Captain Robert Carter, 4th Cavalry

[keogh]

General Rosser's (of the CSA) was an experienced Cavalry officer who saw a good deal of combat during the Civil War. Here are his own comments regarding Reno's actions at LBH. They seem to agree, in large measure, with the views of Captain Carter:

From what I can gather from Gen. Terry's instructions to Gen. Custer, it is quite evident that Custer should attack the savages wherever found, and as to the manner of attack, of course, that was left to the discretion and judgement of Gen. Custer, and viewing the circumstances of this fatal attack, from my standpoint (ie. that of an experienced Cavalry officer) I fail to see anything very rash in the planning of it, or reckless in its attempted execution. On the contrary, I feel that Custer would have succeeded had Reno, with all the reserve of 7 companies, passed through and joined Custer after the first repulse. . . . and instead of an effort being made by Reno for such a junction, as soon as he encountered heavy resistance, he took refuge in the hills, and abandoned Custer and his gallant comrades to their fate.

The Indians were running, and it is evident to my mind that Gen. Custer was doubtless ordered to pursue them, cut off their retreat to the south, and to drive them back upon Terry and Gibbon, and thus hemmed in between these commands, they were to be crushed. To do this, it was necessary for Custer to strike them wherever he found them, and by vigorous blows and hot pursuit, he was to drive them into the trap which Terry had set for them. Infantry on expeditions against Indians can only be used as guards for supply trains, and in the pursuit of Indians upon a mission such as Custer's, they are as useless as fox hounds in pursuit of wild geese.

It was expected when the expedition was sent out that Custer and the 7th Cavalry were to do all the fighting, and superbly did a portion of them do it. As a soldier, I would sooner today lie in the grave of General Custer and his gallant comrades alone in that distant wilderness, that when the "last trumpet" sounds, I could rise to judgement from my post of duty, than to live in the place of the survivors of the siege on the hills.

[keogh]

General Rosser continues with his critique on Reno's actions at LBH, similar in nature to those leveled by Capt. Carter. He is writing directly to Reno thru the New York Herald (Aug. 22, 1876) my own comments in yellow:

Your patriotism and courage I have never questioned; but as long as you are a public servant you will be fortunate if you escape with simply a criticism of your plan, and only your judgement censured. . . . But now Major, as to the manner in which you, as detachment commander, performed your duty on that unhappy day, I will not assume the office of judge. . . . The errors which I believe you committed in that engagement were attributed to what I believed to have been a lack of judgement and want of experience in Indian warfare, as I understand you have seen but little service with your regiment on the plains; and in looking over your plan of attack, I could see no good reason for your gently pushing a line of skirmishers down toward a mounted force of Indians when it was expected that you would attack vigorously with your entire command.

The fact of your dismounting and taking to the point of timber [ie. the Garryowen Loop] to which you refer was an acknowledgement of weakness, if not defeat, and this too, when your loss was little or nothing. This was an act which I condemn. You had an open field for cavalry operations, and I believe that if you had remained in the saddle and charged boldly into the village [the Hunkpapa Camp], the shock upon the Indians would have been so great that they would have been compelled to withdraw their attacking force from Custer, who, when relieved, could have pushed his command through to open ground, where he could have maneuvered his command, and thus greatly have increased his chances of success. But if you had charged into the village and been repulsed, could you not have fallen back upon Benteen in good order, and thus saved the disaster which befell you in the confusion and haste with which you were forced to cross the river? You must remember that your situation was very different from the one in which Custer was placed. You had an open field, in which you could handle your command, while Custer was buried in a deep ravine or canyon [ie. Medicine Tail Coulee], and as he supposed, stealthily advancing upon an unsuspecting foe, but was, by the nature of the ground, helpless when assailed on all sides by the Indians in the hills above him.

