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Post by montrose on Oct 10, 2010 7:46:24 GMT -5
Clair,
I agree with your comments about C Company. My only concern is the lack of cartridge cases in the initial C Co position. I expected Fox and crew to find evidence of a skirmish line adjacent to Calhoun's company, but at a right angle to it, facing the river.
Now back to Keough and the issue of decision making. I believe he was located right where his body was found, you believe he was located at or near Calhoun. So let me explain my reasoning.
1. Obviously, his body was found in the swale, not on Calhoun Hill.
a. His company staff was found immediately around him, with the exception of Porter. I agree with the placement of the Porter marker with the second cluster of men. That would be the right place for the XO to be, if the CO was present in command. If Porter had been in command, he would have been with the Keough cluster.
b. Deployment. My impression is that I Co was in reserve when they were hit. There is no evidence of a skirmish line, and the terrain they were in is a very good place for a reserve and a very bad place to fight.
c. Keough flight theory. If Keough had been on Calhoun Hill, at some point he fled from there back to his own company. He must have made this decision early, since Calhoun and Crittenden did not make it, nor did that many survivors from C or L. So now Keough is supervising two companies, and things go wrong. He doesn't try to rally C Company, or lead a hasty defense to the west of L Company. He takes off to the rear. I don't buy it. Looking at his actions in the Civil War, if he had been on Calhoun Hill, he would have died on Calhoun Hill. This is similar to the stand he made in the Civil War that got him captured, with the difference being that the Indians weren't taking prisoners.
2. C Company attack. I believe C Company's attack was due to a request from Calhoun to Harrington to clear Calhoun's right flank.
a. Reserve. If Keough was on the hill, the attack should logically have been given to I Company. That is the very purpose of having a reserve.
b. Direction of attack. If Harrington was operating on his own hook, I would expect his attack to be at the Indians on his right front, infiltrating in the low ground.
c. Haste. If C Company was acting to support Calhoun, then this means Calhoun did not think he had time to send a messenger to Keough, and wait for I Company to arrive and deploy. If he made this decision, I am sure he would have sent a messenger to Keough. The problem is figuring out of the L Company men who made it to the swale, or died enroute; was there an NCO or orderly who may have been a messenger. No way to be sure.
d. Time. Since I Company didn't deploy, this means that the collapse of Calhoun's company must have happened quickly. I mean the time it takes for a mounted messenger to get to Keough, and for Keough to respond. Since Keough did have so many leaders near him, he may have just received the news and was preparing orders for the Company to respond.
3. Summary. I believe if Keough had been present on Calhoun Hill, the defense would have been better managed. I do not blame him for being where he was, I think the threat from the village was low when he established his position, and he was waiting for Benteen and the trains to arrive from the south.
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fred
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Post by fred on Oct 10, 2010 9:13:31 GMT -5
Montrose,
I agree, in essence, with your last post. I had not thought of the L vs. C business, but that is an acceptable scenario/reason for the C Company charge off the ridge.
I am still of the opinion-- and it does not seem that anything you have written would disagree or contradict this-- that the main threat was to the horses and men being held back in the swale. That, and encroaching Indians to Calhoun's south (out of the Deep Coulee environs).
I am assuming you think Keogh's own I Company was in more of an "administrative" posture than a tactical deployment. Am I correct with that assumption?
Unfortunately, there is nothing much in the way of L Company body identification that would help in your messenger theory. 1SG Butler, of course, was found a considerable distance from the position, and there were several L Company bodies identified on Last Stand Hill, all privates: Francis T. Hughes, Charles McCarthy, Oscar F. Pardee, and Thomas S. Tweed. It was not noted if any of these men were assigned as orderlies.
There may have been more, but I am unable to open my main document that might show if there were... I guess I'll have to try to switch computers.
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by strange on Oct 10, 2010 10:03:36 GMT -5
The Indians claimed to have snuck up on one particular group of soldiers and to have caught them by surprise when they were more or less standing around (do correct my grammar if I'm not saying this right). I think that was Keogh, thus whatever he was needed for was probably never put into action, meaning he was cut down before he was supposed to do whatever he was supposed to have been doing and was forced onto precarious defense or retreat as well as other companies trying to save him.
There's a few good guesses at what he was intended for. I think given his reputation and the fact that he was rather on his own from the others, he was probably being prepped as an active fighting force to wrap around the enemy and fall into place when they appear and far less administrative. Though, administrative sounds a bit like carrying orders back and forth and staying in communication and that seems to concur with Reno's last memories of him.
