the least to hunt them from their homes and then to destroy or carry off their belongings. But it must be remembered that the French in Algeria and the Russians on the steppes have had to deal with nomads who thought fit to adopt guerilla tactics, and British troops have had practically no experience of such conditions. Raids designed to destroy hostile dépôts of food or ammunition of course stand on a different footing altogether, their value in any class of warfare can hardly be overrated; but guerillas, savages, or semi-civilized adversaries rarely have such dépôts, therefore the question of operations against them hardly arises in small wars. The system of raiding the enemy’s cattle was employed to a certain extent by the British forces in Kaffirland in 1877, and in the suppression of the Rhodesian rebellion; but it was not found that these enterprises had much effect upon the Mashonas in 1897, who held out till tackled in their caves. In these campaigns great difficulty was experienced in getting the enemy to fight. Of course if the force is actually short of food raids may become absolutely necessary; and if a body of troops has ... been compelled to adopt a defensive attitude for a time, a bold raid will tend to re-establish its prestige, and will encourage all ranks at a time when they may be depressed owing to their unsatisfactory position. But regular troops who can find no better means of stamping out the resistance of guerillas than by raids will probably take a long time to perform their task.
Pacification of revolted districts.
When the operations take the form of pacifying a disturbed district, ... and as is ... usual during at least some period of a guerilla war, much judgement is needed. The enemy must be chastised but must not be driven to desperation. General Hoche's system in thus described by Thiers.
Hoche in La Vendee.
Hoche devised an ingenious mode of reducing the country without laying it waste, by depriving it of its arms and taking part of its produce for the supply of the Republican army. In the first place he persisted in the establishment of entrenched camps. ... He then formed a circular line which was supported by the Sevre and Loire [rivers] and tended to envelop progressively the whole country. This line was composed of very strong posts, connected by patrols so as to leave no free space by which an enemy who was at all numerous could pass. These posts were directed to occupy every hamlet and village and to disarm them. To accomplish this they were to seize the cattle which usually grazed together and the corn stowed away in the barns: they were also to secure the principal inhabitants; they were not to restore the cattle and the corn, nor release the persons taken as hostages, till the peasants should have voluntarily delivered up their arms.” This was a case of restoring order in a great tract of civilized country where the insurrection was prompted largely by religious feeling. It was a case of civil war, and the brilliant French soldier-administrator substituted this system for the devastation which had been tried by his predecessors and had failed.
Upper Burma.
Similarly in Burma great care was taken not to exasperate the people of the newly acquired province, and to punish only the dacoits [ie. bandits] and marauders who infested the country and were reducing it to anarchy. The country was divided into groups of posts, each group having troops enough to garrison all the posts, while a flying column was always ready to take the field. [Note: This was a similar strategy used by the U.S. Army along the Bozeman Trail military posts in 1866 during the Red Cloud War.] The operations were especially directed against the dacoits [ie. bandits]; villages which harboured them were destroyed, cattle were carried off and crops impounded; but great care had to be exercised not to punish villages which were merely victims of dacoity [ie. banditry]. Fines were sometimes inflicted to make the villagers give up their arms if it was thought they were in league with the marauders. But in these operations the population as a whole was friendly to the regular troops.
Severity sometimes necessary.
In the Indian Mutiny, a campaign for the suppression of a rebellion when the most drastic measures were justified by the events at its outset, guerilla warfare was not a feature, except in the Central Provinces and in some few localities after the rebel armies had been overthrown. The nature of the campaign was such that the insurgents were so roughly handled in the field that the country was practically pacified on the battle-field. But in South Africa in 1851–52, in 1877, and again in 1896, rigorous treatment was meted out to the enemy in crushing out disaffection, and with good results; the Kaffir villages and Matabili kraals were burnt, their crops destroyed, their cattle carried off. The French in Algeria, regardless of the maxim, “Les reprêsailles sont toujours inutiles,” [ie. "Reprisals are always useless,"] dealt very severely with the smouldering disaffection of the conquered territory for years after Abd el Kader’s power was gone, and their procedure succeeded. Uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity. A system adapted to La Vendée is out of place among fanatics and savages, who must be thoroughly brought to book and cowed or they will rise again....
Chapter XII -- FINI
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Post by keogh on Jun 2, 2017 12:52:49 GMT -5
CHAPTER XIII -- Part I
Introductory Remarks with regard to Tactical Conditions.
Tactics in Regular Warfare as a matter of rule.
In regular warfare, where armies similarly organized, armed and trained, engage in hostilities, experience has shown that certain broad rules of conduct must be adopted on the battle-field if success is to be achieved. These rules form the basis of the principles of modern tactics as now accepted in the military forces of all civilized countries. Theory and practice combine in proving their soundness. Doctrinaire may differ on points of detail ..., practical soldiers in the field may vary to a certain extent the application to the conditions with which they have to deal, but taken as a whole, modern tactics form a code which in great campaigns between the regular armies of today, both sides equally abide by.
Question of armament entirely alters the conditions in Small Wars.
But in small wars it is altogether different, because the whole question of tactics hinges upon the armament of the forces engaged. Armaments has fixed the proper form of battle array from the remotest ages down to the present time. In small wars the weapons of the enemy differ, as a rule, totally from those upon which the regular forces depend; [Note: This was certainly true at the Little Big Horn in 1876.] savages armed only with spears, fanatics trusting merely to the knife, warriors with antiquated matchlocks [or Plains Indians with spears, bow and arrow, tomahawks, warclubs, matchlocks, and some carbines and repeating rifles] -- such are the foemen often met with in these struggles, and in conflict with them, battle formations adapted to the conditions of more regular warfare must ... be often out of place.
Dispersion and Depth replaced by compact formations.
