Supplementum: Timeline for LBH Battle

[Clair]

LOL...okay, I'll modify that to I want a "stopwatch," but not a clock!

ConZ

[keogh]

Apr 22, 2013 8:45:55 GMT -5 Clair said:

I feel that I cannot participate in such a discussion because the "time stamp" we put on anything I find to be completely irrelevant. Part of that is due to the great discrepancies of reporting...any times mentioned by anybody are only very vague references as to what order things happened in.

I wish clocks didn't even exist, and that nobody ever stated a time of day. It is a red herring.

Instead, I would recommend focusing on an anchoring event, such as Bill suggested initially, and just calling it "H hour." Then any time anybody wants to mention is referenced as "H+ [so many hours, minutes]." Nobody cares what anyone's watch says it is, or what watch time people imagine it might be. It only matters how long it was since some anchoring event.

Putting an "a.m." or "p.m." after any set of three or four numbers is a great distraction, and very misleading as you try to examine this murky historical action.

Clair

I do agree in principle with what you're saying here Clair, but recognizing the fact that nearly every published author of this battle attempts to reconstruct it using clock times, and factoring in the general public's reliance on such clock times to visualize when these events took place, I have undertaken the extreme challenge to attempt to analyze and reconstruct a more accurate clock timeline that, if nothing else, may correct some of the more egregious errors that other authors have engaged in over the years. A good example of this is the common, yet completely unsupported, arrival of Benteen on the bluffs at 4:20 pm. The more serious students can, and should, use the H+ time sequencing that you mention above. But the fact remains that over 90% of the general public will still rely on simple clock times for their more simplistic understanding of what happened when that day. We must therefore respond to the needs of the masses on this issue.

garryowen,

keogh

[herosrest]

Gentlemen,


Without claiming expertise or desires for fame or notoriety, l have given a considerable number of years free time to study of why the timing doesn't work. Because it remains a cause celebre that is incredibly annoying in its challenges and the argued positions which develop l urge you to summon your knowledge of mankind, military, legal, authorship and your bank balance to contemplate honestly the significance of Maguire's report to the Chief of Engineer's as it was deployed in battle against Whittaker for the RCoI.

The timing problem is resolved, l do not lay claim to it and say, honestly, my interest lays still with the tactical fight that day on Custer's battlefield. Each of those such as Graham and Gray who misled generations of those interested in the battle with timing ploys, simply get in the way. Philbrick has raised it to art form, quite incredible.

There is a beauty to the reality in that Wallace may never have known, realised or remembered of, the information given to Smith on Far West and carried to Lounsberry, to be published decades later. Irony.

A li'l surprise -

[herosrest]

Keogh,

. We must therefore respond to the needs of the masses on this issue.

God bless you. You have done a terrific job assisting enquiring minds. No ands or buts, well done with your time.

[keogh]

May 4, 2013 10:11:22 GMT -5 herosrest said:

Keogh,

We must therefore respond to the needs of the masses on this issue.

God bless you. You have done a terrific job assisting enquiring minds. No ands or buts, well done with your time.

Well, thank you very much for the kind compliments herosrest. Its nice to know that I am not condemned to damnation by at least one person here. <g>

garryowen,

keogh

[herosrest]

Amended link ~ select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F6061FFC395A127B93C6A91789D85F4D8784F9

[herosrest]

sun time is an important adpect of data given by cavalrymen central to the battle.

Note Trumpeter John Martin's response to Question 7 of the link: www.digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=goto&id=History.Reno&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=350 transcript of his testimony.

Significantly, warriors present were able to report events in military time from a watch captured during the battle at Rosebud, ine week earlier.

A series if timing misnomers were introduced to study if the battle during Lt. Wallace's testimony to Reno's court of inquiry and culminating with his quip in reference to the time of the place. Fortunately an accurate and detailed itinerary of the march of the 25th June exists, which entirely supports the central premise of Keogh's study, analysis and conclusions so far.

The warrior reported by Lazy White Bull as shouting warning across the river that soldiers were approaching and had killed his sin, took place at Crook watch time 1pm. It is doubtful that minute time was understood but one is one.

The time of the place, as quipped by Wallace two and a half years later is relevant only thus. At the summer solstice, June 21st, Terry's engineering officer did not recalculate time. Both Terry and Crook by Longitude of their headquarters, kept the same time to with a handful of minutes by the calculations of their respective engineering officers. Their time was the result of calculating by engineering officers located on the headquarters meridian of longitude. Their time was the time of their headquarters. That was the prime responsibility if their Engineering officers.

