Billy Cross -- Scout

[herosrest]

I attempted to work out when Cross gave his interview, it obviously requiring x amount of time to be published. The point being had he returned to Terry and the column when the interview was given. As far as I understand, Kellogg was the only reporter until after news of the battle broke, so who, how, and where and when, did Cross give an account that dated to July 4th. The account could not have been published at that date since it would precede the news sent from Bismarck the following day to publish on the 6th. The earliest dated story i have encountered was by Muggin's Taylor carrying Gibbon's despatch of 28th June to Fort Ellis, and his Diamond R article dated July 3rd and published on the 5th July.

Far West stopped over briefly at Powder River. The Josephine was passed bringing supplies to Terry. It's an interesting puzzle. Was Cross interviewed before he returned to Terry, Reno and Varnum.

According to Lt Paulding, MO with Gibbon's command, the Josephine arrived to Camp on the Yellowstonr July 7th with supplies. Therefore Billy Cross's account of the battlr was submitted to the New York Times by Lt. Byrne at Powder River depot.


William Cross had no definitive knowledge of the battles outcome, having left before the siege commenced on the 25th with only the knowledge of those accompanying, or that he talked to, before departing the Little Bighorn.

Riverboat shuffles ~

phm.stparchive.com/Archive/PHM/PHM12231938p07.php

digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/1937/

lbha.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=basics&action=display&thread=4326

Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876, J.S. Gray, page 88 and Lt. Byrne,

books.google.co.uk/books?id=iGordBj_47AC&pg=PA89&lpg=PA88&ots=xNqcRHTmVf&dq=custer+powder+river+josephine&output=html_text

An interesting detail offered by William Cross in his interview, linked above, relates his estimate of the camp size. Having been present only during the opening phases of events of the 25th before being isolated from the defence site and running for Powder River, the 900 lodges is remarkably accurate. A military count by Terry's staff gave 18-1900, which should be halved acros the four mile camping site, which relocated on the afternoon of the 25th.

[Clair]

Dec 1, 2012 16:11:57 GMT -5 tunkasila said:

When Weir was on his way to the Peaks, the fighting was at least beginning on Battle Ridge/Calhoun Hill and likely Cemetery Ridge and the lower slope of LSH. For Cross to have seen anything of any possible action around MTC or the ridges above it, he’d have had to been in the vicinity about 1½ hours earlier which just doesn’t fit as I see it.

Here is where the assumptions of your own accepted model come into play. This seems to be a very fast model of the Custer fight. It very well could be much slower. What if Custer is still fighting around Ford B...down on Butler Ridge and Greasy Grass Hill, when Weir is approaching "his" peaks? With nobody on Calhoun Hill yet at all, or at least just beginning to arrive at Calhoun Hill?

This would be a model that has Custer fighting around Ford B for twenty or thirty minutes after dismounting a few hundred yards from it, and slowly pulling away from the ford towards Calhoun Hill. I think my own model has Yate's movement from Ford B to Calhoun Hill about concurrent with Weir's movement from Reno to Weir peak. I think Weir arrived on his peak about the same time Custer and Yates first arrived on Calhoun Hill, and Keogh was still marching along N-C Ridge to join him.

I take it this is a very slow developing Custer battle, compared to your model?

Given that the Rees and Cross had left the skirmish line before it’d gone into the timber, then crossed the river to the bluffs with stolen horses, I’d guess they’d be along SSR region about the time Custer was crossing MTC to Luce. If so, the soldiers they mention could well be those who couldn’t keep up with Custer.

More questions about timing, to highlight the differences in models...Seems to me that the Rees began capturing that herd BEFORE Reno dismounted, and continued rounding them up and driving them up the bluff while Reno was still out in the valley. By the time the Rees got to the top of the bluff with their ponies, Custer's column was down in the low ground in MTC near the mouth of Cedar Coulee, out of sight of said Rees (and out of sight of Thompson/Watson, who passed the Rees about when they got to the top of the bluff). At this time, Reno's line is still out in the valley...perhaps G Co is just being called into the timber.