The dispersion combined with depth which may be said ... to be the main feature of modern tactics, is a necessary consequence of arms of great precision and range. Dispersion in itself, and the freedom which it gives the individual, combine to make the troops a bad target for the enemy. [Note: The principle of 'dispersion' by the 7th Cavalry in 1876 resulted in skirmish lines having a 5 yard spacing between dismounted troopers.] Depth facilitates the making good of losses which dispersion cannot obviate, and it ensures that, if the course of events should lead to shock action, it may be possible to show a bold and solid front. But when the enemy is unprovided with modern guns and rifles, the 'reason d'etre' [ie. reason being] of such a formation ceases to exist; and as it is a difficult one for the leader to control, there are strong grounds for adopting one that is compacter [ie. deployments with closer intervals] and more manageable.
But there are other reasons for reverting [back] in operations against irregular forces to tactical methods discarded with the progress of military discovery. The enemy [such as Zulu warriors -- although very rarely with Plains Indians] often relies mainly on shock action, and this can be best met in serried [ie. compact or close] line. Again, the extreme rapidity and suddenness of the hostile movements make it desirable to have the regular forces well in hand. Moreover the fact that on the battlefield the adversary generally enjoys a great preponderance of numerical strength [such as the Sioux and Cheyenne at the Little Big Horn], often makes it desirable that the army engaged should be able to form front [ie. deploy for action] in all directions. And, since the enemy generally gives no quarter, the protection of the wounded becomes a subject of special anxiety and demands that exceptional dispositions shall be made. [Note: This was certainly the case at the Little Big Horn in 1876.]
Great variety in enemy’s armament and mode of fighting in different cases.
Of course the extent to which tactical principles differ in small wars from the [conventional] system obtaining in great campaigns varies very widely in different cases. For in small wars the enemy’s mode of fighting will at times approximate to the accepted system of regular warfare, while at other times it will diverge so greatly as to lose almost all resemblance to it. Sudanese and Zulus trust mainly to the spear and to the rush of desperate masses, Achinese and Senegalese rely on fire-arms employed in bush and jungle. The Moors at Isly and [Plains Indians] depended mainly upon their mounted men. The hill-men on our Indian borders [and Plains Indians] fight in scattered bodies armed sometimes with matchlocks, sometimes with breech-loaders, and sometimes with magazine rifles. The rebels in the Mutiny employed tactics not dissimilar to our own. Kaffirs and Maoris [and often Plains Indians] make war in guerilla fashion, ambuscades and surprises being the most effective weapon in their armoury. Battle formations suitable in a campaign like that in Egypt of 1882 are out of place in conflicts against hordes of fanatics, armed with assegais and knives. Tactics adapted to the thickets of Benin are ineffective among rugged hills, such as formed the theatre of General Négrier’s remarkable operations in western Tonkin.
Leaving out of account the difficulties of terrain terrain which generally present themselves in this class of warfare, the lack of roads, the deficiency of supplies and often of water, the peculiarities of climate, and looking at the tactical conditions merely from the point of view of the special characteristics of the enemy, certain peculiarities generally met with may be specially noted. [Note: In the case of Plains Indians, these special characteristics include a heavy reliance upon mounted warfare and mobility, together with a greater reluctance to accept heavy casualties in battle, thus an aversion to frontal attacks at close quarters. Their main objective in battle is often directed more towards winning honors or engaging in personal acts of bravery rather than the destruction of their enemy. Their command and control capabilities in battle are very weak or non-existant.]
Enemy’s mobility on the battlefield.
One is the rapidity of the hostile movements, which has already been referred to in its strategical aspect. The mobility of the enemy as a rule aids him at least as much in the actual battle-field as in his transfers of force from one part of the theatre of war to another. [Note: This certainly is a characteristic of Plains Indians warriors who primarily fight mounted.] We find in the Sudan the [foot soldier] followers of the Mahdi almost able to keep up with cavalry – this fleetness of foot of savage warriors on open ground gives to their rushes almost the character of a charge of horse. The [foot soldier] hill-men of the Indian frontier and natives of South Africa in broken country, have frequently perplexed regular troops by the extraordinary rapidity with which they can transfer themselves from one part of the field to another. A special feature of the Abyssinian tactics at the battle of Adowa was their rate of movement and consequent capacity for overwhelming the scattered brigades of Italians in detail.
(to be continued)
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Post by keogh on Jun 4, 2017 16:35:42 GMT -5
CHAPTER XIII -- Part II
Introductory Remarks with regard to Tactical Conditions.
Difficulty as to Wounded.
Another very evil characteristic of the irregular warrior is that he does not respect the wounded of his opponent – a fact that will at times exert an all powerful influence on the conduct of the regular troops. [Note: This was certainly true in the Plains Indian wars.] The wounded cannot be left if there is the slightest fear of their falling into the enemy’s hands. Now it takes four men to carry one who is 'hors de combat' [ie. out of action] for any considerable distance [if dismounted], and it takes one man to carry the arms of the four bearers and of the wounded man – every wounded man in fact puts five out of action in case of a retirement [on foot]. Thus if out of a company of 80 [foot soliders] twelve are wounded, only eight men are left in the ranks; and if two more are wounded, it becomes almost impossible to save these and their arms. This difficulty about the wounded is a very serious matter in retrograde movements or when a force of regulars is moving with the enemy hovering all round it. [Note: The above restrictions on moving wounded soldiers would be lessened significantly if horses or mules are available to transport them as opposed to being carried by the soldiers themselves. At the Little Big Horn Fight, Major Reno elected not to transport his 7 to 10 wounded men by horse or mule.]
Want of cohesion in the hostile ranks.