[keogh]

General Rosser continues with his critique on Reno's actions at LBH, similar in nature to those leveled by Capt. Carter. He is writing directly to Reno thru the New York Herald (Aug. 22, 1876) my own comments in yellow:

Colonel Benteen says:---"When I first came in sight of the valley of the Little Big Horn 12 or 15 dismounted men were fighting on the plain with Indians charging and recharging them. Colonel Reno's mounted party was retiring across the river to the bluffs. I then marched my command in line to their succor." Now, in reading this account at this distance, would one be blamed for supposing that those dismounted men had been cruelly abandoned to their fate and were only saved from their fate by the timely arrival of the gallant Benteen? From your letter I infer that your entire command was not called into action in your attack upon the village, and that your loss was but trifling until you began your retreat.

You do not state, but I have the impression from some of the accounts sent in from the field, that you began your skirmish with the Indians about half past 12 to 1 o'clock [actually, it would have been closer to 1:40 pm according to my own timeline as well as Fred's; Rosser's time above is a closer reference to the time when Reno first go his orders to advance to the attack], and that you recrossed the river and occupied the bluff about 2 o'clock [actually closer to 2:30 pm]. Now, to the reporter of the New York Herald you state that you made a reconnaissance in the direction of Custer's trail about 5 o'clock. The Indians appear to have withdrawn from your front as soon as you recrossed the river. Why then, could you not have gone in pursuit of Custer earlier?

When you did go, you say that you heard "chopping shots." Do you not think that even then, by a bold dash at the Indians, you might have saved a portion, at least, [likely Keogh's battalion] of Custer's perishing command? I have no desire of casting a shadow over you or anyone else that the name of Custer may shine the brighter; and if my criticisms of your conduct in this engagement are unmerited, I deeply regret it, for from the beginning I have never had a thought of doing you or any member of your worthy command an injury, and on the other hand, perhaps I can never benefit my noble friend, who on this field fell a victim to a few combinations of unlucky mishaps. Yet, I am proud to know that he sleeps today sublimely in an honored grave, and all patriots and lovers of heroic deeds, performed in devotion to duty, will join in his requiem.

[mitchboyer]

Hevat, why are you so convinced that Reno could not have stayed in the timber longer than he did? It is true that the imitative was lost when Reno prematurely ordered to skirmish. In war, "initiative" is often lost but, is just as often regained.

We now know that Benteen's command arrived in a short time after Reno achieved the hill, in fact some troopers were still climbing the hill at that time. It has been estimated that Benteen arrived in twenty minutes or so.

If Benteen had observed Reno still in the timber would he have not chosen to support him there? The approach of fresh troops would probably, at the least, created consternation in the Indians flank!

A close scrutiny of Reno's command skills within the timber displays an inexplicable neglect of the perimeter and, a disregard toward a defensive positioning of troops for that defense. Chaos, confusion, orders not given, and an aura of "every man for himself" imbued minds of many of the men there. It was a deplorable situation that was as much a result of a lack of command as the Indians themselves.

Under such conditions, escape in any fashion, is preferable to unavoidable and horrific death.

Carter's point (I think) is that had Reno commanded his troops in a manner conducive with his rank and stature, the initiative would have been regained and Reno could have, would have been in the timber to receive Benteen when and if he arrived.

Needless to say, all may have perished as a result of my scenario. Just as possible, Reno and Benteen together may have usurped the Indians initial thrust and turned the tide.

To assume that any tactic chosen, other than the one selected by Reno, would result in failure can only be surmised by anyone.

Carter, undoubtedly, being a reputable soldier wondered out loud why Reno performed as he did?

The difference between the trip to "Weir's Point" and the "timber" in numbers alone should be obvious. The Weir's Point episode occurred perhaps two hours after Reno left the timber and included thousands of embolden warriors who were totally successful in their defeat of the 7th.

The timber, however, occurred in the initial portion of the fray where many of the warriors (Cheyenne) were still involve further north with Custer. In other words, the odds of success for the soldiers dramatically decreased after Custer's entire command was wiped out;moments before the Weir's Point excursion.

Thank you
Sir

[fred]

Nov 29, 2013 18:10:26 GMT -5 mitchboyer said:

If Benteen had observed Reno still in the timber would he have not chosen to support him there? The approach of fresh troops would probably, at the least, created consternation in the Indians flank!

Mitch,

Remember something...