In one of his accounts, Curley said, - ‘…Mitch Boyer said he was going down to Custer and his men and for the rest of us to go back to the pack outfit. Being on the hill we could see Reno was retreating and was well to the foot of the hills. The Arapahoe scouts of Custer had some of the Sioux horses and brought them across the river just below the ridge on the east side. We also met two groups of soldiers on the ridge just north of where Reno made his stand.’

Need to watch the sequence of events here. Don't assume that this means Thompson was still on the bluff while Reno was retreating from the timber. If this were true, he and Watson would certainly have 1) said so, and 2) turned around and joined Reno atop the bluff. No way they would go down the bluff into the hostile village with Warriors all over chasing Reno, especially since some of these Warriors were climbing that very bluff to get around and ahead of Reno during the chase!

So I would say that 1) the Ree ponies were well gone and out of sight before Reno ever thought of leaving the timber, and 2) the Soldiers Curley mentions were either not Thompson/Watson, or he puts them out of sequence.

For Cross to have seen anything of Custer’s troops in action it’d have to have been at least an hour before Benteen reached Weir and he’d have had to be in the Luce/Nye-Blummer region at least.

I'm not sure of your positions for Cross, but my model has Keogh still alive (and out of sight fighting his last down in his swale) when CPT Benteen personally gets to Weir Hill. Gen'l Custer is standing beneath his personal colors, and the regimental colors, still flying and secure, atop Last Stand Hill. If Benteen's eyes were good enough and could see through the dust and gunpowder, he would be able to see Custer's standards go down.

Yes, passed near him and were shot at by a few soldiers. They must therefore have come up just after Knipe left.

Agree, but how long after Knipe left? Could have been 20 minutes after. I think Knipe left before Custer's column went over the "saddle" between Weir and SSR, and Custer's column was well down Cedar Coulee and out of sight by the time the pony herd got to the top of the bluff in this area. I don't think anyone in the column fired at the herd...I think those were Soldiers that were straggling behind, like the SGT that talked to Thompson before leaving him behind. Otherwise the Rees would have mentioned seeing Custer's column itself, I think. So I believe Knipe was long gone down into Ash Creek valley by the time the Rees climbed the bluff with their ponies.

Something like this below. Note that the river comes right up to the bluff just north of Reno's retreat ford, and we can be fairly sure, I think, that the herd did not cross the river going south...in fact, I think it was the river that forced the herd to turn and climb the bluff...they ran out of open space as the Ree's chased them south, so the horses HAD to climb the bluff right there.

Attachments:

[keogh]

From Walter Camp's notes on his interview with John Burkman (IU, B2, F11), with my annotations in brackets:

Burkman told me that on [the afternoon] pm of June 25, he saw Billy Cross among the Ree scouts going back on [the] trail [along Ash/Reno Creek]. [He] says [that] he talked with Cross, and Cross was riding with [only] one stirrup, and Cross said it [ie. the missing stirrup] was shot off in the fight. [Note: Pvt. Peter Thompson in his narrative also mentioned seeing Cross' missing stirrup -- although Thompson mistakes him for Billy Jackson. Thompson also mentioned that Cross' horse was bleeding from a wound in its left hind leg, likely from the shot that knocked off Cross' left stirrup.] Cross told Burkman that he knew of two men killed in the fight. ([Camp:] These may have been all that Cross personally saw killed in the fight. It also proves that Cross was in the [valley] fight as it could have been no other fight than Reno's.) Cross was then advising that they, the [Ree] scouts [who had brought the captured Sioux ponies down to Ash/Reno Creek], [should] not attempt to take the captured [Sioux] ponies away, as the Sioux would follow and try to get them.

[moderator]

I am reposting this informative contribution from Jose (blaque) who originally posted it some years ago in a different thread:

Further to the shot stirrup story, it’s a pity that Nichols gives no source to his version. There’s nothing about it in Cross’ July 1876 interview, other than the fight against the Sioux pursuers (numbering about 45 warriors) took place five miles -not 15- from Reno Hill, that “there was good water there, and the Indians cut me off”. Since the Cross entry in the MWC book states that he left Custer’s column before the fighting started, and reduces his participation in the fight to the herding of some ponies, I think the author is assuming that the only place where Cross could have lost his stirrup as a result of enemy fire was during that skirmish which was fought late in the evening and far from the battlefield. This seems to be just an educated guess. I know at least of one other case where Nichols’ well-intentioned reasoning may have led him to a serious misrepresentation of facts. And I say “may” because I admire his work, and it’s possible that he just forgot to mention all his sources.