Strange
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Post by on Oct 10, 2010 12:21:07 GMT -5
I agree with your comments about C Company. My only concern is the lack of cartridge cases in the initial C Co position. I expected Fox and crew to find evidence of a skirmish line adjacent to Calhoun's company, but at a right angle to it, facing the river. I'm looking at his seminal book, and he didn't do a survey of that small finger west of Battle Ridge, towards GGR. If the position was on Battle Ridge itself, of course, the leveling of the ridgeline for the road may have eliminated most of that evidence. Right...with his former company, and his reserve, not in a position to observe his battalion. Agree, but I'm not sure that where Porter's body was found actually indicates his "fighting position." For one thing, I don't think I Co was ever in any fighting position, so where anyone was found dead is probably moot. But I can see that if Keogh is trying to drag his reserve somewhere, he would head for the guidon in all the dust. Why Porter didn't die right there, but died somewhere else, may only indicate that he was already dead by the time Keogh got there? That is my model, as well. Here's my model: Keogh is actually with C Co as it charges, behind it. He wants to see the view from GGR when they take it, so he can coordinate with Yates' battalion to the north, which I believe he was supporting. Just as soon as the company dismounts and their boots hit the ground, Crazy Horse is galloping up Deep Ravine for Battle Ridge to get behind Calhoun, and Lame White Man and hundreds more are on foot going up Calhoun Coulee right behind them, rolling up their right flank. Keogh just turns his head to the right to see this, yells for C Co to pull back to Calhoun, and gallops as fast as his horse will take him for his reserve. Just by "accident" that this happens to be his old company...if L Co were the one in reserve, I believe Keogh would have been found dead next to their guidon in the swale. I think the key here, is "what would the battalion commander do in this situation?" He would gallop back to grab his reserve and deploy it...that was the only communication that he had. Meanwhile, I Co is just waiting down there in the swale...was Porter watching from the ridgetop? He SHOULD have been, but indicators are that he was not. I think Crazy Horse gets to I Co, leaping over the ridge, about the same time Keogh does, and THAT is why Keogh is dead by the guidon, and I Co is immediately caught in a swirling melee. I think men in I Co were being killed at the same time as the initial men in C Co were killed, and before anyone in L Co was down. Calhoun my have requested, but I don't see any way Harrington moves on his "order." Only Keogh could have ordered that...I'm quite sure about this! The mission is a likely one, but just as likely is it that Keogh was ordered to "support by fire" Yates (with Custer) move across a ford to the north, and that C Co was moving to GGR to support Custer's flanking attack. But then I Co would be in front of C Co's line of fire. Not likely, I think. Also, there was a threat to L Co's left flank as well, which only I Co was positioned to thwart. Hmmm...I'm not quite sure what you mean, here. It is a quandry for theorists, though, with C Co going down to a very large terrain feature. They couldn't come close to occupying most of that ridgeline. Whomever sent them there really didn't think there was much opposition building behind that ridge, or down in Deep Ravine. My current model envisions C Co going pretty much straight west from their position on/before Battle Ridge...just a "support by fire" position for Yates' maneuver. I still have a really hard time with Keogh being anywhere but where he could see everything that was going on around him. From Fred's probable point on the ridge, which I agree with if he wasn't right on Calhoun Hill itself, he was halfway between Calhoun and Harrington, and either officer could just gallop on over and talk to Keogh in about two minutes! I can imagine Keogh's Irish temper if he had seen a messenger leave Calhoun and arrive at Harrington, and Harrington's troopers mounting up. <g> Most officers in Harrington's position probably wouldn't even agree to such an order, but Harrington was very junior, so I admit that he might have followed an order (or suggestion) from Calhoun, after looking for Keogh over his shoulder. <g> Ahhh...try this: Upon C Co dismounting on GGR, Crazy Horse gallops 200 Warriors straight up Deep Ravine and pel mel over Battle Ridge, about in its center. They think they are riding around the backside of Calhoun. They plop right into the middle of I Co's men, standing at the head of their horses in column formation, and chaos ensues, for BOTH sides. Surprise engagement. Keogh, having watched this, arrives at his reserve at about the same time, but of course he can't do anything with it at this point, and gets caught up in the melee. L Co isn't even engaged yet...they are just observers. C Co is running for their lives, and about half of them go down by the time any survivors make it to Calhoun Hill, and eventually to Custer hill. Yeah...I think it is a greater condemnation of Keogh's leadership to say he was in the swale from the beginning, than that he made any mistakes from Calhoun Hill. <g> But if you model that he was with the attack, and was just as surprised as everyone with the Deep Ravine attack and raced back to get his reserve, I think that is acceptable officer behavior. In my book, anyway. <g> You owe me, Elisabeth.  Clair |
