Post by keogh on Jun 6, 2013 22:19:13 GMT -5
A good many students of this battle believe the crossing of the divide to be about noon, placing their full faith upon the unsubstantiated itinerary of Lt. Wallace. I believe this faith to be both misguided and unfounded, and has led to a number of confusions and misunderstandings that have prevented to this day the publication of an accurate timeline for this battle. Lt. Wallace, being the official itinerist of the Regiment, was in a position to provide accurate times for most events of the battle. Many battle students today place their faith in his statements without bothering to examine the full scope of his RCOI testimony which was riddled with errors or misstatements of facts. It is my belief that Lt. Wallace intentionally mislead the RCOI by attempting to add at least one hour of time to the events that afternoon in an effort to protect his colleagues -- and the reputation of his Regiment -- from public criticism that they delayed their advance to support Custer during the height of the battle. An entire article could be written regarding the problems endemic in Lt. Wallace's RCOI testimony, but this is not the time nor place for such an analysis. Instead, let us examine what our battle participants had to say about when the command likely crossed the divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn Rivers:
1) Col. Reno (RCOI): claims he received command of his battalion at 9 a.m.
ANALYSIS
This time estimate of Col. Reno is simply not supported by other participants of the battle. According to our other battle participants, at 9 a.m. the Regiment had left Halt #1 and was making its way up the divide 4.5 miles to Halt #2. Custer was still at the Crows Nest at this time and had not yet returned to the Regiment to give Reno command of his battalion at that time. We can safely dismiss this time estimate from Reno as inaccurate.
2) Lt. Wallace (RCOI, my interpretive comments in brackets): The first halt [at Halt #2] was at 10:07. We started out [to cross the divide] at 11:45. At 12:05 it halted, and the divisions into battalions was made, and it moved on at 12:12.... Question: Is that memorandum you refer to the original itinerary? Wallace: No, sir; that is a copy. I did not compare it, but Lt. Maguire said it was an exact copy.
ANALYSIS
Lt. Wallace gives us his itinerary for the movements of the command above. The rear of the command likely arrived at this location by 10:07 a.m. as Wallace indicated in his itinerary above. Now the problem we really have with Wallace's itinerary is that he expects us to believe that the command delayed its advance from Halt #2 for an hour and 38 minutes -- at a time when Custer realized his command had been discovered and the need for a rapid advance was at hand, if Custer had any hopes at all of catching the hostiles before they were warned of his approach. It truly amazes me how many otherwise intelligent battle students fail to pick up on this one obvious 'faux pas' in Wallace's itinerary. It makes no sense. It appears to me that Lt. Wallace, for reasons of his own, decided to add roughly one hour to his time estimates from this time forward. Had the Regiment arrived at Halt #2 at 10:07 a.m. shortly before Custer's return from the Crows Nest, there would be no earthy reason why the command could not have commenced their advance to the valley of the Little Big Horn before 11 a.m.
Of course, there are other red flags in Wallace's itinerary. He claims the command began their advance to cross the divide at 11:45 a.m. and moved all of 1/2 a mile before halting once again to divide the Regiment into battalions. He described Halt #2 as being 1/4 mile east of the divide and the stop where they divided into battalions as 1/4 mile west of the divide. Wallace then claims that it was 12:05 when this stop occurred, indicating that it took 20 minutes for the command to cover 1/2 a mile, which equates into a crawl of an absurd 1.5 mph! And this at a time when the command had been discovered! No, there are too many of these red flags in Wallace's itinerary, red flags that are consistently ignored by too many battle students today. I find the following question put to Lt. Wallace at the RCOI to be of interest:
Question: Is that memorandum you refer to the original itinerary? Wallace: No, sir; that is a copy. I did not compare it, but Lt. Maguire said it was an exact copy.
It is a shame that the Recorder did not demand that Lt. Maguire produce the original itinerary of Lt. Wallace so that the court could decide for itself if it was truly an exact copy, as Lt. Wallace so alleged. Unfortunately, Lt. Maguire was not asked to do so, and to this day, no one has ever seen that original itinerary. One wonders what could have happened to it? Instead, we are left entirely with Lt. Wallace's word for it. The choice is yours. You can 'Believe It - Or Not!' Needless to say, I am in the 'Not' category on this one.