When Benteen reached the LBH River, Reno was in full "retreat/charge" mode. If Reno had chosen to stay... and I believe he could have stayed a little longer... his time was severely limited. LT Hare, one of the savviest of the officers, felt that if the Indians had charged the woods, the command would not have lasted more than a few minutes, but Indians did not fight that way. “I think we could have stood them off about 30 minutes by using the ammunition judiciously” [RCOI, 282]. If they had stayed in the timber much longer—even 20 minutes—Hare believed they would have been shut in and would not be able to get out [RCOI, 295].

So based on that we have to assume the time was severely limited. Also, remember this, the general idea was to pull back the way they had come, i. e., back up the LBH valley. The former CSA major general, Tom Rosser (Custer's West Point friend), alluded to that type of movement if Custer were forced from Ford B... which, of course, he wasn't: and he didn't. There were also two other enlisted men who referred to precisely that type of movement when they were about to leave the timber, but there were so many Indians forcing them away from that route, the command was forced to ford the LBH where they did.

All of that aside, however, if Reno remained in the timber by the time Benteen reached the river-- and Benteen realized where Reno was-- Benteen told the RCOI he would not have attempted to join Reno until the packs were up: Benteen had already received the Cooke note and would absolutely comply with those orders. (This, of course, is something Benteen's detractors don't want to hear.)

Now, Benteen reached the LBH at 2:48 PM, meaning Reno was already twenty-five minutes into his retreat!! And when Benteen reached the river the packs were still 1½ miles east of the lone/burning tepee or more than 3 miles from the river. At a speed of some 3½ to 4 miles per hour, it would have taken the train another hour to reach the river. Reno would have never survived that long, or if he did, his command would have been decimated.

It is my opinion the number of Indians released from the valley fight some time after Benteen arrived on the hilltop had virtually no affect on the Custer fight. Even without the valley Indians Custer was outnumbered at least 6 to 1, and as he further piecemealed his command, those odds became worse. The only Indian of note to have left the valley early was Crazy Horse, and he probably left shortly before Benteen's arrival on the hilltop. (There were some others who left earlier, but in no appreciable numbers; the majority of Indians left well after Benteen arrived.)

From my perspective, it is not when Reno left, but how he left. And that-- to my knowledge-- has not been properly discussed on these boards. At least not in a very long time.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fuchs]

Nov 29, 2013 19:44:19 GMT -5 @fred said:

All of that aside, however, if Reno remained in the timber by the time Benteen reached the river-- and Benteen realized where Reno was-- Benteen told the RCOI he would not have attempted to join Reno until the packs were up: Benteen had already received the Cooke note and would absolutely comply with those orders. (This, of course, is something Benteen's detractors don't want to hear.)

I'm pretty much illiterate in all things military, but this sounds hard to believe.


You arrive at the battlefield and see that your fellow men and officers are in very deep trouble at least, and in the process of getting slaughtered at worst.

If you delay, it might be too late for them. What you perceive of the enemy equals to daunting, but not impossible odds, 300 against 900, if Benteen's and Reno's detachments both get into action.
Those were just the kinds of odds the US Army was expected to fight against Indians, and win.

At the very least you could relieve some pressure off the surrounded Reno with a diversionary attack, and give him the chance for a more controlled retreat.


You have your orders, but your orders are fuzzy, and clearly not taking into account the situation before your eyes.
If you engage, you leave the pack train open to attack, but it isn't exactly defenseless, and it getting attacked is a hypothetical.
On the other hand, you have a very real battle right in front of you, where you might be able to make all the difference right now.

[hevat]

Nov 29, 2013 18:10:26 GMT -5 mitchboyer said:

Hevat, why are you so convinced that Reno could not have stayed in the timber longer than he did? It is true that the imitative was lost when Reno prematurely ordered to skirmish. In war, "initiative" is often lost but, is just as often regained.

Mitch,

In my opinion Reno could have stayed longer in the timber. Only, I don’t see why he should have done so.

We now know that Benteen's command arrived in a short time after Reno achieved the hill, in fact some troopers were still climbing the hill at that time. It has been estimated that Benteen arrived in twenty minutes or so.

