Questions for Major Reno

[mikegriffith]

If I had been on Major Reno's court of inquiry, I would have insisted that he be asked the following questions--in fact, I would have been glad to have asked them myself:

* How is it that you now claim that you heard no heavy gunfire from Custer's location, that you had no idea that Custer was in a large-scale battle, that you only heard a few scattered shots and thought they were coming from near the village, when nearly everyone else in your unit and in Captain Benteen's unit heard heavy firing, including volley firing, and when you yourself stated in your report that you and others ("we") heard firing and knew it was Custer?

* You claim that when you made your charge you had no idea where Custer was, but a number of men in your unit saw Custer on the bluffs and saw him heading north. How is it that you were unaware of this fact?

* After you reached Reno Hill, why did you not at least send out a patrol toward the sound of the firing, and/or when others told you that they heard heavy firing, to determine what was going on?

* When you read General Custer's note to Captain Benteen to "come on" and "be quick," why did you wait for over an hour before making any effort to move toward Custer?

* Regarding your claim that you had no idea that Custer was fighting a pitched battle, where did you think all the Indians who had attacked you had gone? Why did you think they had suddenly departed to the north? To take a nap?

* Captain Benteen has confirmed in two letters that you did in fact suggest abandoning the wounded but that he vetoed the proposition. What can you possibly say to justify such a disgraceful suggestion? (I realize the letters were written after the RCOI.)

* Why is there such a huge discrepancy between what you say and what most others say about how many Indians were in your front when you decided to halt your charge?

* You say that you could not have held the timber, that it was indefensible given the number of soldiers you had. Are you not aware of incidents where smaller units than yours held off a large Indian force by taking cover in areas that were similar to the timber from which you fled? Why do you suppose that you suffered virtually no casualties in the timber until you began to order some soldiers from their defensive positions to prepare for your flight from the timber? Do you know that a veteran, decorated Indian fighter like General Miles has observed that the timber formed a "natural rifle pit" and that leaving that area was a terrible mistake? And, would it surprise you to learn that most of the Indians who have commented on the subject have expressed surprise that you fled the timber and have said they could not have gotten at you in the timber?

* When you fled from the timber, why did you make no effort to establish a rear guard of any kind? And, when you had crossed the river, why did you make no effort to provide any kind of protection for the soldiers who still needed to cross?

* When Captain Weir asked you for permission to move toward Custer, why did you repeatedly refuse his request and why did the discussion become so heated? Before you reply, be advised that even Captain Benteen has tacitly acknowledged in a letter that this argument occurred, and we have several other witnesses who have said Weir asked you for permission to leave and that you said no. (Yes, I realize Benteen wrote that letter after the RCOI, and that most of the other accounts/references came after the RCOI as well.)

[benteeneast]

A fine list of questions Mike and Whitaker had his list also but I thought all judges and questioners were officers? Some are easy to answer. Some are loaded questions and probably not allowed. The attorney's are not allowed to testify only ask questions.

Regards

Steve

[mikegriffith]

Some other points/questions I would have raised:

* I would have pressed Reno about his answer to Lee's question about defending just part of the timber. The timber was separated into two area by a large clearing. Lee asked him if he could not have at least defended part of the timber on one side of the clearing (RCOI 2:522). Reno again gave the invalid answer that he didn't have enough men, that they still would have been too far apart.

* I would have jumped all over Reno's ridiculous claim that Custer was already destroyed by the time Reno left the timber! Yes, Reno said that. See RCOI 2:525.

* I would have pressed Reno about his assertion that he didn't remember anyone telling him that they heard firing from Custer's position. This, of course, would have also involved Reno's argument with Weir. The fact that everybody could hear an intense battle going on to the north was what led Weir to confront Reno.

* I would have confronted Reno with testimony that contradicted his version of Custer's orders to him. For example, Dr. Henry Porter overheard Lt. Cooke relay Custer's charge order to Reno,
and he never heard Cooke say that "the entire command" would support Reno, only that Custer would support Reno (RCOI 1:159).

* I would have asked Reno how he could have possibly believed that "the entire command" would support him when he admitted he had no idea where Benteen was? From the RCOI:

Q. At the time you left the timber, could you see Capt. Benteen's column?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you see him?
A. No, sir.
Q. Had you any reason to expect him to unite with your command?
A. Not the most remote. (RCOI 2:504)

Then, again, how in the world could Reno have believed that "the whole outfit" was going to support him?

