Captain Robert Carter, 4th Cavalry

[moderator]

Captain Robert Carter, a combat veteran of the Indian Wars and a member of the 4th U.S. Cavalry, expressed his views on the Little Big Horn and several of its officers and their conduct in a series of letters he wrote over the years. His letters and opinions in this regard will be posted herein.

Captain Carter attended West Point with several 7th Cavalry officers, which might form the basis of some of his opinions of them. He was also on friendly terms with Godfrey and exchanged correspondence with him about LBH. He specifically mentions as one of his 7th Cavalry informants as being the son of Major Merrill. Captain Carter was also a recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions during the Indian Wars.

[keogh]

An excerpt from Captain Robert Carter's MEMORANDA (Sept. 6, 1932) regarding Major Reno:

Reno's record during the Civil War, although he was breveted as many others were, was clouded by at least one most discreditable affair, as related by General Wesley Merritt, formerly commanding the regular cavalry division under Sheridan, and later, the 5th Cavalry. He [Reno] was under a cloud when he was a tactical officer at West Point (1865-66) (the writer was there) and was hastily relieved before his tour of duty had expired, and the cause for such relief was suppressed.

[keogh]

Captain Robert Carter of the 4th US Cavalry presents his views of Reno's leadership in the valley, my own annotations in brackets:

"Col. Graham seems to assume that Reno was fully justified before Benteen came up, in leaving his defensive position in the timber to save his command from annihilation, because then he did not know the conditions, and the Indians were filtering into the timber from several directions and endangering his communications to the rear."

In these few short words, Capt Carter sums up most of the excuses rendered to Reno by his defenders. Carter's rebuttal to them follows:

"I do not find any positive proof that at any time the Indians were 'filtering' into the timber in any considerable numbers. If this were the fact, more than one [actually two] would have been killed or wounded during the period in which he (Reno) remained there."

"He (Col. Graham) admits, however---but not in his story---that "knowing all the circumstances as they afterwards occurred, and as it is now well known," that Reno could and should have remained in the timber until Benteen arrived, [note that Carter quite naturally assumes that Benteen will shortly enter the valley to support Reno there] not only to save his command from annihilation---which he (Reno) afterwards exposed them to by his cowardly flight in an utter rout---but in the hope that the two commands [Benteen's & Reno's] could probably have done much by a possible advance, with Benteen as the directing spirit, in the direction of the village, in drawing away a large body of the Indians whom he seems to think were then advancing to head Custer off and block his crossing of the lower fords to get to the rear, or on the flanks of the Indian village, even if they were not already attacking him across those fords."

[reddirt]

I don't know but, it seems to me that Mr.Graham was such an honorable , retired soldier that he honestly believe that the officers who testified at the Reno Inquiry 'Told the truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God!" I really thing that Mr. Graham could even imagine anything else.

For example, Mr. Graham argues fiercely with Capt. Carter's position that Reno's way of leaving the timber was somewhat of a cowardly act. Graham says no way. Reno may have lost his head a bit but, no way was Reno a coward.

When the Commander of a group of people who are being killed "loses his head" resulting in men being left behind in the timber and a wild chase to the river comes about, what do you call that man? A scout?

I understand that any person my fall victim to fear, that's why we are called "human" but, to disregard a failure that results in deaths by a graduate of the Military Academy of the United states calls for a better explanation!

[keogh]

Continuing Captain Carter's analysis of Major Reno's decisions in the valley at LBH:

"I could cite many instances, but most notably Gen. Geo. F. ("Sandy") Forsythe's command of but 50 . . . scouts in his fight with Roman Nose's Cheyennes at Beecher's Island in 1868, where he "stood off" 700 or more well armed Cheyenne warriors for nearly 8 days, and this after his 2nd in command (Lt. Beecher) and his surgeon had been killed and he himself had been wounded 3 times. There was no timber for cover, nothing but a low sand spit in the middle of the stream, protected only by low banks and a few stunted willow trees. There were many instances when fewer men in a buffalo wallow hole on the open prairie stood off 10 times their numbers. I myself, in 1871, with but 5 men, held back several hundred Comanche Indians with no cover, for quite a long while, or until the main command could come to my rescue. Of course, in all of these instances there were some casualties. That is always expected. It is part of the game. I lost but 1 killed and 2 wounded of my little bunch of 5 . . . soldiers. . . . Indians always hesitated . . . to 'close in' and fight in the face of a well directed fire by which they knew they would lose many of their warriors, killed or wounded."