It has been repeatedly pointed out during the RCOI that Reno didn’t know where Benteen was and what his orders were.

If Benteen had observed Reno still in the timber would he have not chosen to support him there? The approach of fresh troops would probably, at the least, created consternation in the Indians flank!

It seems to me that Benteen would have been surprised to find Reno in the timber on the left bank of the LBH surrounded by enemies. From what I’ve read, Benteen wasn’t our Keogh’s kind of cavalry man. <g> I believe that he would have wanted to know where Custer was and how to protect the pack train before he made any decision.

A close scrutiny of Reno's command skills within the timber displays an inexplicable neglect of the perimeter and, a disregard toward a defensive positioning of troops for that defense. Chaos, confusion, orders not given, and an aura of "every man for himself" imbued minds of many of the men there. It was a deplorable situation that was as much a result of a lack of command as the Indians themselves.

Reno must have been disagreeably surprised when he heard that Co A, (and out of necessity Co M) had left the skirmish line. I don’t know who was responsible for the chaos and panic in the timber but it is clear to me that it wasn’t by Reno’s doing. He was too busy in the glade. However, the fact that his troops panicked in the timber might have been one of the reasons why he decided to leave.

Under such conditions, escape in any fashion, is preferable to unavoidable and horrific death.

Somehow I don’t believe that Reno made a choice between life or dead. He had to do something to get a grip on his battalion - and so he did.

Carter's point (I think) is that had Reno commanded his troops in a manner conducive with his rank and stature, the initiative would have been regained and Reno could have, would have been in the timber to receive Benteen when and if he arrived.

Hmmm. Rank and stature ... They play an important role in manuals and trials but not in the timber where only a few can see and hear you. Carter should have known better.

Needless to say, all may have perished as a result of my scenario. Just as possible, Reno and Benteen together may have usurped the Indians initial thrust and turned the tide.

I don’t think all would have perished in the timber. The battalion had become unmanageable and therefore useless.

To assume that any tactic chosen, other than the one selected by Reno, would result in failure can only be surmised by anyone.

Indeed.

Carter, undoubtedly, being a reputable soldier wondered out loud why Reno performed as he did?

I’ve no problems with his questions - only with his easy answers.

The difference between the trip to "Weir's Point" and the "timber" in numbers alone should be obvious. The Weir's Point episode occurred perhaps two hours after Reno left the timber and included thousands of embolden warriors who were totally successful in their defeat of the 7th.

The whole Weir Peak affair remains a complete mystery to me.

The timber, however, occurred in the initial portion of the fray where many of the warriors (Cheyenne) were still involve further north with Custer. In other words, the odds of success for the soldiers dramatically decreased after Custer's entire command was wiped out;moments before the Weir's Point excursion.

Thank you
Sir

The odds weren’t very good anyway after Custer crossed MTC, in my humble opinion.

Regards,
Henk

[fred]

Nov 30, 2013 4:58:30 GMT -5 fuchs said:

I'm pretty much illiterate in all things military, but this sounds hard to believe.

Benteen was asked if he could have joined Reno in the timber. His response was, he could have tried. [414]
• He also said he would not have tried if he did not have the packs. [414]
Benteen said if he had tried to make the timber his “losses would have been very much greater than they were….” Benteen felt the seven companies would have been wiped out. [415]


You seem to forget that when Benteen reached the river what he saw was a handful of troops fighting off Indians. There was a huge cloud of dust and smoke and the distance was a good 1 1/2 to 2 miles away. The timber area was even farther: probably about 2 1/2 to 2 3/4 miles away... longer, if you believe "keogh's" claim that the timber was located in the Garryowen Loop.

And you expect a cavalry commander to abandon a vulnerable, strung-out command loaded with extra ammunition and all the remainder of the supplies-- and with more men than Reno had-- to charge willy-nilly into a cloud of dust and smoke three miles away? And what was the condition of that command? How many men were left? How many Indians were there? What were the odds?

You do not need to be a tactical or a military genius to figure that choice wouldn't be the first one you take!!!