And I would have followed up the exchange below with brutally pointed questions:

Q. Did you ask any question of Lieut. Cook as to whether you would be supported or not?
A. No. sir. I had official information that I would be supported by the whole outfit.
Q. Had you any reason for believing General Custer would not support you in any other way than by following in your rear?
A. None, sir. In my opinion there was no other way to support me.
Q. An attack on the flank would not be a support?
A. No, sir, not under the circumstances.
Q. Did you not state in your report that he intended to support you by an attack on the flank?
A. I may have said that.
Q. Did you not know at the time you crossed the river that Capt. Benteen was on your left?
A. I did not know where he was. I never saw him after he left the column. He might have gone to the mouth of the Rosebud for all I knew.
Q. Had you any reason to believe that Capt. Benteen might have gone to the mouth of the Rosebud?
A. No, sir. I knew nothing about it.
Q. You saw his column after it started to the left?
A. Yes, sir. It disappeared in a few minutes.
Q. Had you any reasons for believing that Capt. Benteen had been sent so far away that he would not be up and join in the fight?
A. I never gave the subject a thought. I knew whatever orders he got he was capable of executing. (RCOI 2:520)

Are you kidding me? Reno's answers here could, and should, have been shredded to pieces.

* I would have challenged Reno on the story that the horses were all spent, too tired, worn out, etc. Sergeant Edward Davern, who rode with Reno, said his horse was in "tolerably good condition" and that the other horses in the unit were in "tolerably good condition" (RCOI 1:285). Dr. Porter said Reno's horses were in good condition (RCOI 1:160). I'm sure some horses were more tired than others, but the idea that nearly all the horses were already worn out is not supported by the evidence.

* And, I would have skewered Reno on his failure to use bugle commands to alert everybody in the timber that the command was leaving. Davern said the only way he knew the command was leaving the timber was that he saw men from G Troop run for their horses (RCOI 1:289). The use of bugle commands was standard procedure and for good reason. Even Kevin Sullivan, who gives Reno the benefit of the doubt on nearly all other issues, strongly criticizes him for failing to use bugle calls to order the retreat from the timber. So does Charles Kuhlman, even though Kuhlman bent over backwards to be fair to Reno. So does Edgar Stewart. Bugle calls were supposed to be used precisely because they could be heard above the noise of battle.

[benteeneast]

Mike

I think you can press someone's opinion all you want but get nowhere. Opinions differ all of the time in courts and Reno only has to defend what he believed at the time to form his decision at the time which includes the battle readiness of the troops with him. I believe he states the perimeter of the entire timber was to large in his opinion. That you would ask him about defending part of the timber seems to me to be lack of tactical understanding for asking the question on defending part of the timber in the first place. I would respond if you think it OK to let them into some of the timber that is a tactically incorrect decision.

If you note the discussion between Fred and Bill on location of the timber you can see that even Bill agrees that if the size is to large than it can't be defended.


Regards

Steve

[benteeneast]

I would have pressed Reno about his assertion that he didn't remember anyone telling him that they heard firing from Custer's position. This, of course, would have also involved Reno's argument with Weir. The fact that everybody could hear an intense battle going on to the north was what led Weir to confront Reno.

Than he would accuse you of making a false statement or not listening to Churchill's testimony

4. Where did it appear to come from and at what distance?
A. It came from down the river and I thought at the time that it was 2 1/2 or 3 miles away from the sound. It was not a very plain report of guns.


You expertise of what gun shots sound like at 3 miles distance is lacking. Churchill was not Reno supporter and states it was not a very plain report of guns. You can hear it and even determine what it is but it less than talking levels. You would have to define a volley as the duration of the sound and not the intensity.

I suggest that French's firing that Churchill notes was much louder than anything 3 miles away. If you shoot it can also reduce you hearing and sometimes its permanent.

[benteeneast]

When you fled from the timber, why did you make no effort to establish a rear guard of any kind? And, when you had crossed the river, why did you make no effort to provide any kind of protection for the soldiers who still needed to cross?