3) Sgt. Kanipe (Camp Int., Custer in 76, my interpretive comments in brackets): Custer returned from his view from [the Crows Nest] and rejoined the command sometime between 10 and 11 a.m.
ANALYSIS
Custer returns from his first trip out to the Crows Nest to rejoin his command at Halt #2 at some time between 10 and 11 a.m. Based on other accounts, I believe this time would be much closer to 10 a.m. than 11 a.m. I would suggest about 10:10 a.m. Although Kanipe does not give us a time estimate for the crossing of the divide, his statement above suggests a time closer to 11 a.m. as opposed to 12 noon, as our other sources tell us that Custer had returned and called for his last Officer's Call at a time close to 10 a.m.
4) Lt. Hare (Camp Int., Custer in 76, my interpretive comments in brackets): says the 7th Cavalry began to move again up the divide [from Halt #1] between 8 and 9 a.m. Custer had already left earlier for the Crows Nest. They halted [at Halt #2] near the divide .... less than 1/2 mile from the top of the divide. They stopped and lay concealed for over an hour.... This was [sometime] between 10 a.m. and noon. During this time [likely after the last Officer's Call] Custer again goes to the Crows Nest to look at the Indians.
ANALYSIS
It is important to note that it would take the command, moving at a walk, about one hour and 15 minutes to cover the 4.5 miles between Halt #1 and Halt #2 on the divide. If the command left Halt #1 at 8:30 a.m., as I believe it did, the lead elements of the command would reach Halt #2 at about 9:45 a.m. with the trailing elements arriving at or just after 10:00 a.m. During this halt, Officer's Call would be sounded as soon as Custer returned from the Crows Nest, a short time later, and the command would rest for just over an hour before moving out again to cross the divide. The time frame for this event would be, according to Lt. Hare's recollection, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. We should make note of the discrepancy between Hare's comment that the command rested at Halt #2 for one hour, yet then gives a timeframe of two hours, saying it was sometime between 10 a.m. and 12 noon. This makes little sense, especially when we factor in the realization that the lead elements of the command likely arrived at Halt #2 at about 9:45 a.m. in covering just 4.5 miles in an hour and 15 minutes. A rest of a little over an hour would before moving out again would begin about 9:45 a.m. and end at about 10:55 a.m.
5) Pvt. Taylor (With Custer on the Little Big Horn): We did not stop until about 10:30 a.m. when we came to a halt in a ravine, some 4 or 5 miles from the summit of the divide. Here we were ordered to keep concealed and to preserve quiet.... But in the meantime, our presence having been discovered ... "it was necessary to act at once," and we started off again, crossing the divide a little before noon.
ANALYSIS
There are a number of errors in the reminiscence of Pvt. Taylor given above. One clear mistake Pvt. Taylor makes is describing the location of Halt #2 as being 4 or 5 miles from the summit of the divide. That would be the correct distance of Halt #1 from the divide. Halt #2 was about 1/4 of a mile east of the divide, according to Lt. Wallace and Lt. Edgerly's recollection. Lt. Hare would support that when he described its location as being less than 1/2 mile from the divide. Another problem Taylor confronts us with is the same one given by Moylan and Godfrey in their accounts, this being an inexplicable 2.5 hour span of time for the Regiment to move just 4.5 miles from Halt #1 to Halt #2. Something is clearly wrong here. Either the command left Halt #1 well after 8:00 a.m. or the command arrived at Halt #2 well before 10:30 a.m. or both. Consequently, Taylor's time estimate of crossing the divide at a little before noon must also be suspect as well, especially when we consider his statement that "it was necessary to act at once". This would preclude an unnecessary delay of an hour an a half before advancing on the hostiles, as a 12 noon crossing of the divide would suggest. Taylor was likely basing these time estimates mentioned above on what he had previously read from Lt. Godfrey's Century Magazine article on the battle as opposed to his own personal recollections. Of course, Taylor's reference to "a little before noon" might actually reference a time closer to 11 a.m., as indicated by other participant accounts.