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Post by keogh on Oct 10, 2010 15:09:33 GMT -5
Clair, I agree with your comments about C Company. My only concern is the lack of cartridge cases in the initial C Co position. I expected Fox and crew to find evidence of a skirmish line adjacent to Calhoun's company, but at a right angle to it, facing the river. The road construction would have obliterated any sign of skirmish action along Battle Ridge. Had there been any evidence of a position, it is no longer there. I would agree with Clair's placement of Keogh at the southern end of Battle Ridge. Why in the world would a battalion commander place himself down in a swale out of sight of the rest of his command and the field of action? Keogh's staff would go where Keogh goes. If he rode from his observation post on Battle Ridge down into the swale, his staff would follow him there. As far as Lt. Porter goes, his marker does not mark the spot where he was killed. No one knows where he was killed. I suspect that he was one of the few I Co. survivors to reach LSH at the end. I also suspect that he ended up along with Lt. Sturgis in the movement down to Deep Ravine (I believe there was at least one other I Co trooper who accompanied E down to the ravine). This would explain why both Sturgis & Porter's bloody clothing was found in the village afterwards. They both may have been captured alive in the vicinity of the village and tortured to death or decapitated that night. That is the impression most people get when they see the swale position. There is evidence, however slight, of a skirmish line or deployment on the military crest at the southern half of Battle Ridge (on the west slope of the ridgeline). The road construction would have eliminated all other evidence, but it is interesting to note that there are 2 trooper markers located exactly where this proposed skirmish line existed, and about 50 yards directly above the markers set for the death sites of Lame White Man and Noisy Walking. This also happens to be the position that Keogh, as battalion commander, would occupy giving him a commanding view of both Calhoun Hill, Finley Ridge, & Weir Point. I do agree with you that the swale was an excellent position for a reserve, and it is for this reason that I believe Keogh had his battalion horses kept. My model has Keogh dividing I Co into 2 platoons---1st platoon deployed at the top of Battle Ridge to establish firing positions on the military crests both east and west, with 2nd platoon kept in reserve in the bottom of the swale standing to horse. I agree with you here Montrose, but I come to a different explanation of events. My interpretation is that I Co. and the led horses in the swale came under direct attack before L Co was overrun. I believe the attack into the swale occurred very shortly after Lame White Man's attack against C Co. on Finley Ridge. L Co was never overrun in my view. They abandoned their position in an effort to provide support to I Co & their horses down in the swale. I think it very unlikely that Lt. Calhoun would presume to order a different company to attack. Calhoun has no authority to order another company to do anything. That move is the Battalion Commander's call. I disagree. Removing I Co from its position in the swale would expose the led horses to attack and expose the entire battalion position to attack from the eastern ridgeline. I doubt very much that a 2nd Lt. in his first fight would be operating on his own hook. If he moved off of Battle Ridge, it was because he was ordered to do so by his BC. Contrary to the views of most here, I do not believe C Co was moved down to Finley Ridge to support L Co's right flank. I believe C Co was sent to Finley Ridge (not Greasy Grass Ridge) to provide covering fire against hostiles located at the southern base of Calhoun Hill (an area often referred to as 'Henryville'). This model is supported by the research of Richard Fox who found a line of Springfield carbine bullets at this location that could only have come from Finley Ridge. Sending C Co down to Finley Ridge to clear out the base of Calhoun Hill was made after Keogh observed D Co arriving on the Weir peaks. To Keogh, the long awaited advance of Benteen's battalion had finally arrived and steps had to be taken to clear a path for his arrival and provide cover fire for his expected approach across Nye-Cartright Ridge. Or, alternatively, I Co came under direct attack in the swale before L Co collapsed. If this occurred, as I believe it did, then L Co would have attempted to move off to the swale (dismounted no less) to support Keogh in his death struggle to save their horses. L Co was, in effect, caught between a rock and a hard place. They had no choice but to abandon their position and move to support Keogh. I think the arrival of Weir on his peaks to the south is what caused Keogh to deploy C Co on Finley Ridge. This single act opened up his defense to an overwhelming attack by mounted hostile elements from first the western ravines (Lame White Man) then from the east (White Bull, Crazy Horse & Red Horse). The first attack hit C Co and caused Keogh to deploy all his skirmishers to the west of Battle Ridge. By doing so, it opened up the swale position (& the led horses) to attack from the east. garryowen, keogh |
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Post by montrose on Oct 11, 2010 7:49:07 GMT -5
Sidebar. Bluehorse got me thinking about inclusive and exclusive groups.