I would say you don't understand the situation. The mounted Indians were all around the troops there was no rear to protect that was any more important than the flanks or front. You can not stop mounted Indians on your flanks and front with a rear guard action. You also would sacrifice anyone left to implement such action. The horses were moving at full speed and they could never catch up. They would be fed to the Indians in a small group and destroyed.

[benteeneast]

I don't think they let an EM ask questions at the Reno court of inquiry did they?

[mikegriffith]

Feb 1, 2014 12:18:52 GMT -5 benteeneast said:

When you fled from the timber, why did you make no effort to establish a rear guard of any kind? And, when you had crossed the river, why did you make no effort to provide any kind of protection for the soldiers who still needed to cross?

I would say you don't understand the situation. The mounted Indians were all around the troops there was no rear to protect that was any more important than the flanks or front. You can not stop mounted Indians on your flanks and front with a rear guard action. You also would sacrifice anyone left to implement such action. The horses were moving at full speed and they could never catch up. They would be fed to the Indians in a small group and destroyed.

Incorrect. When the soldiers first burst out of the timber, the Indians scattered because they thought it was a charge. When they realized the soldiers were in a panicked retreat, then they fell upon them.

Furthermore, there is no excuse for Reno's failure to at least try to protect the soldiers who were still trying to cross the river after he and others had made it across.

And, if he hadn't made the foolish mistake of leaving the timber in the first place, he would not have lost one-fourth of his unit in his disastrous retreat.

[benteeneast]

Feb 1, 2014 12:37:10 GMT -5 mikegriffith said:

Feb 1, 2014 12:18:52 GMT -5 benteeneast said:

When you fled from the timber, why did you make no effort to establish a rear guard of any kind? And, when you had crossed the river, why did you make no effort to provide any kind of protection for the soldiers who still needed to cross?

I would say you don't understand the situation. The mounted Indians were all around the troops there was no rear to protect that was any more important than the flanks or front. You can not stop mounted Indians on your flanks and front with a rear guard action. You also would sacrifice anyone left to implement such action. The horses were moving at full speed and they could never catch up. They would be fed to the Indians in a small group and destroyed.

Incorrect. When the soldiers first burst out of the timber, the Indians scattered because they thought it was a charge. When they realized the soldiers were in a panicked retreat, then they fell upon them.

Furthermore, there is no excuse for Reno's failure to at least try to protect the soldiers who were still trying to cross the river after he and others had made it across.

And, if he hadn't made the foolish mistake of leaving the timber in the first place, he would not have lost one-fourth of his unit in his disastrous retreat.

Not incorrect at all. The Indians gave way from a charge but they were still all around them. The troops were at first heading toward the village I believe and then they turned and moved toward the closest point on the bluffs that could see. The Indians beat Reno to the crossing and killed the Dr and his escort by crossing ahead of him. I am guessing that you don't ride horses and therefore don't understand the panic they were in during the retrograde.

But to prove me incorrect show us a map where you would put a rear guard when they left timber that would have any effect on the Indians on thier flanks and to the front. The Indians were faster than the cavalry. The Indians were better horsemen.

By the time they reached the river the Indians were mixed in close quarter battle. Listen to the officers the troops were not following orders and it requires a rally point to change that. I think it is evident that cavalry needed a rallying point and usually that would be a reserve unit of troops.

I have no doubt that Reno should have known that running flat out would put the horses in a panic of flight rather than fight and the troopers attention was limited to staying on thier horse once thier revolver was empty. They needed to break contact in order to regroup.

Regards

Steve

[mikegriffith]

Feb 1, 2014 12:12:09 GMT -5 benteeneast said:

I would have pressed Reno about his assertion that he didn't remember anyone telling him that they heard firing from Custer's position. This, of course, would have also involved Reno's argument with Weir. The fact that everybody could hear an intense battle going on to the north was what led Weir to confront Reno.

Than he would accuse you of making a false statement or not listening to Churchill's testimony

4. Where did it appear to come from and at what distance?
A. It came from down the river and I thought at the time that it was 2 1/2 or 3 miles away from the sound. It was not a very plain report of guns.

You expertise of what gun shots sound like at 3 miles distance is lacking. Churchill was not Reno supporter and states it was not a very plain report of guns. You can hear it and even determine what it is but it less than talking levels. You would have to define a volley as the duration of the sound and not the intensity.