On the other hand, there’s an interesting statement made by Private Burkman (Custer’s striker) to Walter M. Camp in 1911, which reads as follows:

“Burkman told me that on pm of June 25 he saw Billy Cross among the Ree scouts going back on [the] trail. Says he talked with Cross, and Cross was riding with one stirrup, and Cross said it was shot off in the fight”.” (Hardorff’s OTLBHWWC, p. 182-183).
Burkman also remembered that Cross was then advising his fellow scouts to get rid of the captured ponies in order to avoid being pursued by the Sioux. So it’s evident that Cross lost the stirrup before the skirmish with his pursuers took place.

The good things about Burkman’s statement is that it gives more ground to the reasonable assumption that Watson’s half-breed scout was actually Billy Cross, not Billy Jackson; that Cross’ assertion that he fought for two hours before leaving the field should not be discredited as Nichols seemingly does, since Watson/Thompson & Burkman reported he was dangerously close to the fighting prior to that late, rearguard action; and that apparently there’s always a grain of truth in Thompson’s stories, however weird (though I’m still at a loss about the Custer at the ford episode).

I also think that someone made an excellent point earlier in this thread, when suggested that Cross’ saying “Custer shot my stirrup off” might be a reference to Custer’s men, and not to GAC. Actually this hypothesis may be well substantiated with Cross’ interview, where in several instances Cross’ use of “Custer” can be read as synonimous of “7th Cavalry”. For example, he says that before he left Reno hill “I was up on the same ridge where Custer was”. He reports that he saw the corpse of Dr. De Wolfe “while with Custer’s command, after they had joined”, an obvious reference to the arrival of Benteen’s column. And when talking about the pack train, after stating that it was “about four miles up the river to Custer”, he says that finally “the pack mules went down and joined Custer”.

Cross’ account fits quite well with the facts as generally accepted and contains no serious contradictions if we replace “Custer” with “US Cavalry” whenever common sense dictates it. Otherwise someone could present a theory about the linking of Custer and the defeated Reno on Reno hill, the subsequent march of the former to Custer’s ridge accompanied by Cross, and the marvelous escape of the pack train after having joined Custer’s doomed command .

Summing up, Cross could have been fired upon (like other scouts were) by some trooper of Custer’s rearguard while leading a number of ponies back along the right bank of the river, and not by Custer the man himself.

Jose

[herosrest]

Cross was amongst the group of ten scouts who moved down river led by Stab, and attempted to join Custer's companies before running back as Company D moved towards Weir's Peaks and MTC. Members of this group had attempted to rescue the group of scouts including Young Hawk but were forced back up the bluff and then tried to reach Custer. This was before Weir and Company D advanced after Custer. Company D met these scouts as they advanced along the bluffs and Cross was amongst them and definatly identified. This could not have occurred earlier or later in the day. Company D met Cross as he returned from trying to reach Custer.

[carolyn]

one can read Billy's story here

you can see Billy's story here:

chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85025007/1876-08-02/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1789&sort=date&rows=20&words=Billy+Cross&searchType=basic&sequence=0&index=7&state=&date2=1922&proxtext=billy+cross&y=18&x=13&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=3

[carolyn]

another article here:

chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030313/1876-08-01/ed-1/seq-5/#date1=1789&sort=date&rows=20&words=Billy+Cross&searchType=basic&sequence=0&index=6&state=&date2=1922&proxtext=billy+cross&y=18&x=13&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=3

[herosrest]

This query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9903EFD6143FE63BBC4B52DFB166838D669FDE should link to Cross's first interview at Powder River, given to Lt. Bernard R. Byrne, 6th Inf.