6) Lt. Edgerly (The Custer Myth, 1881 account, my interpretive comments in brackets): At about 10 o'clock in the morning we were ... 15 miles from the hostile camp. Our force was then all together [at Halt #2]. We halted while Custer [earlier that morning] went on a hill with the Crow and Ree scouts to take a look at the Indian camp, which was in sight. When General Custer came down from the hill, Officer's Call was sounded. The officers all went to where he was and he told us that ... we would press on as quickly as we could and attack them in the village if possible.... He then ordered troop commanders to mount their troops and report when they were in readiness to move on. In about a minute, every troop commander had reported.
ANALYSIS
Lt. Edgerly tells us that the command had all reached Halt #2 at about 10 a.m. When Custer returned from the Crows Nest a bit later, presumably about 10:10 a.m., Officer's Call was sounded, whereupon the officers were told that they "would press on as quickly as they could" and attack the hostiles "in the village if possible", thus indicating the need for speed at this point. When Officer's Call ended, presumably about 10:30 or 10:35 a.m., the troop commanders were told to "mount their troops and report when they were in readiness to move on. In about a minute , every troop commander had reported." Lt. Edgerly tells us here that there was no hour and a half delay before moving out to cross the divide, as Lt. Wallace would infer from his deceptive itinerary. That extended delay makes no sense whatsoever.
6b) Lt. Edgerly (RCOI): Officers Call was at 10 a.m. on June 25, about 1/4 mile east of the divide.
ANALYSIS
Edgerly agrees with most other sourced that Officer's Call was at about 10 a.m. and that Halt #2 was about 1/4 mile east of the divide.
6c) Lt. Edgerly (letter to wife, 7/4/76): we ... moved on again till about 10 a.m. when Officer's Call was sounded again. After nearly an hour's rest and a reconnaissance by Gen'l. Custer and some scouts, we were told that the Indians had undoubtedly discovered our presence as several had been seen on the bluffs, and the only thing for us to do was to move on them at once.... We then mounted and moved forward about half a mile, halted and he (Custer) reassigned the companies into battalions....
ANALYSIS
Edgerly says that the command reached Halt #2 about 10 a.m., followed shortly thereafter by Officer's Call (after the return of Custer and his scouts from their reconnaissance at the Crows Nest). He says that the command rested at Halt #2 for "nearly an hour's rest". Which indicates that the command rested from about 10 a.m. until some time just before 11 a.m. when they moved out again to cross the divide.
7a) Lt. Godfrey (RCOI): crossed the divide "at about 12 o'clock."
7b) Lt. Godfrey (Godfrey's Narrative): They crossed the divide a little before noon.
ANALYSIS
Godfrey's time estimate of a divide crossing at or a little before noon would suggest that Custer delayed his advance for about an hour and a half after his last Officer's Call, when Custer announced his plans for an immediate advance on a soon to be expected fleeing village. This is exactly what Lt. Wallace suggested in his account. I believe both officers are wrong about this. There are no sources that indicate such a lengthy and inexplicable delay occurred at that time.
8) Lt. De Rudio (RCOI, my interpretive comments in brackets): the command was broken into battalions [after crossing the divide] around 11 or 12 o'clock.
ANALYSIS
De Rudio gives us an accurate range here of sometime between 11 a.m. and 12 noon that the command stopped to divide into battalions after traveling only 1/2 mile from Halt #2 on the divide. I believe the correct time would be shortly after 11 a.m.
9) Capt. Moylan (RCOI): claims the organization into battalions was made about 1 1/2 miles west of the divide about 12:30 p.m., but added "I don't know definitely about the time."