I suggest that French's firing that Churchill notes was much louder than anything 3 miles away. If you shoot it can also reduce you hearing and sometimes its permanent.

Once again you prove to be unreliable when it comes to describing accounts. Yes, as you note, Churchill said the firing was not very plain, but he also said this--on the very same page from which you quote:

I remember hearing what I took to be volleys and spoke of it to some of the men. I heard about 4 or 5 volleys. (RCOI 1:414)

So he heard it clearly enough that he identified four or five volleys and mentioned hearing the firing to others. What's more, if you read a little further down in his testimony, Churchill soon clarified that the firing came from Custer's direction. He further said that the firing lasted 1.5 to 2 hours.

Why did you omit all of this information? This is not the first time you've been caught providing markedly incomplete versions of accounts.

In addition, what about the many accounts that heavy firing could be plainly heard and was heard for quite some time? I trust you're aware of these numerous accounts. Even Dr. Kuhlman, who did his best to be fair to Reno, was dismissive of Reno's denial of hearing heavy firing because the evidence is compelling that everyone heard it.

Finally, what about Reno's statement in his report that he and others heard firing and knew it had to be Custer?

[benteeneast]

Feb 1, 2014 12:59:58 GMT -5 mikegriffith said:

Feb 1, 2014 12:12:09 GMT -5 benteeneast said:

I would have pressed Reno about his assertion that he didn't remember anyone telling him that they heard firing from Custer's position. This, of course, would have also involved Reno's argument with Weir. The fact that everybody could hear an intense battle going on to the north was what led Weir to confront Reno.

Than he would accuse you of making a false statement or not listening to Churchill's testimony

4. Where did it appear to come from and at what distance?
A. It came from down the river and I thought at the time that it was 2 1/2 or 3 miles away from the sound. It was not a very plain report of guns.

You expertise of what gun shots sound like at 3 miles distance is lacking. Churchill was not Reno supporter and states it was not a very plain report of guns. You can hear it and even determine what it is but it less than talking levels. You would have to define a volley as the duration of the sound and not the intensity.

I suggest that French's firing that Churchill notes was much louder than anything 3 miles away. If you shoot it can also reduce you hearing and sometimes its permanent.

Once again you prove to be unreliable when it comes to describing accounts. Yes, as you note, Churchill said the firing was not very plain, but he also said this--on the very same page from which you quote:

I remember hearing what I took to be volleys and spoke of it to some of the men. I heard about 4 or 5 volleys. (RCOI 1:414)

So he heard it clearly enough that he identified four or five volleys and mentioned hearing the firing to others. What's more, if you read a little further down in his testimony, Churchill soon clarified that the firing came from Custer's direction. He further said that the firing lasted 1.5 to 2 hours.

In addition, what about the many accounts that heavy firing could be plainly heard and was heard for quite some time? I trust you're aware of these numerous accounts. Even Dr. Kuhlman, who did his best to be fair to Reno, was dismissive of Reno's denial of hearing heavy firing because the evidence is compelling that everyone heard it.

Finally, what about Reno's statement in his report that he and others heard firing and knew it had to be Custer?

On the contrary it is you that made the statement of the intense firing. It only takes one witness to rebut your statement. You still don't get that sound level is not intense as you state. Volley fire would be determined by how long the sound lasted not the sound level.


Why did you omit all of this information? This is not the first time you've been caught providing markedly incomplete versions of accounts.

This is a lame argument it only took one statement by Churchill to refute you intense level of fire. If I follow your reasoning than it is you that stated intense firing and didn't provide us with all the statements made by others to dispute your statement. Not the first time you have done this.

I have never disputed that volley could be heard by those not engaged in conversation and sitting away from those that were. In fact that is my opinion that some would hear and other may not and has always been my position. That explains the accounts without someone having to lie.

If you have ever hunted and can't remember hearing the shots it might help you to understand.

[benteeneast]

So he heard it clearly enough that he identified four or five volleys and mentioned hearing the firing to others. What's more, if you read a little further down in his testimony, Churchill soon clarified that the firing came from Custer's direction. He further said that the firing lasted 1.5 to 2 hours.