By the same warrior (Eli s. Ricker) Custer's fight was over at 4pm.

Testimony by Martin (linked) is important to clarifying at least two visits by Custer to see the valley from the bluffs. At the time of the first visit with Trumpeter Martin, Custer then waved hat to his command watering horses. Lt. Cooke was present with the HQ and five companies.

This is a fundamental point. Martin and Peter Thompson simply reported events as they were and had no reason to mislead over such. Cooke was with the watering command.

[mitchboyer]

I have just hard copied both pages. Thank you Sir. ;D

[keogh]

Oct 5, 2013 18:36:41 GMT -5 mitchboyer said:

I have just hard copied both pages. Thank you Sir. ;D

My pleasure Tony. It has taken me a good deal longer working on this timeline project than I could have ever imagined possible. And I'm still not entirely done with it.

garryowen,

keogh

[reddirt]

Efforts like this are what makes your forum so interesting and, I have to say that I have enjoyed my time here and I am looking forward to learning so much more. it must have taken a lot of study and commitment from you to do this. what really blows me away is your commitment to your membership.

I just made a hard copy too and please never stop doing exactly what you've been doing! I would have never had the way to figure all of this timing out by myself. Thank you!

[fred]

Nov 7, 2013 17:35:37 GMT -5 trish said:

Thanks Fred very interesting loved your book "Participants of littlebighorn" couldn't put it down....

Thank you, Trisha. I appreciate that very much.

... very interesting you mention the horses stupidly I hadn't thought about them before how did they manage to get back to the" far west" with so many killed did General Terry have any spare or did most of the command have to walk?

Those without horses were forced to walk; but remember, there were several companies of infantry with Terry and Gibbon, so a lot of men did a lot of walking!

The following may help you with the events of those days after the two commands joined:


June 27, 1876—Tuesday—Early morning, just after first light—Reno writes a message for Terry, whom he supposes is with Gibbon’s command somewhere down the Big Horn or Little Bighorn valleys.

Camp of the Little Big Horn
Twenty miles from its mouth, June 27

Gen. Terry:
I have had a most terrific engagement with the hostile Indians. They left their camp last evening at sunset, moving due south, in the direction of the Big Horn mountains. I am very much crippled and cannot possibly pursue. Lieutenant Mackintosh [sic] and Dr. DeWolf are among the killed. I have many wounded, and many horses and mules shot. I have lost both my own horses. I have not seen or heard from Gen. Custer since he ordered me to charge with my battalion (3 companies), promising to support me. I charged about 2 PM, but meeting no support was forced back to the hills. At this point I was joined by Capt Benteen with 3 companies and the pack train (rear guard, 1 company). I have fought thousands and can still hold my own, but I cannot leave here on account of the wounded. Send me medical aid at once and rations.
M. A. Reno, Major 7th Cav [Chicago Times, February 9, 1879]

➢ The message was given to scouts and they headed downstream. They returned shortly, however, with word that a number of “warriors” occupied the lower regions and they could not get through.

3:30 AM—The “Far West” starts again.

Early morning—Terry’s command has a light breakfast and starts its move upriver.

➢ The Indians have disappeared.
➢ LT Bradley fords the LBH and begins his scout on the east side of the river.

7:30 AM—Terry’s column begins its advance.

➢ Moved between 1½ to two miles and stopped for ten minutes.

7:40 AM—Terry moves onto a hill.

8:20 AM—Spots a few tepees about two miles in front.

9 AM—Troops from Reno Hill see a body of people moving up the valley. It turns out to be Terry’s force [Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 74].

9:30 AM—Godfrey uses this time when a cloud of dust was seen downriver [“Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” p. 35].

10 AM—The “Far West” reaches the confluence of the Little Big Horn and Big Horn rivers, approximately forty miles south of the Big Horn’s mouth. CPT Baker offloads his troops to reconnoiter the south side of the LBH valley.

Later morning—Terry’s column advances into the abandoned Indian camp. Holmes Paulding finds Yates’ gauntlets, Porter’s buckskin shirt, and Sturgis’ underclothing and spurs.

➢ Gibbon viewed the dead soldiers along Reno’s retreat route and was then alerted to small dark figures atop the bluffs. Even with his binoculars he could not tell if they were soldiers or Indians. He was about 1½ miles away.

11 AM—Terry reaches Reno’s position.

➢ Terry writes telegram to the Adjutant General of the Military District of the Missouri, Chicago, via Fort Ellis.