ANALYSIS
Capt. Moylan's account of this event contains some serious errors. His most glaring error was his statement that the division into battalions was made 1.5 miles west of the divide. More reliable accounts from Edgerly and Wallace place this halt to reorganize into battalions at only 1/4 mile west of the divide, the command having only traveled 1/2 a mile from Halt #2 east of the divide. It would appear that Moylan was attempting to support Wallace's claim of a 12 noon crossing of the divide, yet then claims it took 30 more minutes to move 1/2 mile to the point where the Regiment divided into battalions. This would put their rate of advance at an absurd 1 mph! Perhaps this is why Moylan chose to relocate this halt a further 1.25 miles west of where it actually took place. In my view, Moylan's account above is entirely unreliable and not supported by our other battle participants. He at least had the decency to qualify these inaccuracies by saying: "I don't know definitely about the time."
10) Pvt. J.B. Gallenne (letter to Father Genin, 7/5/1876): at about 11 a.m. we perceive a wigwam of war about 10 miles ahead of us.
ANALYSIS
Pvt. Gallenne tells us that shortly after crossing the divide at about 11 a.m. they could see a lone tepee about 10 miles ahead (or west) of the command. It is interesting to note that the 2nd lone tepee was almost exactly 10 miles west of the divide crossing.
11) Lt. Mathey (RCOI): "they started from 11 or 12 from where the long halt was made" on the divide.
ANALYSIS
Lt. Mathey indicates that the command started out to cross the divide at some time between 11 a.m. and 12 noon. I believe this range of time is essentially correct, with the command crossing the divide closer to 11 a.m. than 12 noon.
12) Capt. McDougall (RCOI): got his orders to act as Rear Guard about 11 a.m. on the divide. They started out 20 minutes after the command.
ANALYSIS
Capt. McDougall's account above suggests a divide crossing closer to 11 a.m. with the Pack train starting out about 20 minutes later.
13) Lt. Varnum (I, Varnum): The column arrived at the trail-crossing of the divide about 10 a.m. ....
ANALYSIS
Lt. Varnum is likely using a sun time reference of 10 a.m. for the command's crossing of the divide. The HQ watch time would actually by 10:57 a.m. or a few minutes before 11.
14) Pvt. Windolph (I Fought With Custer): It was around noon on this fatal Sunday of June 25 when we crossed the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn.
ANALYSIS
Pvt. Windolph's memoirs were written by Frazier & Robt. Hunt and published in 1947. I strongly suspect that the times he gave for the events were heavily influenced by Col. Graham's timelines that were previously published in his book The Story of the Little Big Horn in 1926, as Windolph's times follow Graham's unique & popular times -- based almost exclusively on those given by Lt. Wallace at the RCOI and thus contradicting the evidence provided by the great majority of the battle participants, both red and white. The Hunt's reproduce and insert sections from Graham's book to supplement Windolph's own memoirs, thus my conclusion is that Windolph's times are not to be relied on.
15) Dr. Porter (St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 3, 1878 interview): "It was about ten o clock when the command was divided."
ANALYSIS
Dr. Porter indicates that Custer divided the regiment into separate battalions at "about ten o'clock." This would likely be a reference to sun time, with a HQ watch time of being closer to 11 a.m. shortly after crossing the divide.
16) Edward Curtis interview with 3 Crow Scouts in The North American Indian: "In the early forenoon the command [crossed the divide and] moved down the western slope of Wolf mountains and out on the plain...."
ANALYSIS
The Crow scouts confirmed to Curtis that the regiment crossed the divide in the forenoon, not at noon, which supports the Participant Timeline crossing at about 11:00 a.m. on June 25th.
CONCLUSION
Based on the participant accounts listed above, I believe the lead elements of the Regiment arrived at Halt #2 about 9:45 a.m. with the rear elements arriving at Halt #2 at about 10:07 a.m. Custer returns from the Crows Nest at sometime between 10:05 and 10:10 a.m. and sounds Officer's Call. Officer's Call occurs between 10:20 and 10:35 a.m. The officers are then told to prepare and mount up their companies for an immediate advance on the hostiles, which occurs between 10:35 and 10:50 a.m. with the command ready to move again, leaving Halt #2 at 10:50 a.m. and crossing the divide at 10:55 a.m. as supported by the accounts of Dr. Porter, Lt. Varnum, Capt. McDougall, Lt. De Rudio, Lt. Edgerly, Lt. Mathey, Lt. Hare and Pvt. Gallene. In doing so, we must reject the later time estimates given us by Lt. Wallace, Capt. Moylan and Pvt. Taylor.