Some J.S. Gray research - link

Cross's tepee count is interesting in the point that 1800 lodge sites were counted on the ground and since the camp moved during the battle, being taken as three, four, six and thirty seven miles long - in fact there were obviously 900 tepees present, give or take the few which arrived during the fighting, to leave 900 imprints plus the 900 from the relocation.

There may be another account, i'll see if can hunt it up.

It is from Cross, dated 4th July 1876, that it was known or stated at least, by a scout, that Custer was shot in the bottom. Cross reached Powder River with a cocoon of knowledge which was his experience up to 4pm of the 25th with no-one to tarnish or query what he told. He described accurately Lt. Hodgson's fall. A sergeant knew Custer was killed - perhaps a scout sergeant.

Anecdotumly - this battle concept
from this post - link ignores the location given by Lt. Varnum in respect where he saw gray horse troop riding along the bluffs, as he (Varnum) dismounted in the valley. W.A. Graham published the information on a map in his Story of the Battle, in 1926. Here is the map - link

Now, relating Graham's data to clair's work, according to Varnum who saw them, Company E were at the place where is marked Weir Peak and there is no way that company used Cedar Coulee. Since all five Companies and the HQ advanced togaether, none of them used Cedar Coulee. Established opinion is therefore incorrect and seriously flawed if, one accepts Varnum. There is considerably good reason why he should be believed and the information accepted. Of course, that shortens the duration of Reno's valley fight slightly.

[keogh]

An Article from the New York Herald, dated Aug. 1, 1876, with my annotations in brackets: PART I

Bismarck D.T., July 31, 1876

A letter written by a sergeant in the Sixth infantry, dated Yellowstone depot, July 15, has the following interesting points in relation to the Custer massacre. You will note a new theory of Custer's attack and defeat which is at least plausible; but to the letter:

THE SERGEANT'S LETTER

The impression prevails here, as well as above, that Custer was given away treacherously by a half-breed guide he had with him, by the name of Billy Cross, and every circumstance, so far as ascertained, tends to confirm the impression that this guide had an understanding with the Indians beforehand, and treacherously led Custer' command into a snare, where they were all massacred, with the exception of one Crow scout and two guides, named respectively Girard and Jackson. Cross, with the Indian guides that came from [Fort] Lincoln with Custer, deserted the command shortly after the fight began [Note: This was a common, yet mistaken view taken by early students of the battle], and nothing was heard of them until they came into this camp, about 160 miles -- four days travel -- from the scene of conflict. Had they joined Gibbon or Reno, the latter of whom was in close proximity and the former no more than twenty-five or thirty miles away, and informed the one or the other of Custer's situation, the lives of some of the brave men who perished might have been saved.

They [the Indian scouts] came in two distinct parties. Cross and one party [of scouts came in] about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th of June, and another party of about nine or ten more [scouts], leading surplus [ie. stolen Sioux] ponies, in about five hours after. When their different stories were compared they were found to want harmony in several very essential particulars. Most of the Indians cartridge frills were full and none of them had expended more than two or three rounds. This, in connection with their contradictory stories, created in the minds of many, myself among the number, doubts as to their courage and honesty toward Custer on this occasion, and I for one found it difficult to eradicate this impression from my mind.

Most of them [ie. the Indian scouts] are mere boys, and one of them gave evidence the other day that he was deficient in courage, and he is doubtless a fair criterion by which to judge the whole. Parties who have arrived from Terry since with despatches inform us that the men who were fortunate enough to escape this dreadful carnage, the Crow scout [Curley] especially, charge these Indians with cowardice, and say they ran away at the beginning of the fight. [Note: This false impression was held by soldiers unaware that these scouts were told to capture the enemy's horses and bring them back to safety. They were not expected to stay and fight, although a number of them did.]