And let's not forget the fact Benteen was already confused about "who" was "where." Diverging trails, remember? One going left, one going up the bluffs... and now more confusion with troops in the valley...?!

There are plenty of "blamers" out there who criticize Custer for a lack of reconnaissance-- and I am not one of them! because to me, that's about all Custer did the entire time he was mounted: reconnoiter-- yet suddenly Benteen should charge blindly into a cloud of dust...? "Hi-yo, Silver!!!"

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Nov 30, 2013 7:00:36 GMT -5 @hevat said:

Reno must have been disagreeably surprised when he heard that Co A, (and out of necessity Co M) had left the skirmish line. I don’t know who was responsible for the chaos and panic in the timber but it is clear to me that it wasn’t by Reno’s doing. He was too busy in the glade. However, the fact that his troops panicked in the timber might have been one of the reasons why he decided to leave.

Henk,

I do not believe this is accurate.

First of all, I know of no "troop" panic in the timber, even as they prepared to leave. There are several accounts of companies A and M forming up in order, preparatory to leaving.

Next, there is plenty of evidence-- in the form of other accounts-- that allude to the pull-back from the valley floor being ordered by Reno himself.

The problem in the timber stemmed from Reno's yanking half-- or better than half-- of G Company off the line and into the timber, accompanied by McIntosh. He did that because of reports of infiltration and his concern about his horses there. Sound logic, though because of the dense underbrush men probably spread out too much and lost contact with one another. That led to a loss of control and that was more McIntosh's responsibility than Reno's. After all, we always seem to blame Reno for everything: he did have officers who had responsibilities for their commands, as well.

You also had several M Company men in the timber area, having been sent there by Reno/French/Ryan to clear the area... also sound tactics.

And if you look at the troops left behind after the command "charged" out of the woods, it appears most of those were men from G and M, verifying accounts of what Reno was doing.

To me, the word "panic" can only be used to describe the rear-end of the column during the "charge."

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fuchs]

Nov 30, 2013 8:52:44 GMT -5 @fred said:

You seem to forget that when Benteen reached the river what he saw was a handful of troops fighting off Indians. There was a huge cloud of dust and smoke and the distance was a good 1 1/2 to 2 miles away. The timber area was even farther: probably about 2 1/2 to 2 3/4 miles away... longer, if you believe "keogh's" claim that the timber was located in the Garryowen Loop.

And let's not forget the fact Benteen was already confused about "who" was "where." Diverging trails, remember? One going left, one going up the bluffs... and now more confusion with troops in the valley...?!

Oh well, seems I fell into the trap of using hindsight information for my reasoning not available for the people in question back then, and treating this like some kind of computer game, with perfect situational awareness and complete control.

yet suddenly Benteen should charge blindly into a cloud of dust...? "Hi-yo, Silver!!!"

That wasn't exactly what I had in mind, but given the lack of information for Benteen, and the impossibility for any communications between Reno and Benteen to coordinate any action, my suggestions indeed appear to have been naive



Benteen was asked if he could have joined Reno in the timber. His response was, he could have tried. [414]
• He also said he would not have tried if he did not have the packs. [414]
Benteen said if he had tried to make the timber his “losses would have been very much greater than they were….” Benteen felt the seven companies would have been wiped out. [415]

If the only realistic option for coordinated action open to Benteen would have been cutting his way through to the timber, than obviously he had to wait for the train.

Thanks for making this clear to me, Fred.

[keogh]

Nov 30, 2013 4:58:30 GMT -5 fuchs said:

I'm pretty much illiterate in all things military, but this sounds hard to believe.

Fuchs, I don't think you are as illiterate in this subject as you might imagine. I think you bring up a very good point here, and clearly one that the Recorder at the RCOI also assumed.

You arrive at the battlefield and see that your fellow men and officers are in very deep trouble at least, and in the process of getting slaughtered at worst. If you delay, it might be too late for them. What you perceive of the enemy equals to daunting, but not impossible odds, 300 against 900, if Benteen's and Reno's detachments both get into action. Those were just the kinds of odds the US Army was expected to fight against Indians, and win. At the very least you could relieve some pressure off the surrounded Reno with a diversionary attack, and give him the chance for a more controlled retreat.