Another important point, and one which often greatly affects the course of an action, is the absence of cohesion in the hostile ranks. This independence of the individual is fatal to trenchant [ie. vigorous] tactical combinations on the part of the opponent. [Note: This is certainly the case with Plains Indian warriors.] The chieftain of a band of irregular warriors seldom has his following thoroughly in hand, although instances do occur in certain of these campaigns where large bodies of savages are manoeuvred on the battle-field with precision and effect. The lack of organization and the non-existence of a properly regulated chain of responsibility are not without certain advantages in action; if they tend to prevent combined enterprises under the guidance of a single will, they also hinder decisive action on the part of the regular troops. In the more orthodox [ie. conventional] warfare which arises when two modern armies come into conflict, it is not so much the actual placing 'hors de combat' [ie. out of action] of numbers of soldiers fighting on one of the contending sides by the tactics of the other which decides the issue of a battle, as the disintegration of the worsted army and the confusion into which its units are thrown. [Note: In other words, it is not so much the number of actual casualties sustained in battle that will decide the issue, but rather the morale factors which cause the disintegration of a force and its subsequent confusion into which its units are thrown leading to a rout of the affected force.]
The military forces of to-day are complicated organisms which the stress of combat tends to disturb, the more elaborate the machinery the more liable it is to be thrown out of gear by rough handling or by sudden shock; it is owing to this ... that the art of war has assumed so definite a shape. But irregular warriors have not so highly sensitive a tactical system, they are prepared to disperse should the fates prove unpropitious, and each fighting man enjoys individual independence. [Note: This is clearly the case with Plains Indian warriors.] In these small wars, in fact, the enemy does not offer an intricate organization as an object for the commander of the regular troops to direct his energies against.
Irregular warriors individually superior to trained soldiers in many respects.
Again, there is the important fact to be borne in mind that irregular warriors [ie. like Plains Indian warriors] are generally warriors not by training but by nature. The fighting instincts of the regular soldier are, in spite of his training and his military calling, dormant until he goes on active service. He lives in a land with a settled social system, where life is secure and where the rights of property are protected by laws which are obeyed. But his opponent has grown up under very different conditions. He has been accustomed, like his fathers before him, to look on 'might as right,' and to trust to his own right hand for safety amid the turbulent surroundings in which his lot is cast. Thereby he acquires a military sagacity and a skill in the use of such weapons as he has at his command which the trained soldier never can aspire to. [Note: This accurately describes certain advantages possessed by Plains Indian warriors vis-a-vis U.S. Regular Army soldiers.]
The one trusts to his own wits in the hour of danger, the other looks to his superior for guidance. And so it comes about that, leaving actual courage and also ... arms out of account, the regular troops are individually inferior to their opponents in these wars. They do not possess the same fertility of military resource, they have not the same instinctive capacity for contriving ambushes and for carrying out surprises, they are amateurs while their adversaries are professional fighting men. The enemy enjoys ... certain tactical advantages in these wars which compensate in some slight degree for the benefits derived upon the battle-field by the regular forces from their weapons of precision, their discipline, their training, and their elaborate organization, but only in slight degree. Great numerical superiority or peculiar conditions of ground can alone place the antagonists on terms of equality with the civilized army in actual conflict so long as this is not overburdened with the care of stores and convoys – a very important condition as will be seen in some of the later chapters. [Note: These differences illustrating the advantages of Plains Indian warriors vs. Regular soldiers of the U.S. Army can readily be seen at the Little Big Horn in 1876.]
CHAPTER XIII -- FINI
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Post by keogh on Jun 7, 2017 2:04:50 GMT -5
CHAPTER X1V -- Part I
Tactics of Attack.
Offensive tactics generally imperitive.
In the majority of small wars the regular troops have generally to adopt the offensive on the battle-field as a matter of course. The enemy declines to attack, trusting to advantages of position and to such cover as nature provides or can be improvised. Even the Sikhs, the most formidable fighting race the British army has had to deal with in the east adopted defensive tactics from choice when engaged in what was essentially an offensive campaign. And even when the enemy does not show this instinctive disinclination to assume the role of the assailant, it is still a fundamental principle of this branch of the art of war always to attack the adversary when possible. [Note: This basic principle was illustrated by the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn in 1876.] Brave and fanatical warriors who fight in masses and adopt shock tactics sometimes compel the regular army to act on the defensive, to march and to fight in square and to forego the morale advantage of being the attacking side. But such conditions are the exception and not the rule.
The great importance of impressing the enemy with the feeling of inferiority, the advantage of a dominating attitude in the theatre of war, the value of morale effect, have been dealt with in earlier chapters. A daring and resolute plan of campaign affords the best guarantee of ultimate success, and on the battle-field the same great principle [ie. of adopting a daring and resolute plan of battle] holds good as the history of the small wars most unmistakably proves. When decisive victories have been won by insignificant bodies of regular troops over great masses of barbaric foemen as at Plassey, Isly, and Meani it has almost always been due to the assumption of a bold offensive, and this gives to the study of the tactics of attack upon such antagonists a special interest. [Note: Custer's actions at the Little Big Horn have often been criticized by those unfamiliar with small wars as being too bold of an offensive considering the ratio between his smaller numbers compared to those of the Indians opposing him. However, Callwell points out several examples where "insignificant bodies of regular troops" have achieved "decisive victories" by a bold offensive "over great masses" of irregular forces. Thus we can see that Custer's aggressive maneuvers at Little Big Horn had precedence in the annals of small wars.]
How theory of attack differs in small wars from regular warfare.