So in the interest of fairness, I think we need to recognize the other main theory on Custer's force. This is the theory that after Ford B the force was beaten back by Indians from the ford and routed from there. Custer and the two companies with him were trying to break out to the northeast when they ran headlong into enemy forces coming up from the other side, and were overrun.
Now in the military, when we have a mission, we brief our proposal to our boss for approval. It is customary to provide no less than three courses of action (COA's). It is also customary to toss out at least one straw man COA, something so flimsy it will easily fail. At the end of the day, you want the boss to pick the same COA that you did, and it kinda sucks when he picks another, since you and your folks are likely cheating and already preparing for COA 2. (Most ODAs I have seen briefback use COA 1 and COA 3 as the throwaways).
So here is my dilemma. I see this theory as a straw man theory. I can't find a way to match known facts to what I think would be a reasonable response to LTC Custer and his commanders.
But because people do believe this theory, I think we should encourage those folks to post here.
So now Custer with E and F are repulsed at Ford B. Keough moves from Nye Cartwright to Calhoun, or was already there in support of Ford B attack.
Custer either retreats under pressure to Calhoun Hill, or realizing that position is not tenable heads to LSH.
Now here is my challenge to the usual suspects, meaning Keough, Conz, Fred. Don't blow holes in this theory. Trying not to stray too far from known facts (Testimony, archeology, body locations, Goldin); try to develop a supporting theory for this scenario. Many smart people did belive some version of this theory to be true.
It is my own opinion that the work of Fox and Scott have pretty much beaten this to death, but give the devil his due.
very respectfully(v/r)
William
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Post by Melani on Oct 11, 2010 9:22:40 GMT -5
Having at this point in my life spent many hours sitting in Keogh's swale (my preferred trail guide station), there is no way I can imagine that Keogh himself was staying down there with his troop--it's positively claustrophobic, you can't see anything. But it would be the perfect place for held horses. My question is, at what point was Keogh hit? His knee wound would have been incapacitating but not fatal, and he would no longer have been able to stay on a horse, but could have still been capable of command. Since the bullet that hit his knee apparently went through the horse, it's possible Comanche was down anyway. If he was hit while on the ridge (where he could see what was going on), I think it would be logical for him to have been taken down to the swale.
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Post by bluehorse on Oct 11, 2010 17:18:36 GMT -5
Montrose,
For many years I felt sure that people were tending to ignoring a great deal of Indian testimony that appeared to indicate that Custer was driven back from ford B with a growing degree of confusion and disintegration amongst his command as they passed through the Calhoun and Keogh areas until they were finally wiped out on LSH. If one was to read the accounts of men like Bob Tail Horse and others who were at the ford, this certainly seemed to be the way they were telling it. But as we all know, the problem with Indian testimony is how little of what we read today is the way they actually told it in the first place. Apart from a natural caution many of them must have practiced when telling the erstwhile enemy what they may have done themselves, much of the colorful language they may have used was compressed for white ears, so all we have are the biggest, boldest headlines. For me these headlines fall apart when one looks at who died where. If Custers force was as jumbled up and confused as their stories seemed to imply, why are there no bodies of either men and horses from E or F companies, let alone officers or members of head quarters scattered over and around the Calhoun and Keogh areas? If nothing else this should tell the last remaining sceptics that they are not there because they were off elsewhere when this particular part of the battle took place.
I don't doubt that some of those at the ford thought that what they were witnessing was indeed a confused retreat, and that given what eventually followed they naturally thought that the scatter of dead was all part and parcel of that first imagined repulse. But the fact is there were simply not enough Indians present during that early stage who were in a position to effect this outcome, so as far as I'm concerned that particular theory had to go into the waste bin.