Some time during the day—probably late morning—CPT McDougall and privates Ryan and Moore (B Company men) buried Hodgson on “a little knoll between my position and the works on the hill and these two men and myself dug his grave and buried him” [Kuhlman, Legend into History, p. 139].

12:35 PM—The “Far West” starts again, continuing its move up the Big Horn River.

5:30 PM—The “Far West” reaches “Sitting Bull Rapids,” taking one hour to ascend them.

8:30 PM—“Far West” ties up, unable to ascend further rapids. Total distance traveled from the mouth of the Big Horn was approximately 66 miles. The day’s temperatures varied from a high to 76º to a low of 63º.

June 28, 1876—Wednesday—Reno abandons hill position. Combined command moved down the ridges and buried Custer’s command.

➢ Establish bivouac next to Gibbon’s men, on their right.

Morning—The “Far West,” unable to proceed up the Big Horn any farther, turns and rapidly descends the river, mooring at the mouth of the LBH where it remained all day.

Morning—CPT Ball sent out to follow the Indian trail, south. He followed it for ten or twelve miles and it headed toward the Big Horn Mountains. On his way back he discovered a large fresh trail that led directly toward the village.

Noon—Engineer sergeant Wilson reports the arrival of the Crow scout, Curley [Carroll, The Federal View, pp. 67 – 68] [In Camp/Hammer, Custer in ’76, p. 241, a civilian named James M. Sipes said this was on “Tuesday” morning. Sipes, who was a sometimes-barber aboard the “Far West”—but mostly just a sightseer along for the ride—was fishing on the left bank of the LBH with Grant Marsh; a man named Reuben Riley, the ship’s steward; and another man named Burley or James Boles, when he said Curley rode into the water from the right bank. He had three ponies and a red Sioux blanket he had taken from a dead Sioux. A slight variation of this story appears in Stewart, Custer’s Luck, pp. 479 – 480.]

8 PM—Terry moves camp 4½ miles down the valley. They had great trouble moving the wounded on their hand litters.

➢ After they made the litters for the wounded, “two men were assigned to each hand-litter, but it was soon found that this was not sufficient, and the number had to be doubled, and, besides, two men had to be assigned to each horse-litter to steady it. Infantrymen and dismounted cavalrymen relieved each other every few minutes….”

June 29, 1876—Thursday—Terry orders LT Maguire to make a survey of the battlefield. Also ordered horse litters made.

During the day—Three scouts arrive at the “Far West” with news of the battle. The boat was immediately barricaded and preparations were made to receive the wounded.

6:30 PM—March commences again.

10 PM—The van of Terry’s command reaches the “Far West.”

June 30, 1876—Friday—1 AM to 2 AM—Command reaches the “Far West.”


Best wishes,
Fred.

[herosrest]

From 3:15 pm onwards' all gunfire heard by 7th Cavalry at or approaching Reno Hill, emanated from Company D's engagement beyond the Peaks. This is not to say that that gunfire began at 3:15 pm, simply that gunfire after 3:15 was nothing to do with Custer's fight. This explains why participants hidden under cover in the valley timber thought gunfire was moving towards them.

[keogh]

Aug 17, 2014 21:13:19 GMT -5 herosrest said:

From 3:15 pm onwards' all gunfire heard by 7th Cavalry at or approaching Reno Hill, emanated from Company D's engagement beyond the Peaks. This is not to say that that gunfire began at 3:15 pm, simply that gunfire after 3:15 was nothing to do with Custer's fight. This explains why participants hidden under cover in the valley timber thought gunfire was moving towards them.

Of course, the problem with this interpretation is that Edgerly clearly stated that D Co's. engagement with the enemy did not begin until the last 30 minutes before they left the Weir Peaks. Our participant timeline has D Co's arrival at the peaks at about 3:10 p.m. and its final withdrawal from the peaks at about 5:45 p.m. The firing you refer to above would thus have taken place between 5:15 and 5:45 p.m. This would be a time well after the participants described hearing firing from the valley. Pvt. O'Neill put the firing on Custer's field ending at about 5 p.m. or 15 minutes before the start of D Co.'s action on the peaks. Gerard could not hear any firing after 2 hours and 20 minutes or so after Reno left the valley. That would suggest a timespan of about 2:40 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. or 15 minutes before the start of D Co.'s engagement with the enemy on the peaks.

garryowen,

keogh

[herosrest]

I agree with your determination of the problem, and therefore, there is a problem in relation to the duration of Company D's deployment or our understanding of it. There are various reports which relate arrival at and beyond the heights which give opposing data as to what was seen. However, Weir went looking for Custer and believed he saw the companies on the field. This was actually warriors in uniform and waving guidons, a ploy perhaps. What ever, observation occured early, rather than after a significant pause to brew some coffee and let it chill. Weir then deployed as skirmishers and this is what is precisely described by the Standing Bear account in Black Elk. The timing is difficult, human nature not quite such so.