As a broad question of the conduct of these campaigns the importance of successes in action being decisive has been already pointed out. Since fights are difficult to bring about [ed. and this is very much true in Plains Indian warfare], and inasmuch as the battle-field is the supreme arbiter, it is obvious that when an action can be brought about mere victory is not enough. The enemy must be not only beaten but beaten thoroughly. Let there be no mistake about this. The whole theory of attack is in small wars quite distinct from that which is adapted to great operations between armies of the first class. On the European battle-field the end to be obtained by attack is ... to drive the enemy out of his position. The general watching from his coign of vantage, his finger on the conflict’s pulse, is no less rejoiced than the panting soldier in the firing line when the hostile musketry slackens and then dies away, a sure sign that the defenders are going to quit their ground. “By all that is holy he is limbering up! Stole away!” – Kingslake’s immortal story of the hillside beyond the Alma well depicts the spirit animating all ranks in an assault upon a disciplined army in position. There is painful uncertainty whether the venture will succeed or not. To the columns sheltering in front of the Cemetery Hill at Gettysburg or below the Grivitza position during the second attack on Plevna, the mere disappearance of the foe to their immediate front would have meant triumph of the most far reaching kind.
But in combat with irregular warriors something more is wanted. The issue of the assault will seldom be in doubt nor will it often entail losses of any military importance. The position which the foe has taken up rarely having any intrinsic importance of its own, its evacuation by the defenders will seldom appreciably benefit the troops beyond clearing the way for further advance. What is wanted is a big casualty list in the hostile ranks – they have been brought up to the scratch of accepting battle, they must feel what battle against a disciplined army means. And it is this fact which gives rise to the necessity of operating against the line of the enemy’s retreat and of enveloping attacks such as have been referred to in Chapter IX. ... [Note: Callwell here advocates for the necessity of regular army troops to operate against the line of the enemy's retreat by use of enveloping attacks. This would appear to be exactly what Gen. Custer attempted to do at the Little Big Horn by attempting to flank and envelop the enemy force opposing Major Reno's advance guard battalion with the right wing of his regiment. Needless to say, we can only speculate on his intentions to do so, but it would appear that had his advance guard battalion held its position in the valley south of the main village, Custer would likely have attempted to cross the river to operate "against the line of the enemy's retreat" by use of an enveloping attack. Needless to say, those unfamiliar with the nature of small wars might find such a tactical maneuver difficult to comprehend.]
Importance of capturing trophies.
... British troops no longer take their colours into action, although prizing them nonetheless on this account as emblems of regimental distinction; but Asiatics generally, and irregular warriors in many other parts of the globe [including Plains Indians], bring banners into the field. Fanatics prize their standards highly and look on them as sacred; their loss is regarded as a disaster and as prophetic of ultimate overthrow. There is ... no material benefit to be gained by capturing them, but the morale effect is great. As in planning the campaign, the seizure of some ancient city or historic stronghold should be rated far above its military importance, so on the battle-field the wresting from the enemy of trophies of this nature is to be counted as a matter of great consequence and moment. In small wars, morale effect ranks almost before material gain. [Note: Callwell makes an important point here often overlooked by those unfamiliar with the nature of small wars, and that is the far greater impact that morale factors play upon the will of irregular enemy forces -- including Plains Indians -- in the course of a battle. It is often this factor that will enable a numerically inferior force to decisively defeat a much larger irregular force in battle.]
(to be continued)
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Post by keogh on Jun 10, 2017 13:05:54 GMT -5
CHAPTER X1V -- Part II
Tactics of Attack.
Difficulty of ensuring decisive success.
Desirable as it is to ensure that success in action shall mean not only the defeat of the hostile forces but their destruction, the conditions frequently render such decisive results quite impossible. Often rugged, rocky hillsides are the scene of struggle. At other times the fight takes place in thickets and in tangled jungle growth. The terrain ... rarely lends itself to telling tactical combinations. But quite apart from topographical questions there are two notable characteristics of irregular warriors which tend to hinder the achievement of decisive victory.
Reasons for this.
In the first place, such opponents lose heart at the spectacle of assaulting columns advancing steadily upon them. [Note: At the Little Big Horn fight Custer advanced on the hostile village with 4 distinct attack battalions.] The morale effect of deliberate attack of this nature indeed affects the nerves of the best of troops; to irregular warriors [such as Plains Indians] it is appalling and uncanny -- and they give way before it. In the second place, when such adversaries do give way, they retreat with amazing rapidity and disappear. They disperse in all directions and conceal their arms, and therefore effective pursuit becomes most difficult; cavalry alone can attempt it, and the ground is often unsuitable for mounted men to traverse.... [Note: The above characteristics describe the combat behavior of Plains Indian warriors very well.]
Objection to purely frontal attacks; advantage of flank attacks.
Purely frontal attacks are, in fact, generally undesirable because the enemy gives way before them and from their direction the hostile line of retreat is left unthreatened. Frontal attacks combined with flank attacks are infinitely preferable if circumstances permit of the manoeuver. [Note: This is the likely reason why Custer preferred to use a 'fix and flank' attack at Little Big Horn as opposed to a more conventional frontal attack on the village with his entire regiment.] Or the attack may be solely directed against the flank and even against the rear of the opponent. In regular warfare flank attacks are held to be expedient owing to the heavy loss sustained in frontal attacks when there are modern arms of precision in the defender's hands; but in small wars, although frontal attacks may sometimes be similarly dangerous, the great objection to them is, as general rule, that they do not ensure decisive victory.... [Note: Those unfamiliar with the nature of small wars are generally critical of Custer at the Little Big Horn for not attacking the hostile village in a frontal attack with his entire regiment. In doing so they fail to realize that "as a general rule" frontal attacks "do not ensure decisive victory" in that "the enemy gives way before them and from their direction" of attack "the hostile line of retreat is left unthreatened."]