Very well summed up, imo. This was the situation in a nutshell.

You have your orders, but your orders are fuzzy, and clearly not taking into account the situation before your eyes. If you engage, you leave the pack train open to attack, but it isn't exactly defenseless, and it getting attacked is a hypothetical. On the other hand, you have a very real battle right in front of you, where you might be able to make all the difference right now.

Again, well summed up. Now, as Fred points out, Benteen stated at the RCOI that he would not have crossed the river and supported Reno until the pack train came up. We can only speculate if Benteen was telling the truth here or simply making a statement to support Reno's decision to retreat from the valley as soon as he did. There were officers in the 7th who knew Benteen quite well, and expressed their opinion that Benteen would have not hesitated to cross the river and support Reno immediately, leaving the pack train with its already strong guard -- keeping in mind that the Pack Train had more troops to defend it than Benteen had in his entire battalion. Let's examine for a moment what one officer had to say about Benteen's hypothetical advance into the valley:

Lt. Hare, in a letter dated June 11, 1929, to his friend Colonel Charles Bates describes the view of Benteen and Weir regarding Reno's decision to abandon his timber position in the valley:

While we were burying the dead on the Custer battlefield on the 28th of June, both Benteen and Weir said to me that they thought Reno should have stayed in the bottom. I (on the contrary) always thought that getting on the high ground was the wise course to follow. On one occasion I said to Captain Benteen, "If you had come up and found Reno in the bottom position, surrounded by Indians, you would have joined him there." This would have left McDougall and his troop with the extra ammunition outside in a perilous position. Benteen was very decided that Reno should have stayed in the bottom.

You will notice that Benteen never corrected or contradicted Hare when Hare most naturally assumed that Benteen would advance immediately to Reno's support in the valley. Hare even expresses his concern that Benteen doing so might actually endanger McDougall and the pack train. Those who knew Benteen well understood that he was no coffee-cooler who intended to sit out a fight waiting for the arrival of a slow moving pack train.

In point of fact, Benteen did not slow down a bit to wait for the pack train to close up after he received his orders from Martin to "bring packs". Benteen did no such thing -- as I believe he was correct in interpreting his orders to mean simply to have the pack train follow his trail into the valley. I think people tend to forget that the Pack Train did not need the equivalent of 6 companies -- or half the fighting strength of the entire regiment -- to defend itself.

To this end, here are a few more views relating to this subject from other officers of the 7th:

RCOI by the Pioneer Press dated Jan. 22, 1879 that has been reprinted in the Edgerly Papers:

"Lt. Lee next asked witness (ie.Varnum) whether it would have been possible for Capt. Benteen to have crossed the river to Maj. Reno's relief? Lt. Varnum said that he believed Col. Benteen could have done it;

----------------

Lt. Edgerly expresses his views from The Edgerly Papers, p. 70, my comments in brackets:

"If Reno had gone and held the [Hunkpapa] village, he would have been joined by Custer and Benteen. The result would have been a costly victory, instead of a terrible defeat. The speaker (Edgerly) thought Reno lost his head."

I don't have the exact quote on hand, but Edgerly also stated that Reno's biggest mistake was leaving the valley, "for we would have joined him there in 10 minutes."

I think it is clear enough that Edgerly, like Hare before him, was convinced that Benteen had no true intention of waiting for the Pack Train to arrive before joining with Reno in the valley, regardless of what he chose to say at the RCOI. They knew him better.

And we must factor in one more thing. Even if we assume the most unlikely scenario of Benteen actually choosing to sit out a fight and wait for the arrival of the Pack Train, we must also factor in Benteen's own stated belief that Reno should have held his position in the timber and not retreated when he did so. Recall that Benteen believed that Reno could have held the timber position for 5 or 6 hours, which was plenty of time for the pack train to arrive and Benteen to provide his timely support.