[keogh]

Here are a few comments Capt. Carter made in regards to Lt. Varnum and the other officers of Reno's command who later supported his decision to leave the timber:

"General Miles does not hesitate in his talks with me to call Reno's conduct rank cowardice, and I had much rather take his, General Gibbon's and General Godfrey's judgement as to Reno's ability to stay in that timber till hell froze over---eating his horses if necessary---as Sandy Forsythe did on Beecher's Island in 1868, than Hare's, Varnum's and others who, after Reno's fear, timidity, or whatever Webster or anyone else may term it, had communicated itself to them to the extent of stampeding them, so that they themselves were not loath to get out of that timber, and make the charge to the rear with them. That would not do, however, to tell the Court. The question comes up, however, where in the hell were they all expecting to go when they headed for the ford? And where they could not see Custer or know where he had gone? Could not see Benteen and ... had no reason to expect the latter to be near, or that either he or Custer could come to their assistance."

[keogh]

Nov 3, 2013 10:21:48 GMT -5 reddirt said:

Bill, when people of his own life time thought this way of Reno, how do you explain the "die hards" of today who defend him? I really, really, really, don't get it?

Well, Reno has always had his defenders throughout the years. I suspect that those who sympathize with the good Major do so because they themselves identify with his tactical decisions and recognize that these decisions are more or less what they themselves would choose to do under similar circumstances. Reno was clearly not an aggressive risk taker, as Custer was known to be. Those who identify with Major Reno, I suspect, are equally uncomfortable with aggressive risk-taking and independent action and more comfortable with the opposite. The supporters of Custer would tend to be just the opposite, imo.

P.S. And the R. C. O. I. found nothing to admonish him!!!

Well, that, I suspect, had more to do with politics and the good name of the Army, at least as far as the public was concerned, than for any reasons of sympathy for the conduct of Major Reno. As Gen. Merritt told us, "they damned him with faint praise."

garryowen,

keogh

[keogh]

Captain Carter critiques both Reno and Custer's plan at LBH and gives his own view on what might have brought on success that day:

"When Reno left Custer's column about 3/4 of a mile from the river (Little Big Horn), and where Custer turned off to go to his right, and then up over the ridge, Cook, the Adjutant, and Captain Keogh are known to have accompanied Reno as far as the ford. Girard, the interpreter, was with them. Custer believed that the Indians were trying to get away and would escape, although his scouts had said that was not the case. Shortly before Reno deployed his column across the valley, Girard saw that the Indians were swarming up from the upper end of the village to boldly attack Reno. He . . . communicated this fact to Cook, who, with Keogh, returned to Custer, rejoining him on the trail. The former doubtless informed Custer of this sudden move on the part of the Indians.

Col. Graham believes . . . that Custer had up to the moment of this information, intended to closely follow Reno in his attack and support him from the rear . . . . It was just at this moment that Custer changed his mind and, without disclosing his reasons for doing so, turned off from the trail and proceeded on his long . . . march over the ridge to his fate. Nobody will ever know positively his reasons for this, or what plan he had in view, except that he was afraid---never doubting that Reno would push through to the village---that the Indians might cross the river and escape over the hills into the Bad Lands, and by this detour, he would be able to head them off by crossing himself at one of the lower fords and attacking them there, drive in towards Reno, thus crushing them between the two commands.

The inability of Reno to get through on account of his rank cowardice prevented this, and Custer's fate was sealed just as soon as Reno retreated, first to the timber, and then back to the river and bluffs, thus leaving the entire Indian outfit . . . to go back and head off and surround Custer by an overwhelming force . . . . It was only by their (Reno & Benteen) joining in the timber, reorganizing, and then charging in on the village, thus drawing the bulk of the warriors away from Custer, that gave any hope of success for any plan that could then be hastily determined on."

[keogh]

Captain Carter goes into a bit more detail concerning his objections to Major Reno's command decisions in the timber at LBH:

"I was not so persistent in my comments in urging that Reno should have gone into the village when he was directed to make his charge; but if he found that he could not do so without subjecting his command to annihilation, he should have remained in the timber as his only salvation. But he could only have done this by a different disposition of his battalion. You admit that it was scattered, instead of holding the edge of the same and that he exercised no fire control. You also admit that when he formed column outside of the timber for his 'charge' to the rear, he left those scattered units in there. That shows then that he had no knowledge of where they were, or in his haste to get out, that he gave any thought as to whether he was, or was not, abandoning them. It was like abandoning ship---every man for himself."