Having said that the ford D excursions seem somewhat confused and inconclusive to say the least. I would still argue that given that the number of Indian accounts that fit action in this area seem to be pretty thin on the ground, we are consequently almost completely reliant on John Stands in Timbers accounts to verify this movement and it's immediate aftermath. Likewise the evidence on the ground, for although there are those that say that there is plenty of material evidence scattered around, I have to say that it doesn't feel very conclusive to me.
On balance I do think that Custer did at least move North and west to check out one, or maybe both ford Ds, { bc, I'd love to know what evidence there was or is, that Custer actually crossed to the West side of the river,} but my current thinking is that he was forced to cut this excursion short due to the developing situation back on Calhoun Hill. On his way back well, the various movements that are currently being argued about--movements to or from Deep Ravine or into the Basin and so on, seem to me to argue for a more stable situation than the one I envisage, but all this is up for grabs.
Bluehorse
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Post by bc on Oct 11, 2010 18:09:53 GMT -5
Montrose, For many years I felt sure that people were tending to ignoring a great deal of Indian testimony that appeared to indicate that Custer was driven back from ford B with a growing degree of confusion and disintegration amongst his command as they passed through the Calhoun and Keogh areas until they were finally wiped out on LSH. If one was to read the accounts of men like Bob Tail Horse and others who were at the ford, this certainly seemed to be the way they were telling it. But as we all know, the problem with Indian testimony is how little of what we read today is the way they actually told it in the first place. Apart from a natural caution many of them must have practiced when telling the erstwhile enemy what they may have done themselves, much of the colorful language they may have used was compressed for white ears, so all we have are the biggest, boldest headlines. For me these headlines fall apart when one looks at who died where. If Custers force was as jumbled up and confused as their stories seemed to imply, why are there no bodies of either men and horses from E or F companies, let alone officers or members of head quarters scattered over and around the Calhoun and Keogh areas? If nothing else this should tell the last remaining sceptics that they are not there because they were off elsewhere when this particular part of the battle took place. I don't doubt that some of those at the ford thought that what they were witnessing was indeed a confused retreat, and that given what eventually followed they naturally thought that the scatter of dead was all part and parcel of that first imagined repulse. But the fact is there were simply not enough Indians present during that early stage who were in a position to effect this outcome, so as far as I'm concerned that particular theory had to go into the waste bin. Having said that the ford D excursions seem somewhat confused and inconclusive to say the least. I would still argue that given that the number of Indian accounts that fit action in this area seem to be pretty thin on the ground, we are consequently almost completely reliant on John Stands in Timbers accounts to verify this movement and it's immediate aftermath. Likewise the evidence on the ground, for although there are those that say that there is plenty of material evidence scattered around, I have to say that it doesn't feel very conclusive to me. On balance I do think that Custer did at least move North and west to check out one, or maybe both ford Ds, { bc, I'd love to know what evidence there was or is, that Custer actually crossed to the West side of the river,} but my current thinking is that he was forced to cut this excursion short due to the developing situation back on Calhoun Hill. On his way back well, the various movements that are currently being argued about--movements to or from Deep Ravine or into the Basin and so on, seem to me to argue for a more stable situation than the one I envisage, but all this is up for grabs. Bluehorse Bluehorse: The evidence is Girard's testimony based upon his 29 years of following signs and being among the NAs. He saw shod tracks of a monted column lead up to one ford and veer away. He followed the tracks and said they crossed. I assume he saw shod tracks lead down one river bank and come out the other side. Godfrey, I believe, or maybe it was Edgerly or Maguire, found tracks that approached what I believe is ford B and then veered away. Is Girard talking about the same set of tracks that veer away? I don't know. Likewise, is Girard talking about an attempt at MTF/ford B and they moved over and crossed at the Realbird fords or thereabouts. From reading his testimony, I don't get the impression that he was talking about 3 miles between but you never know. I didn't get to question him. I don't know if he has any later accounts that clarify whaT He saw. Guess I'll check my reference book by Highplainsrancher. bc |
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Post by bandboxtroop on Oct 11, 2010 22:31:09 GMT -5
Keough I agree with you on that Porter did not die with his troop. But I suggest he was the one officer that was fleeing and was shot off his saddle(not the officer who shot himself) Porters jacket had a bullhole passing from back to front through the heart area according to Paulding who found it in the village. As you say he may have been one of the mounted guys who ran down towards Deep Ravine , and was shot from behind.