Re_assessing gunfire events post 3:15 pm may help. I'll formalise some thinking on this.

Preparation -

files.usgwarchives.net/sd/ziebach/history/z-hst-16.txt From this history, text header 'FIGHTS THE THUNDER', quote - Julia's father died or was killed in battle in 1874 when she was 8. At age 10, she was not at the Custer battle as they moved out before the battle.

This account queries the presence of Iron Cedar at LBH; as provenance by Lt. Col. Wm. H. C. Bowen, U.S.A. in his work ' CUSTER'S LAST FIGHT'

When Reno's advance was checked and his left began to fall back, Chief Gall started with some of his warriors to cut off Reno's retreat to the bluffs. On his way he was excitedly hailed by "Iron Cedar," one of his warriors, who was on the high point, to hurry to him, that more soldiers were coming. This was the first intimation the Indians had of Custer's immediate column; up to the time of this incident they had supposed that all the troops were in Reno's attack. Custer had then crossed the valley of the dry creek, and was marching along and well up the slope of the bluff forming the second ridge back from the river, and nearly parallel to it. The command was marching rapidly in column of fours, and there was some confusion in the ranks, due probably to the unmanageableness of some excited horses.

The accepted theory for many years after the battle, and still persisted in by some writers, was that Custer's column had turned the high bluffs near the river, moved down the dry (Reno's) creek, and attempted to ford the river at the lowest point of these bluffs; that he was there met by an overpowering force and driven back; that he then divided his battalion, moved down the river with the view of attacking the village, but met with such resistance from the enemy posted along the river-bank and ravines that he was compelled to fall back, fighting, to the position on the ridge. The numerous bodies found scattered between the river and ridge were supposed to be the first victims of the fight. I am now satisfied that these were the men who either survived those on the ridge, or attempted to escape the massacre.

The Indians state that; Custer's column was never nearer the river or village than his final position on the ridge. On the battle-field, in 1886, Chief Gall indicated Custer's route to me, and it was on the high ridge east or back of the field.

The ford theory arose from the fact that there were found there numerous tracks of shod horses, but they evidently had been made after the Indians had possessed themselves of the cavalry horses, for they rode them after capturing them. No bodies of men or horses were found anywhere near the ford, and these facts are con clusive to my mind that Custer did not go to the ford with any body of men.

As soon as Gall had personally confirmed Iron Cedar's report, he sent word to the warriors battling against Reno, and to the people in the village. The greatest consternation prevailed among the families, and orders were given for them to leave at once. Before they could do so, the great bodies of warriors had left Reno and hastened to attack Custer. This explains how Reno was not pushed when so much confusion at the river crossing gave the Indians every opportunity of annihilating his command.

Not long after the Indians began to show a strong force in Custer's front, Custer turned his column to the left and advanced in the direction of the village to near a place marked as a spring, halted at the junction of the ravines just below it, and dismounted two troops, Keogh's and Calhoun's, to fight on foot. These two troops advanced at double time to a knoll, now marked by Crittenden's monument. The other three troops, mounted, followed them a short distance in their rear. The led horses remained where the troops dismounted. When Keogh and Calhoun got to the knoll the other troops marched rapidly to the right; Smith's troop deployed as skirmishers, mounted, and took position on a ridge, which, on Smith's left, ended in Keogh's position (now marked by Crittenden's monument), and, on Smith's right, ended at the hill on which Custer took position with Yates and Tom Custer's troops, now known as Custer's Hill, and marked by the monument erected to the command. Smith's skirmishers, holding their gray horses, remained in groups of fours.

The line occupied by Custer's battalion was the first considerable ridge back from the river, the nearest point being about a mile from it. His front was extended about three-fourths of a mile. The whole village was in full view. A hundred yards from his line was another but lower ridge, the farther slope of which was not commanded by this line. It was here that the Indians under Crazy Horse, from the lower part of the village, among whom were the Cheyennes, formed for the charge on Custer's hill. All bodies of Indians had now left Reno. Gall collected his warriors, and moved up a ravine south of Keogh and Calhoun. As they were turning this flank they discovered the led horses without any other guard than the horse holders.

Bowen has welded his 1886 visit to the anniversary into Godfrey's work, including also, Benteen himself; from Goldin, Gall, Patterson Hughes, aide-de-camp to Terry; and other sources.