[keogh]

Captain Carter goes into more detail on his thesis that the key to victory at LBH was Reno's willingness to hold the timber in the valley, should anyone doubt that is what he meant:

"I asked you once if you had ever seen Curtis' story. . . . His is the most detailed account, as shown by the Indians he had on the ground, of every movement of Custer's after he left Reno. According to him, the Indians had not engaged Custer before Reno left the timber---not until Reno took his position on the bluff and Benteen had joined him; and Gall, seeing him comfortably disposed of, left his front and swarmed down to the fords, and not only cut off Custer, but crossing, herded him up on the hill.

General Miles tells me the same thing . . . that when he went over the ground after the battle with some of the chiefs who were in the fight, and afterwards surrendered to him, they pointed out all the places where both Reno and Custer went, and emphatically stated that had Reno stayed in the timber, or made a sortie from the edge nearest the village, or had Benteen joined him (Reno) there and both made an attack from the timber upon the upper end of the village; or had Benteen followed Custer's trail after Custer's message reached him and attacked the center across one of the fords while Reno made his attack from the timber (all of this, of course, on the supposition that Reno held on to his position in the timber, and held his command well in hand)---in any one, or all, of these eventualities, they (the Indians) told General Miles they were prepared to get out, abandon their village and make for the Bad Lands.

He (General Miles) also stated to me that they told him that they did not attack Custer where and when you state . . . with some 2000 to 3000 Indians, while at least 1000 were holding Reno in the timber; but not until Reno had gone back in his headlong flight from the timber to the bluffs, and Benteen had joined him, making it safe for Gall to leave Reno's front to go down and attack Custer. . . ."

[keogh]

Captain Carter continues with his critique:

"It does not appear that when Reno left the timber he was leaving it for 'a place which he could defend better.' He was heading for the ford where he had crossed (ie. Ford A) not to the bluffs by which he was forced by the Indians riding along his right flank. What point did he have in view 'which he could defend better,' when he was riding pell-mell to the rear to recross that ford?

I think Reno was right . . . when his left flank was turned, to get into the timber, and I do not think he should have gone in on a charge upon that end of the village just then, when he saw Indians coming up to meet him in such numbers, but waited for events and better conditions; ie. until he could know where Benteen was, and whether it was, or was not, possible for him (Benteen) to cut his way in and join him."

[mitchboyer]

Nov 7, 2013 2:06:14 GMT -5 keogh said:

Captain Carter continues with his critique:

"It does not appear that when Reno left the timber he was leaving it for 'a place which he could defend better.' He was heading for the ford where he had crossed (ie. Ford A) not to the bluffs by which he was forced by the Indians riding along his right flank. What point did he have in view 'which he could defend better,' when he was riding pell-mell to the rear to recross that ford?

I think Reno was right . . . when his left flank was turned, to get into the timber, and I do not think he should have gone in on a charge upon that end of the village just then, when he saw Indians coming up to meet him in such numbers, but waited for events and better conditions; ie. until he could know where Benteen was, and whether it was, or was not, possible for him (Benteen) to cut his way in and join him."

Whether Reno should or should not have left the "timber" is a debatable point that, in all probability, will continue for at least another century.

The troopers who departed with Reno appear to be of the opinion that leaving was the right move:how they left appeared to be a "horse of another color."

The question that arises in my mind is how could have Reno singled out the "hill" as a safe/safer refuge (compared to the timber) as he could not have known the positive or negative aspects of the terrain of that location for purposes of defense prior to arriving there!!

In other words, could he have left one untenable position for another which may have been even more undesirable for purposes of defense and, if so,why?

Is it possible (as Capt. Carter implied) that leaving the timber at all costs was so paramount in Reno's mind that he truly was dashing toward a last, remembered haven of sanctuary; Ford "A" where Custer's command was last seen?

[keogh]

Nov 5, 2013 18:41:10 GMT -5 @hevat said:

Hmmm. He may have been a great tactician. In his comments on what happened at the BLBH he completely discredits himself by accusing Varnum and Hare of fear and timidity during the battle in the timber. . . . If you can find the time to explain to this board why you believe that Carter's analysis does hit the nail on the head I'll be one of your most interested readers.