Enemy [is] seldom prepared for flank attacks or attacks in [their] rear.
It is somewhat singular that, taking into account the inclination which irregular warriors so often display to threaten the flanks and rear of the regular forces [as the Plains Indian warriors consistently did to the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn, just as they did to Crook's force at the Rosebud fight], such adversaries seldom seem to be prepared for attacks on their own flank or rear. When they prepare their positions for defense, they do not seem to take the contingency [of being flanked or enveloped] into account. Of course, it is not always so .... But an examination of the general course of actions in many campaigns in very different theatres of war, and under the most varying conditions, shows that it is very frequently the case.... It does not seem to occur to irregular warriors that they will not necessarily be attacked at the point where they have made their most elaborate preparations. This is somewhat singular because such antagonists are always in great terror of having their retreat cut, and if they find the regular troops getting round their flanks [will] generally abandon their positions in hot haste; still, experience shows that it is the case.... [Note: At the Little Big Horn fight, this would explain Custer's likely intent to cross the river with his right wing to flank or envelop the warriors containing Reno's advance guard battalion south of the village. Had Reno held his position in the valley for a short time longer, Custer would likely have attempted a crossing of the river and thus placed his right wing between the warriors confronting Reno and their noncombatants and horse-herds, thus threatening their capture or line of retreat.]
Flank attacks give better chance of a decisive victory.
As a consequence of the omission on the part of the enemy to protect his flanks, an attack on one or even both of them can generally be carried out without meeting with serious resistance. When such a direction is given to the assailants, or to a portion of them, it is clear that its tendency is to bring the regular troops, or some of them, onto the hostile line of retreat. [Note: It would appear that Custer was intending to do just such a thing at the Little Big Horn by bringing his right wing across the river at Ford B before Reno retreated from the valley.] The direction of the attack has ... the effect of compensating to a certain extent for that precipitancy of retreat which irregular warriors, with their fleetness of foot, can indulge in, and which so greatly mitigates against a decisive success. The enemy [if flanked or enveloped] cannot get away so easily, and if the adversary has guns, a flank attack is far more likely to secure their capture than a frontal one.
In a word, flank attacks tend to bring about decisive victories, to ensure the very [military] objects which, in warfare of this nature, are the most difficult to attain. And it stands to reason that the more the flank attack is directed against the rear of the enemy, the worse is his chance of escape in most cases. Of course, peculiarities of terrain may modify this, but as a general rule it will be so. It must, however, be borne in mind that irregular warriors [ie. including Plains Indian warriors] are always very nervous about their line of retreat ...; they are very apt to beat so precipitous a retreat when they feel their flank threatened, [and] that they get off in spite of the best arrangements. [Note: Ironically, at the Little Big Horn it was Major Reno who was "very apt to beat so precipitous a retreat when" he felt his own flank threatened. And that precipitous retreat from the valley very likely aborted any intention Custer had of flanking or enveloping the enemy force from the rear by crossing the river at Ford B.]
(to be continued)
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Post by keogh on Jun 13, 2017 16:37:09 GMT -5
CHAPTER X1V -- Part III
Tactics of Attack.
Containing force, in case of attacks on the flank or rear of the enemy.
When the question arises of attacking a hostile position in flank or rear, it is always a matter for consideration whether a containing force should be placed in front, and whether this force should ... join in the attack. If there is any fear of the enemy abandoning his position before the flank or rear attack develops, it is generally well to occupy him in front.... At Kandahar ... the enemy was to a certain extent contained by troops on his front and by artillery fire; practically, however, the whole attack fell on Ayoub Khan's right flank.... At Kirbekan, where the attack was directed against the enemy's rear, a very small containing force was left in front; the guns of this detachment took part in the action but the rest of it was not engaged. [Note: At the Little Big Horn Fight, Custer used Major Reno's advanced guard battalion as a "containing force" in conjunction with his own right wing acting as a turning force against the enemy position in the valley.]
Action of Kirbekan, a rear attack.
This battle of Kirbekan is so remarkable an example of an attack upon the rear of a strong position occupied by irregular warriors, that it deserves to be narrated in some little detail. The Mahdists held a position with their right flank resting on the Nile.... Close to the Nile, and at right angles to it, was a chain of rocky knolls on which the enemy was posted, sheltered behind stone breastworks. About 600 yards off, in echelon to the left rear, was a remarkable ridge of trap rock with almost precipitous sides; this also extended on a line at right angles to the Nile, and it was likewise occupied by the Arabs. In rear of the hostile position, at some little distance off, was the mouth of the rocky Shukuk defile; and it was most important to cut the enemy off from retreating into this. General Earle decided to march right round the enemy’s left and to attack the hillocks in rear and the ridge at its right extremity. Two guns with an infantry escort were left in front of the hillocks to occupy the enemy, and the camel corps was deputed to demonstrate against the front of the ridge. The rest of the force was detailed for the turning movement. The operation was signally successful. The enemy grimly stuck to their position, although from the ridge they must have seen the march of the column which was to attack them from the rear. On reaching the right rear of the hostile position the knolls and the ridge were simultaneously attacked. The Arabs stood their ground well and suffered heavily although a proportion escaped before the attack commenced, but the victory was complete and the hostile power in that part of the theatre of war was absolutely broken and destroyed in this one single action.
Co-operation of containing force.
In this fight the small force left in front of the hostile position was merely a containing force and made no direct attack. [Note: In this case the containing force did not actually attack the enemy. A demonstration or feint was enough to suffice.] As a rule, however, in such operations the force in front co-operates more directly in the combat, and the attack takes the form of a combined assault in front and in flank or else in rear. If it can be arranged that the frontal attack shall occupy the attention of the enemy and keep him on his ground and that the flank attack shall develop just as the retreat begins so that the fugitives can be shot down by the troops working on to their line of retreat, the results will generally be very satisfactory. [Note: This maneuver was very likely what Custer was attempting to accomplish at the Little Big Horn with Major Reno's advance guard battalion acting to "occupy the attention of the enemy and keep him on his ground" until Custer could effect a turning maneuver across the river with his right wing.]