They also say that the night before the fight this [scout Billy] Cross was sent out to scout and reconnoitre and was gone [for] ten or eleven hours; that he returned in the morning and informed General Custer that the village was a small one and he would encounter but very little difficulty in obtaining an easy victory. Custer, who is said by his men to be very impulsive, without first satisfying himself as to the truth or falsity of the report, mounted his command and gave the command forward. The command came in sight of the village within an hour and a half [ie. about 12:30 p.m. according to the Participant Timeline] and he then gave the order to charge it, which was gallantly done, but no resistance was met with until they arrived on the other side of the village location, when they received a terrific volley, which put an end to many a noble fellow's existence, and the troops then found themselves in the centre of a large camp of many villages and completely surrounded by the red devils. [Note: There was no terrific volley fired by the Indians, nor did Custer's command ever enter into the Indian village area, although they would eventually be surrounded on Battle Ridge.]

At this spot the grass and brush were found tied and knotted so as to impede the progress of the horses [note: this claim is ludicrous], and the Indians and some of the villages were screened from view by a sort of wicker breastwork of willow brush, behind which these red sleuthhounds of hell could quietly pick off any of the soldiers without endangering their own precious hides [note: this is more nonsense]. All retreat being cut off there was nothing for it but to [ move] forward. Custer then designated a knoll [ie. Last Stand Hill] for his command to rally at, which they did, breaking through the bronze wall of savages like a streak of barbed lightening and gained the knoll, where they made the last stand, all hands fighting desperately, as men only can fight whose lives are at stake and where the fight became a hand to hand conflict. The squaws made themselves conspicuous, knocking in the skulls with a heavy club with a stone at the end of it, and mutilating [them] in divers other ways, too sickening too [sic.] mention, [to] every soldier that fell.

(to be continued)

[keogh]

An Article from the New York Herald, dated Aug. 1, 1876, with my annotations in brackets: PART II

The [rumored yet unsupported] breastwork referred to, and especially the [rumored yet unsupported] knotted grass especially, presented every indication of having been freshly done, and that the Indians were fully informed and aware of Custer's intentions towards them and had accordingly made every necessary preparation for giving him a warm reception. [Note: There is little or no historical evidence to support the notion that the Indians were aware of Custer's intention to attack their village on June 25th, nor is there any evidence that the Indians prepared for such an attack by making breastworks or by the absurd notion of knotting the prairie grass.] Everybody was scalped and otherwise mutilated, excepting General Custer and Corporal Tiemann [Teeman of F Co.], whose scalp was partly off and who had the sleeve of his blouse with the chevron [ie. corporal stripes] uplaid over it in a peculiar manner. This enabled a good many men of the Seventh cavalry, who are here dismounted, to detect one of the participants in the fight on the Indians side in the person of one Rain-in-the-Face, who was in the guardhouse [at Fort Lincoln] last winter and chained to a corporal, also a prisoner at the time. Not even a button was removed from Custer's uniform [ed. actually Custer's entire uniform was missing from the field when his body was found], while his brother and the rest of the officers were terribly mutilated.

Reno's command was several miles away from the scene of Custer's fight, but was not aware of his having been engaged until after the battle was all over and General Gibbon had arrived with his command to re-enforce him. [Note: This is a false assumption. Reno's command knew that Custer was engaged with the main Indian force about 10 minutes after Benteen joined Reno on the bluffs on June 25th.] To the timely arrival of Gibbon with his "Dough Boys" [ie. infantry] is due the salvation of Reno and his command, for they were also surrounded and fighting desperately and [due to their poor defensive position on the bluffs] with very slight hope of ever coming out alive. To the coolness and bravery and foresight of Colonel Benteen, of the Seventh cavalry, at the beginning of Reno's engagement [on the bluffs after Custer's wing was destroyed], is due the salvation of Reno and the greater part of his command. He now occupies the very enviable position of idol in the esteem of those who were engaged with him and came out with their lives.