Other work, that by McLoughlin, directly contradicts Gall's location when he sighted Custer's command for the SECOND time. He initially spotted Custer as he observed the valley from the bluffs, beside Trumpeter Martin, before galloping the five companies to Medicine Tail Coulee. Gall then observed Custer further down river whilst he was in the village after having gathered his ponies from down the valley. Gall did not engage Reno's companies, or cross the river, other than when he attacked Custer's command.

This is relevant because it compresses time relevant to Gall and the movement by hostiles reported by Benteen as leaving the valley after his arrival on the bluffs. There is a li'l more to cover but that will wait, save for the point that the exodus from the valley given by Benteen, ate lunch over Custer's companies. That horde of hostiles included Runs the Enemy.
archive.org/stream/northwesternfigh00bradrich#page/350/mode/2up

Right. Gunfire.

[herosrest]

The participants time-line gives the following.

3:45 p.m.: McDougall and 1st platoon of Rear Guard arrive on Reno Hill.

4:00 - 4:10 p.m.: the 4th set of volleys fired by Custer's command are reportedly heard by Capt. Moylan, McDougall and Godfrey, and are reported to Major Reno at this time.

Mc Dougall had heard gunfire 15 minutes before reporting to Reno Hill. That is at 3:30 p.m. by the PT. There is every prospect that this was Company D opening its engagement with hostiles on the Deep Medicine Tail divide.

That fire-fight with Company D, and SD's entire fight, is described thus, books.google.co.uk/books?id=bXElCJTANaoC&pg=PA185&lpg=PR10&focus=viewport&dq=black+elk+standing+bear+custer&output=html_text .

Company D engaged hostiles and subsequently skirmished until retreating on the main body, which itself fell back. Commencement of that fight co-incided with the McDougall report of firing heard 15 minutes earlier and which was heard and discussed by officers at Reno Hill, as McDougall marched there.

An essence continues to factionalise an intense dogma about Custer's fight. Conspiracy. Its roots are deep and began very early after Custer's command was destroyed by overwhelming force. It is very likely that malfunctioning weapons and limited ammunition supply contributed significantly to defeat.

None of the officers present were immune or stupid to personal implications of an immense defeat and the loss of Custer. Opinion began almost immediately and remains rooted in defence of principal charachters. Amongst the first opinion was that of Patterson Hughes who was considerable proponent of blaming Custer and the disobeying of orders. 20 years later he was defending his father in law, Terry, with prosaic and dullard news articles. A true Custer hater who could not yield to sensibilities, Custer's wife (whom he constantly provoked) , or the reality that the disaster was in no small part Terry's responsibility.

Reno was early to his own defence with letters to the President and also Sheridan. No record of a letter to Sherman exists. Had Terry been aware of Reno's letter to Sheridan, then l feel that the Major's career would have ended on July 4th, 1876.

Opinion offered by Sheridan was in good part based upon the content of Reno's 4th July 1876 letter to him. Reno was desperate at that date to prevent the mud sticking and he spread it about unceremoneously and in contempt of his colleagues. All that mattered to Reno was Reno in the set of circumstances and uncertanties which prevailed. It was a breath taking letter of insult and injury.

Within months, Whittaker hallmarked the battle with his own twist of the fates and a true dichotomy. His vitriolic analysis of time and motion remains good today and ruffled feathers with factually based conclusion which continues to be argued today and which brought the RCoI into shenaigans of disrepute.

Not finished in analytical assassination of Reno, Benteen, Grant and pretty much the entire government; Whittaker developed the standard battle publication format of the overview and blow by blow fancy of what went down at the Custer fight. Here was seeded the heroic irony which the entire military conglomerate since have argued.

Custer's fight was brief as his five companies were overwhelmed in short order. Had word not spread rapudly on Reno's front that a new threat existed down river, not a man of Reno's would have survived the retreat and most likely, Benteen and the reserve would have been severely mauled if not exterminated.

Whittaker broadly described the battle in terms well understood today and simply could not fathom the brief demise of his hero.

Weir's troops were displaced between Reno and Custer, were engaged with hostiles, and were heard by those on Reno Hill. Paint it any way you like but this is a basic truth. A fact. Gunfire heard at Reno Hill after Weir's advance, came from that company and not Custer on Last Stand Hill or anywhere else. Accepting this argument requires the simple honesty of disambiguation. Are you disambiguous?

Weir's company fought one mile away. Varnum's report of heavy but distant firing lasting a few minutes in two episodes, was the ending of organised resistance on Custer's battleground.