Benteen expresses his own views of Reno actions at LBH in a personal letter to the famous photographer D.F. Barry (March 1, 1895):

"I don't think that Reno pushed the Indians on the bottom on June 25th '76 quite as hard as he might have done . . . it would have showed more true and soldierly instinct. Nor do I think he should have retreated at the head of the column on the bottom without even stopping to withdraw the dismounted skirmishers---not even having a trumpet sounded toward such end! These facts exhibit too truly that he was about completely demoralized."

garryowen,

keogh

[hevat]

Nov 30, 2013 9:09:08 GMT -5 @fred said:

Nov 30, 2013 7:00:36 GMT -5 @hevat said:

Reno must have been disagreeably surprised when he heard that Co A, (and out of necessity Co M) had left the skirmish line. I don’t know who was responsible for the chaos and panic in the timber but it is clear to me that it wasn’t by Reno’s doing. He was too busy in the glade. However, the fact that his troops panicked in the timber might have been one of the reasons why he decided to leave.

Henk,

I do not believe this is accurate.

First of all, I know of no "troop" panic in the timber, even as they prepared to leave. There are several accounts of companies A and M forming up in order, preparatory to leaving.
Next, there is plenty of evidence-- in the form of other accounts-- that allude to the pull-back from the valley floor being ordered by Reno himself.

Agreed. I too believe that it was Reno's decision to leave the timber.

The problem in the timber stemmed from Reno's yanking half-- or better than half-- of G Company off the line and into the timber, accompanied by McIntosh. He did that because of reports of infiltration and his concern about his horses there. Sound logic, though because of the dense underbrush men probably spread out too much and lost contact with one another. That led to a loss of control and that was more McIntosh's responsibility than Reno's. After all, we always seem to blame Reno for everything: he did have officers who had responsibilities for their commands, as well.

Reno made the right decisions - at least till then. He had nothing to do with the decision to leave the skirmish line.

You also had several M Company men in the timber area, having been sent there by Reno/French/Ryan to clear the area... also sound tactics. And if you look at the troops left behind after the command "charged" out of the woods, it appears most of those were men from G and M, verifying accounts of what Reno was doing.

I still have to read most of these accounts, in particular Ryan's.

To me, the word "panic" can only be used to describe the rear-end of the column during the "charge."

Best wishes,
Fred.

Benteen and DeRudio (bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble) used 'panic' to describe the fact that the soldiers were out of control. They seemed deaf to all orders given. If we may believe Varnum this happened again as soon as they left the timber.

All the best! Henk

[fred]

Nov 30, 2013 14:12:20 GMT -5 keogh said:

I don't have the exact quote on hand, but Edgerly also stated that Reno's biggest mistake was leaving the valley, "for we would have joined him there in 10 minutes."

"... 10 minutes," eh? You don't think that's a little hyperbole...? And Reno knew Benteen was only three miles away, right?

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Fuchs, my boy!

I did not mean to be so blunt in that response, so let me try to take off some of the edge and explain my reasoning.

First of all, under the circumstances as we know them and as they unfolded in real time, I believe firmly Benteen did the right thing and made the right moves.

We have, however, a number of hypotheticals; so let me try to deal with them as I think of them. First, I will set them up, then I shall deal with each one separately.

Hypothetical # 1… Benteen passes the lone tepee and the trail does not split, but goes straight for the river, crossing the LBH. No scouts are on the bluffs to direct him and the action in the valley shows no soldiers, but only warriors and loads of dust and smoke.

Hypothetical # 2… Same as above, only Benteen sees troops running from the warriors, very much as he actually saw.

Hypothetical # 3… Everything is as it actually was—the trail heading up the bluffs—only there were no troops seen in the valley, only warriors, smoke, and dust, i. e., Reno was still fighting in the timber.

So, let’s address each one…

Hypothetical # 1…

Because the trail goes straight and crosses the river, Benteen can safely assume all eight companies are with Custer and the fight is downstream. There is only one course of action: charge down the valley.