The Regiment leaves Halt #2 at: H + 2 hours and 20 minutes.
The Regiment crosses the divide at: H + 2 hours and 25 minutes.
1) Col. Reno (RCOI): claims he received command of his battalion at 9 a.m.
ANALYSIS
This time estimate of Col. Reno is simply not supported by other participants of the battle. According to our other battle participants, at 9 a.m. the Regiment had left Halt #1 and was making its way up the divide 4.5 miles to Halt #2. Custer was still at the Crows Nest at this time and had not yet returned to the Regiment to give Reno command of his battalion at that time. We can safely dismiss this time estimate from Reno as inaccurate.
2) Lt. Wallace (RCOI, my interpretive comments in brackets): The first halt [at Halt #2] was at 10:07. We started out [to cross the divide] at 11:45. At 12:05 it halted, and the divisions into battalions was made, and it moved on at 12:12.... Question: Is that memorandum you refer to the original itinerary? Wallace: No, sir; that is a copy. I did not compare it, but Lt. Maguire said it was an exact copy.
ANALYSIS
Lt. Wallace gives us his itinerary for the movements of the command above. The rear of the command likely arrived at this location by 10:07 a.m. as Wallace indicated in his itinerary above. Now the problem we really have with Wallace's itinerary is that he expects us to believe that the command delayed its advance from Halt #2 for an hour and 38 minutes -- at a time when Custer realized his command had been discovered and the need for a rapid advance was at hand, if Custer had any hopes at all of catching the hostiles before they were warned of his approach. It truly amazes me how many otherwise intelligent battle students fail to pick up on this one obvious 'faux pas' in Wallace's itinerary. It makes no sense. It appears to me that Lt. Wallace, for reasons of his own, decided to add roughly one hour to his time estimates from this time forward. Had the Regiment arrived at Halt #2 at 10:07 a.m. shortly before Custer's return from the Crows Nest, there would be no earthy reason why the command could not have commenced their advance to the valley of the Little Big Horn before 11 a.m.
Of course, there are other red flags in Wallace's itinerary. He claims the command began their advance to cross the divide at 11:45 a.m. and moved all of 1/2 a mile before halting once again to divide the Regiment into battalions. He described Halt #2 as being 1/4 mile east of the divide and the stop where they divided into battalions as 1/4 mile west of the divide. Wallace then claims that it was 12:05 when this stop occurred, indicating that it took 20 minutes for the command to cover 1/2 a mile, which equates into a crawl of an absurd 1.5 mph! And this at a time when the command had been discovered! No, there are too many of these red flags in Wallace's itinerary, red flags that are consistently ignored by too many battle students today. I find the following question put to Lt. Wallace at the RCOI to be of interest:
Question: Is that memorandum you refer to the original itinerary? Wallace: No, sir; that is a copy. I did not compare it, but Lt. Maguire said it was an exact copy.
It is a shame that the Recorder did not demand that Lt. Maguire produce the original itinerary of Lt. Wallace so that the court could decide for itself if it was truly an exact copy, as Lt. Wallace so alleged. Unfortunately, Lt. Maguire was not asked to do so, and to this day, no one has ever seen that original itinerary. One wonders what could have happened to it? Instead, we are left entirely with Lt. Wallace's word for it. The choice is yours. You can 'Believe It - Or Not!' Needless to say, I am in the 'Not' category on this one.
3) Sgt. Kanipe (Camp Int., Custer in 76, my interpretive comments in brackets): Custer returned from his view from [the Crows Nest] and rejoined the command sometime between 10 and 11 a.m.