The action at Ferkeh on the Nile in 1896 is a case where the main attack was on the hostile front and a smaller force appeared simultaneously on the enemy’s line of retreat; the Dervish force on this occasion was little, if at all, superior in numbers to the regular troops and was practically destroyed. General Négrier’s method of assaulting the Chinese works in Tonkin, which were generally isolated on hills and knolls, was most effective; while the bulk of the infantry supported by artillery moved direct against the objective, clouds of skirmishers pushed rapidly ahead round to the flanks and brought a cross fire to bear on the enemy in retreat; the Chinese seldom let the French get to close quarters and, but for the enveloping form given to the attacks, they would invariably have practically all escaped. In the desultory fighting in Burma, where the dacoits [ie. bandits] and other hostile bodies generally held villages or some form of stockade, the cavalry used to work round both flanks before the infantry attacked so as to be ready to deal with the fugitives. These minor operations in Tonkin and Burma serve to illustrate the principle of combined front and flank attacks very well.
Main attack on the flank.
If the hostile position is very strong and if, therefore, a frontal attack is likely to lead to hard fighting, the main assault is generally best made upon the flank; a minor direct attack upon the front will be very effective when the flank assault has begun to make itself felt. The conditions here, of course, differ entirely from those described above in Tonkin and Burma, where the enemy was disinclined to offer a determined resistance. As an example of cases where, owing to the strength of the adversary’s position, the main attack has been on the flank while the assault on the front has been only a subsidiary and secondary operation, the attack on the Peiwar Kotal may be cited. [Note: The Little Big Horn Fight would be another example of this form of attack. Major Reno's frontal attack on the hostile village was clearly secondary to the proposed flank/envelopment attack by Custer's right wing.]
Peiwar Kotal.
The capture of the Peiwar Kotal by Sir F. Roberts, in 1878 .... The Afghans held the pass over a lofty ridge with difficult approaches. A frontal attack upon their position would clearly have entailed severe losses, and so Sir F. Roberts determined to attack the enemy’s left with the bulk of his force, surprising it after a night march. Part of his army was to attack from in front when the main movement against the hostile flank had succeeded. Reaching the extreme left of the Afghan defences at early dawn the turning force proved completely successful, rolling up the left wing of the enemy in great confusion towards the centre. It was, however, found that [the] advance along the ridge became ... almost impracticable, and a further turning movement was then undertaken, directed on to the line of retreat of the defenders; these, thereupon, began to give way and this enabled the frontal attack to be driven home. The victory was complete, the enemy’s guns were all captured, and the Afghan troops fled in the utmost confusion having suffered considerable losses.
Enemy inclined to draw all his forces to meet the flank attack and so opens the way for a frontal attack.
Antagonists of this character, if attacked in flank, are much inclined to draw all their forces over to that side to meet the onset, thus enabling a movement against their front to make great way. As actions in such warfare are seldom on a large scale this is generally quite feasible, as the distances are small and the massing of the bulk of the defending force on one side or the other can be rapidly effected. And the consequence is that a frontal attack even by a relatively small body of troops may, after the hostile forces have been drawn off to strengthen the threatened flank, succeed in gaining some great and even decisive advantage if the troops be handled skillfully. [Note: This would have been a logical option for Major Reno's advance guard battalion at Little Big Horn had the main Indian force moved away to confront Custer's turning movement with his right wing.]
At Charasia, in 1879, the Afghans had taken up a strong position in the hills, on either side of a defile through which the road led to Kabul, and were especially in strength to the left of it. Sir F. Roberts disposed his forces for the attack so as to launch the greater part under General Baker against the Afghan right, while a small body under Major White was to occupy the enemy in front of the defile.... As General Baker fought his way forward driving the Afghans off, numbers of the enemy hurried over from near the defile to reinforce their comrades on the threatened right. Major White, finding the enemy in front of him to be no longer very formidable, attacked with great vigour, and he was so successful with his small force that he completely overthrew the hostile left and secured the defile. Hereabouts was posted the enemy’s artillery, and this was all captured by the small force, the rôle of which had in the first instance merely been to contain the enemy on that side.
(to be continued)
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Post by keogh on Jun 21, 2017 18:40:42 GMT -5
CHAPTER X1V -- Part IV
Tactics of Attack.
Difficulty of ensuring combination between a front and a flank attack.
For the execution of combined attacks of this kind careful calculation of time and a correct appreciation of the general probabilities of the action about to take place are necessary. At Kirbekan, the hour at which the guns of the containing force in front of the enemy’s position were to commence firing was carefully laid down. If combination be essential to success, it is imperative that the two detached forces shall actually co-operate at the proper moment.
[Note: Unfortunately for the US forces at the Little Big Horn fight, any chance of cooperation between Major Reno's advance guard battalion and Custer's right wing was eliminated the moment Major Reno elected to retreat from the valley.]
It may be impossible to communicate between them, and the terrain may be such that neither force knows exactly what the other is doing; at Charasia [ie. and at the Little Big Horn] the two forces, although some distance apart, could watch each other’s movements to a certain extent. As a rule it is best to allow the detached commanders some latitude of action, for something unforeseen may at any moment arise;
[Note: Gen. Custer clearly gave his two detached commanders -- Major Reno and Capt. Benteen -- some latitude of action, but that very latitude may have significantly contributed to their defeat that day by failing to cooperate in a timely manner with Custer's right wing.]
but if mutual co-operation be the essence of the operation it is imperative that there be a thorough understanding between the separate portions of the force engaged.