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Post by on Oct 12, 2010 9:40:02 GMT -5
More excellent comments by Bill...some further considerations... Keogh's staff would go where Keogh goes. As an impromptu battalion commander, what do you think Keogh's staff consisted of? Certainly a striker, probably Keogh's personal one from I Co when he was commander there. Perhaps a messenger. And while a battalion might assign an adjutant, I can see a Major having one, but not sure a Captain battalion commander would warrant one. So maybe three riders for Keogh's battalion headquarters element? That is certainly a possible, and plausible, model. The difficulty with this one is explaining the C Co bodies scattered so far down Calhoun Coulee toward its mouth, but any company that gets overrun and dispersed with have bodies all over the place, so this doesn't negate that model...it is just a contra-indicator. I agree with this. I'll add that perhaps L Co was also responding to a rally bugle call from Custer Hill, F Co and 7th HQ finally getting up there and setting up to support Keogh's battalion. So we must allow that perhaps Calhoun was ordered to move off Calhoun Hill towards the north. That is very possible, and Wier's apprearance at about this time is a good indicator that it may have triggered Keogh to order such a move. Clair |
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Post by on Oct 12, 2010 9:47:00 GMT -5
So in the interest of fairness, I think we need to recognize the other main theory on Custer's force. This is the theory that after Ford B the force was beaten back by Indians from the ford and routed from there. Custer and the two companies with him were trying to break out to the northeast when they ran headlong into enemy forces coming up from the other side, and were overrun. A possible model, of course, but the main contra-indicator to this is Custer's expressed knowledge that you never try to outrun Warriors trying to run you down...you turn and face them. It is your only chance. I fully agree. All "possible" models/theories should be explored, even if some feel that they are not "plausible." There is value in the examination. Just lay out what indicators support your model, and what indicators contradict it, and why you support that model (or other's support it, if you are describing someone else's, not your own belief). Yeah...I think you can make a case for it. Clair |
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Post by on Oct 12, 2010 9:52:40 GMT -5
bc,
The biggest trick to interpreting Warrior statements, I think, is trying to understand that person's vantage point, situationally, at the time. If they are fighting Keogh on Calhoun Hill, for example, they may speak as if Custer's whole force is there, not realizing that Yates' battalion is off to the north out of sight.
We have, essentially, three "fire fights" on the Custer battlefield:
1) The ford B fight with Yates (some may think Keogh, but whomever is near the ford and on Butler's ridge).
2) The Keogh battalion fight around Calhoun Hill.
3) The Yates battalion fight around Custer Hill.
These are really three separate battles, and Warrior testimony usually refers to ONE of these fights as if it were the whole battle.
Clair
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Post by bc on Oct 12, 2010 10:21:49 GMT -5
bc, The biggest trick to interpreting Warrior statements, I think, is trying to understand that person's vantage point, situationally, at the time. If they are fighting Keogh on Calhoun Hill, for example, they may speak as if Custer's whole force is there, not realizing that Yates' battalion is off to the north out of sight. We have, essentially, three "fire fights" on the Custer battlefield: 1) The ford B fight with Yates (some may think Keogh, but whomever is near the ford and on Butler's ridge). 2) The Keogh battalion fight around Calhoun Hill. 3) The Yates battalion fight around Custer Hill. These are really three separate battles, and Warrior testimony usually refers to ONE of these fights as if it were the whole battle. Clair When parsing NA reports (I won't call theirs as testimony since they weren't under oath at a court proceeding) we have to look at other fights as well. Your 3 plus, Luce/Nye/Cartwright ridge fight, the C co. charge fight, the E co. fight at deep ravine, the D fords fight, the south skirmish line, D fords to Cemetery Hill area, battle ridge fight, and the Keogh swale fight. All 11 of those places had some warrior/trooper interaction that have to be considered. Some of those happened simoltaneously or in quick succession. We really have to pin down the route taken by each participant. Perhaps we need a thread for each NA chief such as Gall and Lame White Man, and so on to trace their route. I believe we have one on Crazy Horse which hasn't reached a logical conclusion. Did CH ever return to his village from the Reno fight for instance? bc |
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Post by on Oct 12, 2010 10:29:14 GMT -5
I'm not sure we can do much better than Michno, in Lakota Noon...perhaps amend to that where we think he misplaced/misinterpreted a Warrior account.
Clair
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