ANALYSIS
Custer returns from his first trip out to the Crows Nest to rejoin his command at Halt #2 at some time between 10 and 11 a.m. Based on other accounts, I believe this time would be much closer to 10 a.m. than 11 a.m. I would suggest about 10:10 a.m. Although Kanipe does not give us a time estimate for the crossing of the divide, his statement above suggests a time closer to 11 a.m. as opposed to 12 noon, as our other sources tell us that Custer had returned and called for his last Officer's Call at a time close to 10 a.m.
4) Lt. Hare (Camp Int., Custer in 76, my interpretive comments in brackets): says the 7th Cavalry began to move again up the divide [from Halt #1] between 8 and 9 a.m. Custer had already left earlier for the Crows Nest. They halted [at Halt #2] near the divide .... less than 1/2 mile from the top of the divide. They stopped and lay concealed for over an hour.... This was [sometime] between 10 a.m. and noon. During this time [likely after the last Officer's Call] Custer again goes to the Crows Nest to look at the Indians.
ANALYSIS
It is important to note that it would take the command, moving at a walk, about one hour and 15 minutes to cover the 4.5 miles between Halt #1 and Halt #2 on the divide. If the command left Halt #1 at 8:30 a.m., as I believe it did, the lead elements of the command would reach Halt #2 at about 9:45 a.m. with the trailing elements arriving at or just after 10:00 a.m. During this halt, Officer's Call would be sounded as soon as Custer returned from the Crows Nest, a short time later, and the command would rest for just over an hour before moving out again to cross the divide. The time frame for this event would be, according to Lt. Hare's recollection, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. We should make note of the discrepancy between Hare's comment that the command rested at Halt #2 for one hour, yet then gives a timeframe of two hours, saying it was sometime between 10 a.m. and 12 noon. This makes little sense, especially when we factor in the realization that the lead elements of the command likely arrived at Halt #2 at about 9:45 a.m. in covering just 4.5 miles in an hour and 15 minutes. A rest of a little over an hour would before moving out again would begin about 9:45 a.m. and end at about 10:55 a.m.
5) Pvt. Taylor (With Custer on the Little Big Horn): We did not stop until about 10:30 a.m. when we came to a halt in a ravine, some 4 or 5 miles from the summit of the divide. Here we were ordered to keep concealed and to preserve quiet.... But in the meantime, our presence having been discovered ... "it was necessary to act at once," and we started off again, crossing the divide a little before noon.
ANALYSIS
There are a number of errors in the reminiscence of Pvt. Taylor given above. One clear mistake Pvt. Taylor makes is describing the location of Halt #2 as being 4 or 5 miles from the summit of the divide. That would be the correct distance of Halt #1 from the divide. Halt #2 was about 1/4 of a mile east of the divide, according to Lt. Wallace and Lt. Edgerly's recollection. Lt. Hare would support that when he described its location as being less than 1/2 mile from the divide. Another problem Taylor confronts us with is the same one given by Moylan and Godfrey in their accounts, this being an inexplicable 2.5 hour span of time for the Regiment to move just 4.5 miles from Halt #1 to Halt #2. Something is clearly wrong here. Either the command left Halt #1 well after 8:00 a.m. or the command arrived at Halt #2 well before 10:30 a.m. or both. Consequently, Taylor's time estimate of crossing the divide at a little before noon must also be suspect as well, especially when we consider his statement that "it was necessary to act at once". This would preclude an unnecessary delay of an hour an a half before advancing on the hostiles, as a 12 noon crossing of the divide would suggest. Taylor was likely basing these time estimates mentioned above on what he had previously read from Lt. Godfrey's Century Magazine article on the battle as opposed to his own personal recollections. Of course, Taylor's reference to "a little before noon" might actually reference a time closer to 11 a.m., as indicated by other participant accounts.
6) Lt. Edgerly (The Custer Myth, 1881 account, my interpretive comments in brackets): At about 10 o'clock in the morning we were ... 15 miles from the hostile camp. Our force was then all together [at Halt #2]. We halted while Custer [earlier that morning] went on a hill with the Crow and Ree scouts to take a look at the Indian camp, which was in sight. When General Custer came down from the hill, Officer's Call was sounded. The officers all went to where he was and he told us that ... we would press on as quickly as we could and attack them in the village if possible.... He then ordered troop commanders to mount their troops and report when they were in readiness to move on. In about a minute, every troop commander had reported.