Back to you making false statements which is typical of you leaving out the actual statements:


On this page below I found where you failed to present the true statement of Churchill. "I can't tell" is far different than "He further said that the firing lasted 1.5 to 2 hours."




digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=turn&id=History.Reno&entity=History.Reno.p0439&isize=text



Q. How long did that fire last that you speak of as beginning about an hour and a half after you got there?
A. I can't tell; the only thing I could go by was the time the Indians came back on us on the hills I think probably it lasted an hour and a half or 2 hours.


It is clear that reading the entire page that you intended to mislead us on what Churchill said.


Again if you make false statements I don't have an obligation other than to provide a statement in rebuttal. I am challenging the loudness and not the occurrence. If it less than or equal to a conversation level than it may not have been heard by all. It's that simple.

Regards

Steve

[benteeneast]

Once again you prove to be unreliable when it comes to describing accounts. Yes, as you note, Churchill said the firing was not very plain, but he also said this--on the very same page from which you quote:
I remember hearing what I took to be volleys and spoke of it to some of the men. I heard about 4 or 5 volleys. (RCOI 1:414)


I think it proves the opposite and that it is you that proves unreliable when it comes to describing accounts. You made the original post and if you feel there is an obligation to provide the full account than why didn't you do it?


I think your above quote is an example of support for my opinion that the sound was not loud or intense. Hearing what I took to be volleys certainly needs clarification on what he meant by "what I took to be volleys". I suggest that he heard faint sounds of gunfire at a distance and that it lasted longer than a single shot would last.

Regards

Steve

[benteeneast]

So instead of jabbing each other lets get to the root of this. I believe that some persons can hear and recognize a sound while others do not hear a sound that they can recall. That someone had fired a revolver without hearing protection and than focuses on other activities and engages in conversation states they did not hear something could be truthful.

I think you believe because others heard something than an individual must have heard something. That is not true based upon my experience. The lower the sound level the more likely you may not hear something. But that is not always true. You can fire a shot and not hear it to where you recall hearing it of that I am sure. If you think the sound level of numerous firearms is louder than firearm going off at arms length I believe a sound meter will prove you wrong.

So the truth may never be known but you can not state as fact what someone heard or did not hear. Therefore you could never prove what someone heard.

Lets leave it at that an engage in other discussions.

Regards

Steve

[benteeneast]

I would have challenged Reno on the story that the horses were all spent, too tired, worn out, etc. Sergeant Edward Davern, who rode with Reno, said his horse was in "tolerably good condition" and that the other horses in the unit were in "tolerably good condition" (RCOI 1:285). Dr. Porter said Reno's horses were in good condition (RCOI 1:160). I'm sure some horses were more tired than others, but the idea that nearly all the horses were already worn out is not supported by the evidence.

digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=goto&id=History.Reno&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=285

So above is the page that you took that quote from but the question asked was how was the condition of your horse on that morning and not after riding down Reno Creek crossing the river moving down the valley and retrograding at full speed and climbing to the bluffs.

If you don’t have horses than I can understand that ignorance of what constitutes being spent and what effects such as running up the valley, crossing the river, and climbing the bluffs as fast as you can has on the immediate condition of the horses in general. They could be spent and recover in time but I am sure that some were spent by the time they reached the bluffs.

For example Privates Thompson and Watson horses were spent and could not go any further. Those horses had traveled a long distance to get there and traveled every day yet were spent while exiting Reno Creek.
A horse could be spent and still walk but if you needed speed it may not be there.

Read what Martin states about the speed of his horse in his note delivery assignment.

How much time would it take for the majority of the horses in Reno’s retrograde to recover?

I know the one and only time I rode my horse till he dropped it took an hour to recover enough to lead him out of the Inner Basin of the San Francisco peaks and walk him while I carried the saddle. It took around 20 minutes just to get him to move. I tried to put the saddle at least on him and his front legs buckled. I did this out of ignorance of horses and their wiliness to go till spent. Never again will I do this and I make sure my horses are allowed to recover from strenuous activity before they quit.

I am sure that experienced horse cavalry officers knew this and a lot more than I do about pushing horses in groups but if you want to stay in formation and have the ability to maneuver when necessary than the immediate condition of the horses must be taken into consideration.

I also understand Clair’s point that at some point you can decide to burn them up to accomplish the mission. For me the decision point to burn the horses would be in close enough proximity to the location where you needed to be in order to accomplish the mission and that you actually make it there.

Regards

Steve