One of the wounded of Reno's command, who is in the hospital here, says that at one time during the fight [on the bluffs] they heard the advance sounded on the trumpet from Indians; they all rose up, thinking it was Custer come to reinforce them, and they cheered lustily; when the Indians let forth a derisive yell at them, fired a terrible volley and made a charge which they repulsed, as they did several others that were made in rapid succession. The Indian loss was very heavy, and it is said that after the battle was over, where Gibbon's and Reno's commands were burying the killed, they were found piled up like cordwood, so effective was the fire of the soldiers. [Note: Most accounts describe less than 20 Indian bodies found on the field.] Many more of the Indians were tied to their ponies and thus their bodies were carried off, and others were carried away by their friends. The [Springfield] carbines of our cavalrymen, with breeches similar to our infantry ones, are represented to be almost useless after the fifth or sixth round has been fired from them, the spring refusing to throw the shell, thus necessitating the use of the ramrod to eject it. [Note: The Springfield carbines did not contain ramrods at that time, but the Infantry models (called a Long Tom) did.] Great complaint is also made of the cartridges, many of them having hardly powder enough [ed. 55 grams was the standard load] in them to force the ball from the socket of the shell.

There is quite a number of white men [alleged to be] with the Indians, English having been spoken in their ranks plentifully during the engagement. One of the Indians that was shot by Reno's men attracted peculiar attention, and upon going up to him he was found masked, and upon removing the mask the features of a white man were disclosed, with a long, gray, patriarchal beard. This individual was seen several times by Gibbon's command [likely in the weeks before the battle], in charge of small parties of Indians, but they could never get close enough to him to make his acquaintance, so they took him to be an Indian sporting a false whisker for a blind. But when he was pointed out on the field, dead, they recognized him as the same individual. A bugler who was dishonorably discharged in 1869, from the Second infantry, is said to be with them, and it is supposed that he is the one who blew the call of the trumpet.

[Note: The author of this account provides the reader with an abundance on unsupported rumors and suspicions regarding the mistaken notion that the Indians were prepared for Custer's attack on June 25th and thus enabled to set up an ambush that thwarted his attack and doomed it to failure. He also attributes the defeat to a massive number of defective Springfield carbines. The anonymous sergeant implies that Custer's scout Billy Cross was apparently responsible for tipping off the enemy on June 24 based on his going missing for 10 or 11 hours. This article is a good example of the level of paranoia and suspicion infecting the ranks of Terry's command in the aftermath of the battle.]

[keogh]

Walter Camp's letter to Private Fremont Kipp (D Co.) dated Nov. 19, 1921 (Godfrey Papers, Library of Congress) with my annotations in brackets:

My Dear Mr. Kipp:--

.... Yes, Gen. Edgerly did tell me about seeing two men join Reno's command on the hill. Edgerly took one of them to be Billy Cross, but he (Edgerly) was mistaken about that, as Cross was with the Rees and nowhere in the vicinity at that time. [Note: Camp is mistaken here, as Cpl. Wylie supported Edgerly's recollection of seeing Billy Cross riding south along the bluffs towards Reno Hill shortly after D Co. left on its advance north from Reno Hill.] The men seen by Edgerly must have been Thompson and Watson. [Note: This is unlikely.] Edgerly says he shot at one of them, taking him for an Indian, but when the bullet whistled near him he waved his hat, and then Edgerly knew he was a white man. Thompson did not remember anything about the said shooting when I asked him about it. [Note: Likely because the incident did not involve either Thompson or Watson.]

....

Yours truly,

W.M. Camp

[moderator]

Information on Billy Cross from Walter Camp's interview notes with Harvey A. Fox [D Co.], Lilly Library, Folder 4, Envelop 44, with my annotations in brackets:

Harvey A. Fox, D Co. was left at Powder River.... Says [Billy] Cross was first to reach Powder River with one or two Rees. [He] could give no satisfactory account of the fighting but seemed to think all were killed. Billy Cross was a half breed Sioux....

Camp Field Notes, Lilly Library, Box 7, Folder 8, Envelope 135, with my annotations in brackets:

Gerard. Billy Cross [was] short and heavy set.

Camp Field Notes, Lilly Library, Box 7, Folder 8, Envelope 135

Wotakshu. ... Says Cross was a short man.... Aug. 2, 1910. Geo. Bane interpreter. Says Billy Cross was in valley fight with Reno. Says Billy Cross was with Wotakshu all of the time during Reno's fight in the bottom. Did not hear anything about Cross having stirrup shot off. Says Cross arrived at Powder River camp later than some of the Rees. Does not recall Baker being at the fight.