ANALYSIS
Lt. Edgerly tells us that the command had all reached Halt #2 at about 10 a.m. When Custer returned from the Crows Nest a bit later, presumably about 10:10 a.m., Officer's Call was sounded, whereupon the officers were told that they "would press on as quickly as they could" and attack the hostiles "in the village if possible", thus indicating the need for speed at this point. When Officer's Call ended, presumably about 10:30 or 10:35 a.m., the troop commanders were told to "mount their troops and report when they were in readiness to move on. In about a minute , every troop commander had reported." Lt. Edgerly tells us here that there was no hour and a half delay before moving out to cross the divide, as Lt. Wallace would infer from his deceptive itinerary. That extended delay makes no sense whatsoever.
6b) Lt. Edgerly (RCOI): Officers Call was at 10 a.m. on June 25, about 1/4 mile east of the divide.
ANALYSIS
Edgerly agrees with most other sourced that Officer's Call was at about 10 a.m. and that Halt #2 was about 1/4 mile east of the divide.
6c) Lt. Edgerly (letter to wife, 7/4/76): we ... moved on again till about 10 a.m. when Officer's Call was sounded again. After nearly an hour's rest and a reconnaissance by Gen'l. Custer and some scouts, we were told that the Indians had undoubtedly discovered our presence as several had been seen on the bluffs, and the only thing for us to do was to move on them at once.... We then mounted and moved forward about half a mile, halted and he (Custer) reassigned the companies into battalions....
ANALYSIS
Edgerly says that the command reached Halt #2 about 10 a.m., followed shortly thereafter by Officer's Call (after the return of Custer and his scouts from their reconnaissance at the Crows Nest). He says that the command rested at Halt #2 for "nearly an hour's rest". Which indicates that the command rested from about 10 a.m. until some time just before 11 a.m. when they moved out again to cross the divide.
7a) Lt. Godfrey (RCOI): crossed the divide "at about 12 o'clock."
7b) Lt. Godfrey (Godfrey's Narrative): They crossed the divide a little before noon.
ANALYSIS
Godfrey's time estimate of a divide crossing at or a little before noon would suggest that Custer delayed his advance for about an hour and a half after his last Officer's Call, when Custer announced his plans for an immediate advance on a soon to be expected fleeing village. This is exactly what Lt. Wallace suggested in his account. I believe both officers are wrong about this. There are no sources that indicate such a lengthy and inexplicable delay occurred at that time.
8) Lt. De Rudio (RCOI, my interpretive comments in brackets): the command was broken into battalions [after crossing the divide] around 11 or 12 o'clock.
ANALYSIS
De Rudio gives us an accurate range here of sometime between 11 a.m. and 12 noon that the command stopped to divide into battalions after traveling only 1/2 mile from Halt #2 on the divide. I believe the correct time would be shortly after 11 a.m.
9) Capt. Moylan (RCOI): claims the organization into battalions was made about 1 1/2 miles west of the divide about 12:30 p.m., but added "I don't know definitely about the time."
ANALYSIS
Capt. Moylan's account of this event contains some serious errors. His most glaring error was his statement that the division into battalions was made 1.5 miles west of the divide. More reliable accounts from Edgerly and Wallace place this halt to reorganize into battalions at only 1/4 mile west of the divide, the command having only traveled 1/2 a mile from Halt #2 east of the divide. It would appear that Moylan was attempting to support Wallace's claim of a 12 noon crossing of the divide, yet then claims it took 30 more minutes to move 1/2 mile to the point where the Regiment divided into battalions. This would put their rate of advance at an absurd 1 mph! Perhaps this is why Moylan chose to relocate this halt a further 1.25 miles west of where it actually took place. In my view, Moylan's account above is entirely unreliable and not supported by our other battle participants. He at least had the decency to qualify these inaccuracies by saying: "I don't know definitely about the time."