[Note: The supporters of Reno and Benteen often point to the possibility that both of these officers had a poor or misguided understanding of their detachment's role in Custer's plan of battle.]
Further on, in discussing the general question of divided forces co-operating to achieve some common object on the battle-field, some instances will be adduced to show how difficult it often is for a commander to handle detached bodies ... in action and what strange mistakes occur. Everything depends on both the force which is in front [ie. Reno's advance guard battalion at LBH] and that which is turning the flank or manoeuvering against the rear [ie. Custer's right wing] of the opposing army, having been given a correct impulse to start with. It has frequently occurred that one or the other has, either from some misapprehension or else owing to unforeseen difficulties, entirely failed to perform its share of the task.
[Note: At the Little Big Horn, Major Reno has often been criticized for failing to hold his advanced guard position in the valley long enough to cooperate with Custer's attempted flanking or envelopment against the rear of the enemy force due to a "misapprehension" of his intended role as a fixing force south of the village. Some would claim that by his precipitate retreat from the valley roughly 30 minutes after his fight first began, he "entirely failed to perform its share of the task."]
Thus General Duchesne during his final advance on Antananarivo in 1895, finding the Hovas in a very strong fortified position on the Amboluminas range, arranged to attack them both in front and on their left rear; the column destined to turn the flank marched off some time before daybreak while the advance of the columns against the front was made ostentatiously in the morning; but the enemy fled precipitately as soon as the front attack developed itself and before the turning force could join in; the advanced troops and cavalry of this latter, however, managed to cut in on the hostile line of retreat, and did good execution.
Calculations as to the length of time which will be required for a force to march to a certain point over ground which is often not very well known, are apt to prove inaccurate even if some unexpected action on the part of the enemy has not upset them. Moreover, any divided action of two distinct forces moving some distance apart is always liable to miscarry owing to some misunderstanding.
[Note: Defenders of Major Reno will often point to Reno's apparent misunderstanding concerning his promised support from "the whole outfit," mistakenly believing that this proffered support would arrive within minutes of his engagement with the enemy and only from the rear. In point of fact, both of these premises were unreasonable expectations.]
Cavalry in flank attacks.
Advantageous ... as are flank attacks combined with assaults on the front of the enemy’s position owing to their increasing the probability of gaining a decisive success, there is always a chance of the combination failing unless all goes right.
[Note: The example at the Little Big Horn illustrates the disaster which could befall when an attempted flank attack combined with an assault on the front of the enemy's position fails in joint cooperation between the detached units.]
If the ground be favourable for its action, cavalry is very valuable in flank attacks owing to the rapidity with which it can act against the enemy in retreat. The action of Badli ke Serai between the rebels and the force moving from Meerut to Delhi after the outbreak of the Mutiny, is an excellent example of such action by mounted troops; the cavalry and horse artillery were sent to operate against the enemy’s flank and rear while the infantry attacked in front, and the result was a completed rout of the mutineers. This war indeed furnishes numerous other instances of the same kind. At Kali Nuddi, after the relief of Sir J. Outram at Lucknow by Sir C. Campbell, the cavalry was similarly sent round by a concealed detour to fall upon the rebels in retreat. The enemy, driven from his position by the infantry, retired in good order till the cavalry swooped down. The effect when the squadrons delivered their onslaught was tremendous, and the whole mutineers’ force was utterly dispersed, suffering very heavy losses. In the Chitral Expedition of 1895, the cavalry sent round to operate against the flank of the tribesmen on the Swat river, who were occupied by the infantry in front, completely dispersed the enemy by its sudden appearance although the ground was by no means favourable for the action of mounted men. The fire of cavalry dismounted may be particularly effective on an enemy’s flank.
Artillery in flank attacks.
The effect of artillery accompanying a flank attack is also very great. At the Peiwar Kotal the guns with the turning force did fine execution. As a main object of such operations is to act against the enemy in retreat, and as such adversaries are very quick in withdrawing, guns are often the only means of inflicting loss when the hostile force gives way. In the Mutiny the horse artillery performed signal service in this manner working with the cavalry. Guns when they get upon the flank of an enemy’s position can moreover often enfilade it with great effect.
(to be continued)
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Post by keogh on Jun 27, 2017 16:42:49 GMT -5
CHAPTER X1V -- Part V
Tactics of Attack.
Imperative necessity of following up a preliminary success.
In all attacks upon irregular warriors or upon armies of inferior morale it is not only essential to drive the assault home with vigour, but to follow up any success gained with the utmost energy and decision. The impression created amongst such opponents by even a trifling preliminary success is very great, and once they are got on the move they must be kept upon the move. This is a broad principle of offensive tactics, whether the assault be delivered in front, in flank, or as a combination of both directions of attack. It is at the root of the whole system of conducting operations in warfare of this nature, in which morale effect counts for so much. [Note: This is an area which many students of the battle fail to factor in -- the morale effect, which despite large enemy numbers, counts for so much, often breaking their morale after but "a trifling preliminary success." In regular or conventional warfare this is not so. But in small wars -- such as the Plains Indian wars -- this was very much the case and should be kept in mind by students of the Little Big Horn Fight.]
Of course, when the opposing force occupies several distinct lines of defence – a system to which such adversaries, notably the Chinese, are much addicted – infantry may be able, after capturing the first line, to reach the second in time to come to close quarters with its defenders; but it is seldom so. Once the first line is forced, the whole resistance as a rule collapses to an extent which can never be hoped for when fighting against regular troops. Dash is not only essential to start with, but advance must continue without a pause till the enemy has been driven from his last position. This was the system followed in the Indian Mutiny and by General Négrier in Tonkin. [Note: This was, unfortunately, not the system followed by Major Reno at the Little Big Horn.] The adversary does not understand it, and becomes hopelessly demoralized.