Kindest regards,
Henk

Good observation Henk. I will do my best to comply with your challenge by listing a number of LBH veterans whose views in many instances support those opinions expressed by Capt. Carter:

DeRudio, RCOI:

Q. At the time Maj. Reno’s command left the timber, had the Indians got into that bunch of timber where Maj. Reno’s command was?
A. No sir. I don’t think any Indians had got in that timber at all.

---------------------

The Pioneer Press coverage (Jan 30, 1879) of the DeRudio testimony at the RCOI includes the following opinion regarding the defensibility of the timber position:

"The woods could have been held by Major Reno's force as long as the ammunition lasted. By a judicious use of the ammunition, the place might have been held three or four hours."

The above opinion from DeRudio mirrors those of Captain Benteen, who claimed Reno could have held the timber for about the same time or a bit longer.

[hevat]

Keogh wrote:
> I will do my best to comply with your challenge by listing a number of LBH veterans whose views in many instances support those opinions expressed by Capt. Carter:

DeRudio, RCOI:

Q. At the time Maj. Reno’s command left the timber, had the Indians got into that bunch of timber where Maj. Reno’s command was?
A. No sir. I don’t think any Indians had got in that timber at all.

---------------------

The Pioneer Press coverage (Jan 30, 1879) of the DeRudio testimony at the RCOI includes the following opinion regarding the defensibility of the timber position:

"The woods could have been held by Major Reno's force as long as the ammunition lasted. By a judicious use of the ammunition, the place might have been held three or four hours."

The above opinion from DeRudio mirrors those of Captain Benteen, who claimed Reno could have held the timber for about the same time or a bit longer. I believe Gibbon estimated about 4 hours as well, with the force and ammo Reno had on hand that day.

<g> So the opinions of veterans like Carter and Gibbon can be as sensible as those of participants like De Rudio and Benteen...

However, my problem with Carter's opinion is not that he believed that Reno could have remained in the timber but that he expected that it would have made a difference.

I find this difficult to believe. Imho the 7th had lost the initiative from the moment it dismounted and remained stationary and Custer decided to remain on the east bank of the river. From that moment on the regiment could only hope to survive - whether in the timber or on Reno Hill.

It was too late for Benteen and McDougall to make a difference on the hill and would have been too late for them make a difference in the timber. Why they couldn't make a difference is best illustrated by the futility of their trip to Weir Peak while the bulk of the enemy was miles away.

Henk

[keogh]

Nov 8, 2013 13:54:42 GMT -5 @hevat said:

However, my problem with Carter's opinion is not that he believed that Reno could have remained in the timber but that he expected that it would have made a difference.

I find this difficult to believe. Imho the 7th had lost the initiative from the moment it dismounted and remained stationary and Custer decided to remain on the east bank of the river. From that moment on the regiment could only hope to survive - whether in the timber or on Reno Hill.

It was too late for Benteen and McDougall to make a difference on the hill and would have been too late for them make a difference in the timber. Why they couldn't make a difference is best illustrated by the futility of their trip to Weir Peak while the bulk of the enemy was miles away.

Henk

Hi Henk. Capt. Carter does address your concerns above and explains why both he and General Miles believe otherwise, based on what was told to him by Indian chiefs who fought in the battle, with appropriate sentences underlined for emphasis:

General Miles tells me the same thing . . . that when he went over the ground after the battle with some of the chiefs who were in the fight, and afterwards surrendered to him, they pointed out all the places where both Reno and Custer went, and emphatically stated that had Reno stayed in the timber, or made a sortie from the edge nearest the village, or had Benteen joined him (Reno) there and both made an attack from the timber upon the upper end of the village; or had Benteen followed Custer's trail after Custer's message reached him and attacked the center across one of the fords while Reno made his attack from the timber (all of this, of course, on the supposition that Reno held on to his position in the timber, and held his command well in hand)---in any one, or all, of these eventualities, they (the Indians) told General Miles they were prepared to get out, abandon their village and make for the Bad Lands.

He (General Miles) also stated to me that they told him that they did not attack Custer where and when you state . . . with some 2000 to 3000 Indians, while at least 1000 were holding Reno in the timber; but not until Reno had gone back in his headlong flight from the timber to the bluffs, and Benteen had joined him, making it safe for Gall to leave Reno's front to go down and attack Custer. . . ."

The above conclusions were based on the observations and opinions of Indian participants of the battle, not just the personal opinions of Capt. Carter and Gen. Miles.

garryowen,

keogh