10) Pvt. J.B. Gallenne (letter to Father Genin, 7/5/1876): at about 11 a.m. we perceive a wigwam of war about 10 miles ahead of us.
ANALYSIS
Pvt. Gallenne tells us that shortly after crossing the divide at about 11 a.m. they could see a lone tepee about 10 miles ahead (or west) of the command. It is interesting to note that the 2nd lone tepee was almost exactly 10 miles west of the divide crossing.
11) Lt. Mathey (RCOI): "they started from 11 or 12 from where the long halt was made" on the divide.
ANALYSIS
Lt. Mathey indicates that the command started out to cross the divide at some time between 11 a.m. and 12 noon. I believe this range of time is essentially correct, with the command crossing the divide closer to 11 a.m. than 12 noon.
12) Capt. McDougall (RCOI): got his orders to act as Rear Guard about 11 a.m. on the divide. They started out 20 minutes after the command.
ANALYSIS
Capt. McDougall's account above suggests a divide crossing closer to 11 a.m. with the Pack train starting out about 20 minutes later.
13) Lt. Varnum (I, Varnum): The column arrived at the trail-crossing of the divide about 10 a.m. ....
ANALYSIS
Lt. Varnum is likely using a sun time reference of 10 a.m. for the command's crossing of the divide. The HQ watch time would actually by 10:57 a.m. or a few minutes before 11.
14) Pvt. Windolph (I Fought With Custer): It was around noon on this fatal Sunday of June 25 when we crossed the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn.
ANALYSIS
Pvt. Windolph's memoirs were written by Frazier & Robt. Hunt and published in 1947. I strongly suspect that the times he gave for the events were heavily influenced by Col. Graham's timelines that were previously published in his book The Story of the Little Big Horn in 1926, as Windolph's times follow Graham's unique & popular times -- based almost exclusively on those given by Lt. Wallace at the RCOI and thus contradicting the evidence provided by the great majority of the battle participants, both red and white. The Hunt's reproduce and insert sections from Graham's book to supplement Windolph's own memoirs, thus my conclusion is that Windolph's times are not to be relied on.
15) Dr. Porter (St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 3, 1878 interview): "It was about ten o clock when the command was divided."
ANALYSIS
Dr. Porter indicates that Custer divided the regiment into separate battalions at "about ten o'clock." This would likely be a reference to sun time, with a HQ watch time of being closer to 11 a.m. shortly after crossing the divide.
16) Edward Curtis interview with 3 Crow Scouts in The North American Indian: "In the early forenoon the command [crossed the divide and] moved down the western slope of Wolf mountains and out on the plain...."
ANALYSIS
The Crow scouts confirmed to Curtis that the regiment crossed the divide in the forenoon, not at noon, which supports the Participant Timeline crossing at about 11:00 a.m. on June 25th.
CONCLUSION
Based on the participant accounts listed above, I believe the lead elements of the Regiment arrived at Halt #2 about 9:45 a.m. with the rear elements arriving at Halt #2 at about 10:07 a.m. Custer returns from the Crows Nest at sometime between 10:05 and 10:10 a.m. and sounds Officer's Call. Officer's Call occurs between 10:20 and 10:35 a.m. The officers are then told to prepare and mount up their companies for an immediate advance on the hostiles, which occurs between 10:35 and 10:50 a.m. with the command ready to move again, leaving Halt #2 at 10:50 a.m. and crossing the divide at 10:55 a.m. as supported by the accounts of Dr. Porter, Lt. Varnum, Capt. McDougall, Lt. De Rudio, Lt. Edgerly, Lt. Mathey, Lt. Hare and Pvt. Gallene. In doing so, we must reject the later time estimates given us by Lt. Wallace, Capt. Moylan and Pvt. Taylor.
The Regiment leaves Halt #2 at: H + 2 hours and 20 minutes.
The Regiment crosses the divide at: H + 2 hours and 25 minutes.