The question becomes, however, how? The packs are 3½ miles back and McDougall is closer to 4 miles back (remember, he stayed back a bit to pull mules out of the morass). So… in my opinion, Benteen sends an officer—Frank Gibson of his own company—back with a message to Mathey and McDougall. He hurries up McDougall—and at 12 mph McDougall can be up to Benteen in 20 minutes—and Gibson instructs Mathey to climb the bluffs and corral his train with one side against the steep bluffs, the other three sides with clear fields of fire, one of which will be downhill. Mathey has almost two full companies—at this regiment’s strength: 84 men, including 7 from B Company, plus 5 civilian teamsters. McDougall—less the 7 men with the packs—has 37. Benteen should also at this point send one company—Godfrey’s, not Weir—to probe the valley as a reconnaissance. Once McDougall is up and Benteen gets some sort of a report from Godfrey, he should probably start down the valley, charging as he gets closer.

Hypothetical # 2…

In a situation like this, I would imagine Benteen sending a runner back to the packs and McDougall, very much like above, only this time not waiting for McDougall to come up. I would assume—with no other trail to follow—Benteen would have crossed the river immediately and moved down the valley to join the fighting.

Hypothetical # 3…

This is the most difficult decision of all… Benteen’s horns of a dilemma.

I would suspect he would have sent a probe down the valley—I would—sending again for Mathey and McDougall. After that… who knows? Lacking directions from the scouts, it is a gut call and I would suspect Benteen would have crossed the river—maybe waiting for the added strength of McDougall—then moved down the valley.

Let’s also try to remember, while it is fine to claim Reno should have stayed in the timber, none of them—Benteen, Edgerly, Godfrey—were there. Again, it isn’t a matter of whether or not Reno could have held out longer: that isn’t the issue. Even I admit he could have held out longer. But to what purpose? There were enough Indians to wipe out Custer anyway, so the argument that by retreating Reno released hordes of warriors to wipe out Custer is fatuous. And like Benteen said, even had he managed to join with Reno, they would all have been wiped out in the morning or earlier. Benteen would have added only 117 more men (without McDougall and the packs). Pure and simple, those woods could not have been held for very much longer!

Here is an interesting little exercise. Put yourself in Reno’s place. You figure you have about 135 men and you are about to be hemmed in by about 900 Indians—completely surrounded. Your cover is being infiltrated and you are beginning to run low on ammunition. Would you rather stay in the timber or break away to high ground where you can at least form something of a perimeter and exercise better command and control and have clear fields of fire?

It appears all the military thinkers and strategists of the time thought being under siege was not the way to go. And while we have all this post-battle hedging by the likes of others who weren’t under that siege, they all admitted the time was limited.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Nov 30, 2013 15:12:46 GMT -5 @hevat said:

Reno made the right decisions - at least till then. He had nothing to do with the decision to leave the skirmish line.

Henk,

You may want to re-think that...

Reno, M. A., MAJ-- Hodgson told Reno the Indians were moving beyond the troops’ left flank and Reno ordered him to bring the skirmish line in along the edge of the timber. RCOI, 1879; RCOI, 562 – 563.

Sivertsen, J., PVT-- M-- Claimed that Reno gave the order to retreat, but that CPT French changed it to, “Fall back with faces to the enemy!” Coffeen, The Custer Battle Book, 42 – 46. Not sure how Sivertsen would have known that other than being told by someone. He was way out in the valley with M Company when the pull-back order was given.

Davern, E., PVT-- After the line halted, Davern came back and saw Reno near the woods, firing at Indians. The line had withdrawn to the woods. RCOI, 1879; RCOI, 334.

Moylan, M., CPT-- Moylan noticed Indians moving to the line’s left and he went to the edge of the hill [Gerard’s “brow”] and called to Reno to see what was happening. Reno came up, looked, and ordered the line withdrawn to the edge of the woods. RCOI, 1879; RCOI, 216. Here we go again! The two "principals," the only two involved. Both say the same thing

Benteen and DeRudio (bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble) used 'panic' to describe the fact that the soldiers were out of control. They seemed deaf to all orders given. If we may believe Varnum this happened again as soon as they left the timber.

C'est vrai.

But let us not forget, Benteen wasn't there and DeRudio was hunkered down in the thick brush. Neither man was in that so-called "charge."

Once the command hit the river and began crossing, I'll bet there was plenty of panic! So I will give you that one. <g>

Best wishes,
Fred.