Need of initiative on the part of subordinates in the attack.
It is always to a certain extent the case that, when troops have been once launched to the attack, and have driven this home, subordinates have to decide whether to complete the success by a further advance; for it is a matter of moments sometimes, and by waiting for orders a great opportunity may be allowed to pass. It is at such critical junctures that the genius for command asserts itself. [Note: This was never a factor at the Little Big Horn fight for Custer's subordinate, Major Reno, never drove home the attack once his battalion had been committed to battle. Captain French, Reno's subordinate at the fight, criticized Reno for failing to do just that.] But in small wars the principle is so clearly established that the enemy, once on the move, must be kept on the move, that the responsibility assumed by the subordinate commander who presses on is not so great as in a struggle against regular troops. In hill and jungle warfare ... initiative is especially desirable on the part of junior officers. [Note: Sadly, there was little or no initiative taken by any of Custer's junior officers at the Little Big Horn fight other than that of Captain Weir on his unauthorized advance to the Weir Peaks and Lt. Godfrey on his rear guard action covering the retreat from the Weir Peaks.]
The following striking incident at the battle of Kandahar deserves mention as illustrating the importance of individual initiative in not allowing the enemy to recover from the effects of a first reverse. The Afghans held the long ridge ... and the villages of Ghundigan and Ghundi to its right front. Sir F. Roberts’s plan was to attack the right flank of the enemy, and the action commenced by two brigades advancing parallel to each other and capturing the two villages about simultaneously. The enemy retreated round the right of the ridge to the village of Pir Paimal and to the reverse slope of the ridge. As the two brigades advanced sweeping round the ridge, that on the right struck the village of Pir Paimal and captured it, then its advanced troops found themselves suddenly in face of nearly the whole Afghan army close to and on the ridge above the village. Hostile reinforcements were hurrying up, and the enemy was bringing a heavy artillery fire to bear on the British troops sweeping round the end of the ridge. If the Afghans were to make a counter-attack on the advanced detachments a serious check might befall the hitherto victorious troops. The situation was critical. There was no time to lose. Major White, whose regiment, the 92nd, was furthest to the front, at once formed it for a final attack. Charging the enemy he drove his men in like a wedge between the masses on the low ground and those on the ridge, capturing two guns. This sudden onslaught completely changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy broke and fled in all directions, and all further resistance practically ceased.
Cavalry to be at hand to complete victory.
The value of cavalry in completing a victory if the ground be at all suitable can scarcely be exaggerated. Theory in the present day favours keeping this arm of the service massed in considerable bodies on the battle-field, and in regular warfare experience has shown that under normal conditions this arrangement will generally work satisfactorily. The tendency of modern tactical organization is to reduce the amount of divisional cavalry to a relatively insignificant body. But it seems questionable whether in small wars some bodies of mounted men should not always be kept scattered ready to assist the infantry, in preference to the cavalry being all practically kept together. This is, of course, speaking of forces in action some thousands strong; with very small bodies of troops the cavalry is necessarily on the spot.
Other arms to play into the hands of the cavalry.
When there is ground in rear of the hostile position where cavalry will be able to work effectually, infantry and artillery should endeavour to drive the enemy in that direction so as to give the mounted troops a chance of inflicting heavy losses. It is often the case that a force of irregular warriors will be found occupying rugged hills on the far side of which are stretches of level ground; these stretches of level ground the enemy will endeavour to avoid when driven from his position, but with good management the infantry and artillery may make retreat by any other line impossible. At Landaki ... the very rapid flight of the Swatis and the delay which arose in getting the cavalry through the defile by the river owing to the road being broken saved the tribesmen from the mounted troops whose prowess they had learnt to dread; when Sir B. Blood had broken out of the Malakand position a few days before, the infantry had driven the tribesmen down on to a level valley, where the 11th Bengal Lancers and Guides cavalry had given them a lesson which will be remembered for years.
The great problem when attacking irregular warriors in position is not so much to decide how to capture that position, for the chances are that this will not prove very difficult, as to make certain that the victory shall be real victory causing the enemy heavy loss. This end may be achieved in various ways under diverse sets of conditions. But, given the suitable situation, no more effectual way of achieving a decisive, and lasting triumph can be found than to compel the broken straggling array, which has been driven from the ground whence it bid the troops defiance, to stream across a level tract of country where the cavalry can deal a coup de grâce.
Importance of the cavalry being at hand at the right moment.
In the case of the battle of Kandahar the whole of the cavalry was to make a wide turning movement outside the infantry, to cross the Argandhab and to fall upon the enemy in retreat, but owing to unforeseen circumstances it was greatly delayed and came up very late; a few squadrons following the infantry would have been of the utmost assistance after the last stand was made by the Afghans. In broken intersected country the charge of a small detachment of cavalry may be of great value as a minor episode of the conflict, and it is essential that the troopers should be at hand to strike when an opportunity offers and thereby to complete what the infantry has begun. The cavalry operations against the hostile flanks and rear in the Mutiny and in the Egyptian campaign of 1882 were admirable, and they were highly effective owing to the ground being generally favourable. Under these circumstances massing the cavalry seems to have been a good arrangement; but on battlefields less suited for the combined action of great bodies of horse, and in attacking an enemy who, once the infantry have come to close quarters, retires at a rate completely outpacing the trained foot soldier, it is most expedient that the cavalry, or at least some of it, should be on the spot to strike home then and there.
(to be continued)
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